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ABSTRACT 
Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) was brought up in circles of 
Lutheran piety, and looked for the meeting point of 
academic theology and religious experience. Deeply 
influenced by mystics like Eckhart, he sought a solution 
with the help of the philosopher Kant, the theologian 
Schleiermacher, and the psychologist William James. 
He found the locus of encounter with the numinous within 
the human heart (Gemtit), thus proposing humanity as the 
starting point for the study of religion without reducing 
it to psychology or denying its reality as transcendent. 
More recent studies of children's transcendent experiences 
make it impossible to draw a line between those that are 
religious and secular ones, a state of affairs implied by 
the call in the Education Act for 'spiritual development.' 
A neutral stance is needed for the study of religion in a 
secular context, e.g. religious education in Britain, yet 
without denying its validity as religion. 
A new understanding of Otto's 'schematisation' discloses 
the relation between rational and non-rational, as well as 
that between the numinous in essence and its 
manifestations. Recent interest in Experiential R.E. makes 
the application of Otto's approach timely, but 
schematisation rightly applied also offers a dialogical 
wholeness to all aspects of R.E. 
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A note on references and abbreviations 
Where texts are available in English and in German I have 
usually given double references, using the editions listed in 
the Bibliography and abbreviated titles as shown below. The 
page number appears exactly as in the text, either in Hindo-
Arabic or Roman numerals, and these either large or small as 
in the work referred to. In references to works printed in 
numbered columns, e.g. Die Christliche Welt, the number 
refers to the column. To achieve a more accurate reference 
on the page (or column), I have used the letters a, band c 
after the page number, denoting roughly the top third, middle 
third, or bottom third of the printed page. But on a page of 
two columns which are not each numbered, the page is divided 
into quarters, using a and b for the first column, c and d 
for the second. In the case of Pfeiffer (1857 & 1962) each 
page has numbered lines, so the reference is to page followed 
by line numbers. 
In quoting excerpts from texts, I have followed the spelling 
used (unless otherwise stated). Thus texts from Eckhart and 
from Pfeiffer do not use capital letters to begin 
substantives as in modern German, and texts from American 
writers, such as William James and Crouter's translation of 
Schleiermacher's Reden, have American spellings (e.g. center 
for centre). The same applies to the "-ize" ending for words 
which I myself always spell with "-ise". 
Abbreviations have been used for Otto's works frequently 
cited, and for other works which are used in particular 
sections, as well as for well-known journals. Otherwise 
books and articles are referred to by author and date and can 
be found in the Bibliography. In all cases the edition being 
referred to is noted for ease of reference. 
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DH Das Heilige (1st ed. Breslau 1917). page refs are to 
the 1987 edition, Mlinchen. ET=IH. 
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T6pelmann, 1932 
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Key Stages in Education 
Since 1988 the letters KS for Key Stage have been used to 
indicate age phases in schools. 
This works as follows: 
Key Stage 1 covers Reception, Year 1 and Year 2 
(up to age 7-8) 
Key Stage 2 covers Years 3, 4 and 5 (up to age 11+) 
Key Stage 3 covers Years 6' 7 and 8 (up to age 14) 
Key Stage 4 covers Years 9 and 10 (up to GCSE) 
Key Stage 5 covers Years 11-13 of full-time education in 
school (ages 16-19) 
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PREFACE 
I first read Otto's Idea of the Holy as a student, and the 
impression it made remained deep below the surface of my 
daily consciousness. Some years later, shortly after 
returning from four years in Africa, I was asked to teach 
World Religions to student-teachers. It was clear to me that 
if the course was to be more than a parade of outlandish 
religious phenomena, if it was to have any real religious 
meaning, I needed help. So I consul ted Professor Harold 
Turner, then in the Department of Religion at the University 
of Leicester. He advised me that Otto's book would give a 
sound basis, and I have been grateful ever since. 
The purpose of this thesis is in part to explain why this is 
so, a need made all the more topical both by the widespread 
use of world religions in our schools, a growing use of 
philosophical reasoning, and most especially the spread of 
experiential methods in R.E. over the last few years in some 
of our classrooms. These strands, not to mention other 
traditional approaches still needed and still in use, can 
reduce R.E. to a jumble of loose threads if they are not held 
together. It is my belief that Otto's work provides in depth 
the single integrative factor which is the true basis for the 
study of religion. 
In preparing this thesis I have had a great deal of help from 
no less than three Supervisors in the Durham Department of 
Theology. I am grateful to all of them. The first was 
Professor Richard Roberts, the second Professor Dan Hardy, 
and the third Professor David Brown. Each has stimulated me 
to new thoughts, ideas and connections, and most of what is 
worthwhile in this thesis derives from one or other of them, 
or perhaps from the combination. 
viii 
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INTRODUCTION 
Those who read The Idea of the Holy find it a moving book. 
It seems to speak to something deep in their experience and 
gives an intimation of something mysteriously important to 
which they have given too little attention. But, apart from 
a gut feeling hard to put into words, what stays in the 
memory is the wealth of examples from a spread of Eastern and 
Western religions. Surprisingly few of those impressed by 
this book go on to other books by Rudolf Otto. 
But although affected at a psychological level, few see the 
intimate connection between these feelings and their rational 
thought. Yet to demonstrate this connection had been the 
author's main purpose. Readers accept that they are touched 
in mind and spirit (Geist), and even the notion of an 
encounter with the Numinous in the depth of the soul 
(Seelengrund) finds echoes, but the sections on philosophy 
they either skim through quickly with little grasp, or skip 
altogether. In this way they miss the main message. 
The almost world-wide acclaim which greeted this book at the 
end of the Great War proves it met certain needs. Now, 
almost eighty years later, a new consideration of what Otto 
is said is needed, and this from an unexpected quarter. The 
teaching of religion in schools in Britain is moving strongly 
in favour of Experiential R.E. and stressing pupil-response. 
If this trend is to result in more than personal and social 
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education with a psychological slant (and the risks that go 
with it), a strongly integrated rationale is needed to link 
it with traditional religions, with reasoning about religious 
questions, and with ethical aspects of religion. This 
rationale is itself religious, but in a non-confessional 
sense, and is the meeting place which underlies almost all 
Otto's work. 
This is the project to be developed in this Thesis. A brief 
presentation of Otto and an outline of his message is 
followed by some of the main objections to his theory. These 
remain classic and can be brought against experiential R.E. 
also by anyone whose starting point is dogmatic. This is the 
field of Chapter One. The next two chapters discuss Otto's 
work more systematically. In Chapter Two his main 
publications are discussed with a view to establishing a 
consistency, and especially the consistency between his 
phenomenology and his philosophical underpinning of it. This 
covers the whole of his scholarly life. The next chapter. 
Chapter Three, investigates sources for his thinking by 
considering six writers known to have influenced him. 
Otto tried to establish a distinction between religious and 
non-religious experience at the level of phenomena. 
Consideration of transcendent experiences of various kinds in 
Chapter Four makes a clear distinction doubtful, but at the 
same time offers a valuable no·n-confess ional framework within 
which to build R.E. and spiritual development as required in 
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the 1988 Education Act. How this can be done is the subject 
of Chapter Five, which argues in particular for a practical 
application of Otto's theory (or theories) of schematisation. 
Conclusions follow in Chapter Six. 
The whole study is offered both to establish Otto as a 
consistent and fruitful theologian and phenomenologist of 
religion, and at the same time to suggest how his thought can 
guide non-confessional R.E. in this country into the twenty-
flrst century. 
4 
CHAPTEH ONE: 
SETTING THE SCENE 
:ll..l Otto the man 
Hudolf Otto was born on the 25th September 1869 in Peine in 
Hanover, where his father Wilhelm Otto had a fur factory. He 
was the twelfth of thirteen children. In 1880 the family 
moved to Hildesheim and his father died soon after. He was 
brought up in the conservative traditions of Lutheran piety 
which persisted in Hanover, in spite of the efforts of 
Albrecht Hi tschl, who after the annexation of Hanover by 
Prussia in 1866, was appointed to help persuade the 
Hanoverian Lutherans to conform with the Prussian united 
church. 
Of his intellectual development while still at school Otto 
himself relates: 1 
The children argued with enthusiasm and feeling 
about God's having a Son, about accounts of 
creation, about Darwinism and cosmogenesis, and 
I longed for the time when I could study all 
these problems thoroughly. My childhood's wish 
had now become a resolve, with the approval of my 
family: I wanted to study theology. 
Even in Peine he had begun to learn Latin and Greek, and he 
found learning easy. He wrote of himself: "That is why I 
never became accustomed to strictly methodical work." 
Unfortunately this remained true to an extent throughout his 
scholarly life, and it gave fuel to his critics. There is 
often imprecision in the way he expresses himself, and this 
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makes it difficult to grasp what he really means. Yet it can 
also be claimed that the matter he was dealing with required 
a certain imprecision, and where fluidity of thought is not 
merely the effect of ignorance or laziness it can give rise 
to innovative and lateral thinking. This difficulty goes to 
the centre of his work on the holy. 
The young Otto and his fellow pupils argued about evolution, 
about different kinds of religion, though Catholic and 
Protestant were the only varieties available for direct 
observation, and the apparent mismatch between the evidences 
of science and the traditional teachings of religion. This 
mismatch also depends on a difference of method: the one 
deductive, drawn from revelation, and the other inductive, 
dependent on the many-sided world around. Schleiermacher 
referred to this when he spoke of "an eternally prolonged 
play of opposing forces" 2. But for Schleiermacher, as is 
shown in Chapter Three, the two 'opposing forces' were to be 
held together in tension, the one starting from the phenomena 
of the periphery to work towards the centre, the other 
beginning with the essence and evaluating and assessing the 
phenomena in its light. 
But it is clearly not satisfactory if two different methods 
lead to two mutually incompatible bodies of knowledge, and 
Otto wanted to find a consistent position which would not 
require either the absoluteness of spirit at the expense of 
science or the invincibility of materialism at the cost of 
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feeling, piety and the affections. He wanted to convince 
himself and others that a thoroughly reasoned world-view was 
not the antithesis of the feelings he found at the heart of 
religion. This is a problem not just for religion versus 
natural science, but a problem within religion itself. One 
of the key issues, and one which was seized on by some of his 
critics3 , is whether the evidences in religion begin with 
divine revelation or with human experience. Something of 
this problem for Otto can be seen even in the title of his 
doctoral work. 
On the 9th July 1898 Otto defended eighteen theses on the 
subject of the Spirit, the first of which was: "The Ruach 
Jahweh is neither a clearly defin~d nor a unitary concept. 
On the one hand it is represented as divine influence on the 
inner life of men, especially in prophetic enthusiasm, 
resulting in religious-moral actions and characteristics, 
leading in short to spiritual riches. On the other hand it 
is divine, creative energy, both the principle of life in 
creatures and divine power and immanence in the world. "4 And 
in the same year he published his first book, Die Anschauung 
vom heiligen Geist bei Luther (AHG). From these it can be 
seen that the action of the Holy Spirit was for him a 
starting point. After this followed a series of books and 
articles which quickly brought him fame as a rising 
theologian of considerable ability. The enormous breadth of 
his reading, his knowledge of languages, his youthful studies 
of music and art, enabled him to write competently on topics 
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as diverse as theology, psychology, aesthetics, biology, 
philosophy, ethics and Indian religions. It was inevitable 
perhaps that he would be criticised as overstretched and 
inconsistent. Yet there is little doubt that he saw himself 
as entirely consistent, and his subject, religion in human 
experience, as something too important to be confined to a 
single specialist field. 
His academic posts included first Privatdozent then extra-to-
the-faculty professor at Gottingen till he was appointed full 
professor at Breslau in 1914. In 1917 he transferred as 
professor to Marburg where he remained till the end of his 
life in March 1937. Recurrent illness, in fact malaria, 
forced him to take early retirement in 1928, a year after he 
had had the honour of giving the university address on the 
occasion of the 400th anniversary of Marburg's foundation5. 
Here he continued to receive many visitors, some of them 
students, some already distinguished scholars, entertaining 
them in his home or going with them on the walks he so much 
enjoyed in the open country round about. 
Yet his activities were never confined to academic matters. 
In addition to his travels to England, Greece, USA, North 
Africa and the Near East, and his two great far-Eastern 
journeys of 1911-2 and 1927-8, all of which contributed 
directly and indirectly to his teaching and his writing, he 
took an active part in social matters. From 1913 he was a 
member of the Prussian Parliament until its abolition in 
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1918. Karl Ktissner records his concern for a just and 
sharing social structure6. These include proposals for adult 
education within the Church after the Great War, and other 
publications testify to his plans for reforming Protestant 
worship7 , suggestions that Otto had put into practice in one 
of the Marburg chapels. He founded the Religious League for 
Mankind (Religioser Menschheitsbund) 8 apparently on the model 
of the League of Nations in which the sincerely committed of 
all faiths would unite for world peace. His collection of 
religious cult objects from all over the world began with his 
travels, and in the 1920s he established the 
Religionskundliche Sammlung at Marburg which continues to 
grow and to attract students of religion. 
Insofar as it may be possible to look into his personal 
motivation, it seems that two different and often opposed 
strands of religion occupied him. One is academic theology 
including especially philosophical theology, and the other is 
the experience of worship. Otto came to the experience of 
faithful worship through his upbringing in pietistic circles 
of the Hanoverian Lutheran tradition. In his farewell 
address on the occasion of his early retirement from Marburg 
in 1928 he described himself as a "pietistic Lutheran." 9 
Most people who have read Das Heilige (DH) know that "the 
holy" is for Otto the key term in religion. It is tempting 
to link this with his experience at Passover in 1911 in a 
little synagogue in Mogador which he wrote up for Christliche 
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Welt, and Peter McKenzie has translated as follows: 
It is Sabbath, and already in the dark and 
inconceivably grimy passage of the house we hear 
the sing-song of prayers and reading of 
scripture, that nasal half-singing half-speaking 
which Church and Mosque have taken over from the 
Synagogue. The sound is pleasant, one can soon 
distinguish certain modulations and cadences that 
follow one another at regular intervals, like 
Leitmotive. The ear tries to grasp individual 
words but it is scarcely possible and one has 
almost given up when the attempt when suddenly 
out of the babel of voices, causing a thrill of 
fear, there it begins, unified, clear and 
unmistakable: Kadosh Kadosh Kadosh Elohim Adonai 
Zebaoth Male'u hashamayim wahaarets kebodo! 
(Holy, holy, holy, Lord God of hosts, the heavens 
and the earth are full of thy glory). 
I have heard the Sanctus Sanctus Sanctus of the 
cardinals in StPeter's, the Swiat Swiat Swiat in 
the Cathedral of the Kremlin the Holy Holy Holy 
of the Patriarch in Jerusalem. In whatever 
language they resound, these most exalted words 
that have ever come from human lips always grip 
one in the depths of the soul, with a mighty 
shudder exciting and calling into play the 
mystery of the other world latent therein. And 
this more than anywhere else here in this modest 
place, where they resound in the same tongue in 
which Isaiah first received them and from the 
lips of the people whose first inheritance they 
were . 10 
9 
But for Otto it had begun much earlier, and he grew to 
understand the numinous during his period of work on 
Luther11 . 
Das Heilige is not only his best-known book, translated into 
seven languages and still in print in English and German, but 
it also marks a turning point in German theology. While the 
open kind of religious phenomenology which this book helped 
to promote continued to spread in other parts of the world, 
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especially in English-speaking countries 12 , the end of the 
Great War brought in a tremendous change in Germany13 . This 
was as clear in the universities as in other aspects of life, 
but even to sketch the changes would be outside the scope of 
the present enterprise. It must be enough to point the 
fundamental contrast between two books which appeared at 
almost the same time, Otto's Das Heilige (1917) and Barth's 
Romerbrief ( 1919) . Both books emphasised the crucial role of 
experience, but whereas Otto seemed still within liberal 
Protestantism by making use of the manifestations of religion 
and of various religions, Barth and his followers shut the 
door to all that by claiming exclusive value for revelation 
and revelation alone, and that, only insofar as the 
individual is challenged by the Christian gospel. All other 
religion was for Barthians nothing but human invention and of 
negligible value. This absolute claim caught the theological 
mood of the 1920s and 1930s. 
Those who came to Marburg to meet Otto and hear him speak 
were from America, Britain, ijolland, Sweden, Japan and 
several other countries. It is true also that while he lived 
a certain aura surrounded him and was reflected in his 
Geisterkinder14 , but with the rising German-speaking 
theologians, Barth, Bultmann, and E. Brunner, the scene had 
changed. Within his own country even today he is hardly 
read, and the theological current in the inter-war years was 
running against him and what he stood for. 
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Ernst Benz describes Otto as one of the foremost scholars in 
religious studies {religionsgeschichtliche Forschung) at the 
beginning of the century, but the collapse of the German 
nation and empire, and with it the cultural protestantism it 
had supported, brought in dialectical theology and criticism 
of those many theologians who had supported the war 15 . Otto, 
now weakened by illness, had little stomach for the struggle, 
and when Benz came to Marburg as a student in 1935, he found 
the situation as follows: 
Beside the small number of his pupils stood a 
group of students, who in loud voices and with 
youthful oversimplification represented 
Barthianism. They were excited by Bultmann' s 
theology and existentialism, and missed no 
opportunity to pour ridicule on the thought of 
Rudolf Otto . . and to make jokes a,bout the 
collection of religious artefacts he had founded, 
calling it a temple of idols. (Benz 1971, 32-3) 
Bultmann had been a colleague and friend of Otto at Breslau 
before 1917, but after first Otto, then Bultmann came to 
Marburg the friendship cooled. 
Barth can speak for himself, and wrote of a recent visit to 
Mar burg as follows in an open letter (Rundbrief) addressed to 
"Liebe BrUder und Schwestern an allen Orten!" 
On Sunday I visited Bultmann, who spoke well and 
openly about New Testament matters. . Rudolf 
Otto, stretched out on a divan like a regular 
Indian raja giving audience, suffers from 
malaria, which is a pity, but no doubt a 
punishment for his secret betrayal of 
Christianity to oriental no-gooders. (Letter 26th 
February 1922) 16 . 
Chapter One 12 
1. 2 Otto • s book "The Idea of the Holy" 17 
DH is best known for Otto's depiction of the unseen power as 
Mysterium tremendum et fascinans. After arguing that 
religious ideas and concepts belong to the sphere of the 
rational, Otto asserts that religious experience demonstrates 
something more. Beyond terms and concepts there is an 
overplus ( IH 5c; DH 5c) . This is real but not rational. 
Otto coins a name for it: it is the Numinous (IH 6c-7a; DH 
6c-7a). Because it is beyond description, it cannot be 
analysed, yet its effect on the human psyche is so unique 
that the characteristics of this effect can be discussed. 
The numinous casts its shadow on the psyche (no obvious 
reference to the parable of Plato's philosophers' cave) and 
the description that follows is therefore a description of 
human experience, specifically human religious experience. 
Otto begins his description by wanting to go beyond 
Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute dependence." (IH 9; DH 
9) Otto calls this the "creature feeling." One aspect of 
this is dread or awe at the overpowering might of the 
Numinous. The human response is tremor, whereby this aspect 
is called tremendum. At the same time there is a compulsive 
attraction, feelings of love and gratitude. Beneath all 
these responses is a sense of mystery, that the Numinous is 
in essence unknowable. This is the mysterium and the human 
response to this aspect Otto calls stupor. From these 
different moments comes the formula mysterium tremendum et 
fascinans. 
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Thus an outline description of the numinous is obtained by 
examination of the response of the human soul or mind. This 
0 
method means beginning with the human, but bringing to 
consciousness something much more absolute and fundamental. 
The phenomena reveal that which is discovered in experience 
but in reality is not dependent on human experience. This is 
an important distinction which is central to any vindication 
of Otto against those who accuse him of psychologism. 
For this analysis the human response is cardinal. At first 
the data for analysis are the effects of a numinous encounter 
in spontaneous expression. The obvious fact that under 
examination the expression ceases to be spontaneous is a 
well-known area of difficulty which affects all attempts to 
discuss religious experience or analogous experience in non-
religious contexts 18 . Putting the response into words is a 
second-order expression, as too are expressions of the 
numinous in music or art. In fact there are very numerous 
examples of such religious phenomena, many of which are 
worked over, have been ritualised and can hardly be called 
spontaneous in any degree. But all contribute to an attitude 
which is found in all religions. It can be said that the 
music, words and artefacts are at an extended level attempts 
to reconstruct or relive an encounter with the Holy, although 
this is not to deny the immediacy and near-spontaneity of 
some of them. These reconstructions have a further result in 
that they help prepare for a new or renewed experience. For 
some people their first religious experience may take place 
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against such a background. 
One of the charges Otto faces, and especially in connection 
with DH, is that of immersing himself in too many disciplines 
and being unable therefore to make sense of any of them. But 
from his own point of view, the dominant theme of his vision 
is unity. Truth in all fields must be one, and only on the 
basis of ultimate truth and consistency is it possible to 
make sense of human experience. This is Otto's starting 
point and his goal. 
Shortly after Otto's death in 1937, his friend and colleague 
Theodor Siegfried (1938) began an article on him as follows: 
Rudolf Otto has left neither a complete 
philosophy of religion nor a polished dogmatic 
system. This is typical of the man whose thought 
constantly moved between two areas, with the 
result that his interests in the philosophy of 
religion made an explicitly theological claim, 
and his theology had a philosophically 
critical stamp. The borders of different 
disciplines pale in the face of an elementary and 
human wrestling for the truth, which in the last 
resort can only be single . 19 
Before he was forty Otto saw that theology could no longer be 
imposed from above. If religion is real it must relate to 
the world in which we live, and if human beings are religious 
and responsive to the promptings of the divine, then the 
study of religion must begin with the human. The last 
chapter of Kantisch-Fries' sche Religionsphilosophie (KFR) 
begins: 
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Now let us summarise the knowledge we have gained 
in our discussion of the beginnings of modern 
theology, as to its spirit, its duty, its 
relation to science in general, and to philosophy 
in particular. 
1. The old theology was a metaphysic about God, 
Man, World, and their relations, drawn from 
reason and revelation. Religion itself would 
prefer a narration of the deeds of God. Modern 
theology proposes, as a task that can be 
performed, something less than the latter, 
something different from the scope of the former. 
Modern Theology is a Science of Religion; 
Christian Theology a Science of the Christian 
Religion. 
2. The Science of Religion is not a description 
of religions, just as jurisprudence is not a 
description of existing law or of law in general . 
. The science of religion searches for the 
validity of religion and for religion that is 
valid. It may not return to supernatural 
standards (for historico-cri tical reasons and for 
reasons in religion itself); its procedure must 
therefore be identical with that of moral 
science, jurisprudence, and all sciences of the 
mind in general. They are all forced to apply 
themselves to an examination of the rational-
intellectual nature of the human spirit, to a 
criticism of reason and anthropology; they must 
ascertain with precision what Spirit (Geist) is, 
and its kinds; what the Mind and Spirit (Geist 
for both) are capable of as regards activity, 
experience, expression, expression in various 
directions; in this way they are to obtain the 
general concept ion of science, of ethics, of 
aesthetics, of religion, of religious experience. 
(PR 222a-223a: KFR 192b-193b) 
In starting the study of religion with an examination of the 
human mind and spirit (Geist), Otto does not confine religion 
to human experience. He needs to establish a secure 
reference point which is acceptable to rational thought in 
philosophy, and he sets out to follow Kant in researching the 
limits of human reason and beyond. In DH he announces that 
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he is to examine human religious experience, but the 
reference beyond the subjective to the absolute is essential, 
for this is experience of something, something that is 
directly apprehended as the grace and power of the divine. 
In his first publication, Die Anschauung vom heiligen Geist 
bei Luther of 1898, the divine power is manifested in the 
work of the Holy Spirit in the believer, but by the time he 
wrote DH Otto has broadened this to take in religious 
experience in all religions and cultures, whether it · is 
perceived as relationship to God or to unseen powers of any 
sort. The point at issue is that "experience" - in a sense 
to be examined later in relation to "feeling" and "intuition" 
- means for Otto direct contact between the human and the 
reality of the transcendent. This then is the starting 
point. Divine power is not deduced or inferred at the end of 
a chain of reasoning. This is central to the argument of DH. 
It is widely recognised that DH combines phenomenology and 
psychology. But Otto set out to demonstrate the reality of 
divine power in and through the life of the world. This goes 
beyond psychology to involve philosophical argument in the 
fields of epistemology (how we know things) and ontology 
(what really exists). According to some scholars, Otto 
sought to go beyond the mere description of religious 
experience and wanted to produce it in his readers 20 . Poland 
sees DH as a religious book, almost in the way that 
devotional books are religious, if that were appropriate to 
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the Numinous. Different scholars have evaluated his success 
in widely different ways. In his own estimation, one 
suspects, his achievement must stand or fall by this, not as 
a work of psychology but as a demonstration of the divine 
power active in and through human life. 
Otto has frequently been misunderstood. DH focusses 
attention on the non-rational, the phenomenological and the 
psychological. Yet he is at pains to stress that the holy is 
like a woven cloth in which rational and non-rational belong 
together as warp and weft. Neither can exist in religion 
without the other. The intimate relation between them is in 
fact crucial for Otto's thought. It is not satisfactory to 
accept his own suggestion (in the Author's Preface to the 
English edition of IH) that KFR deals with the rational, 
leaving DH to deal with the non-rational. In point of fact 
KFR depends on non-rational presentiment or Ahnung to bring 
the rational structure of reality into direct consciousness. 
Similarly, the many examples of religious phenomena in DH are 
seen as the occasion for revealing direct contact with the 
reality which is the holy, and the discussion of the holy as 
a category apriori is essential. Although DH is centrally 
about the non-rational, the separation is meant to be 
heuristic rather than ontological, and the many examples 
introduced to illustrate non-rational aspects must not be 
allowed exclusive possession. 
The place ~rom which the investigation of both these paths 
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begins - the philosophical-rational and the psychological-
empirical -is the human Geist (mind and spirit). This is 
only possible because human beings have a capacity for being 
made aware of the holy. This capacity or ill-defined 
recognition is not inborn; only the predisposition is inborn 
and it is the task of religious communication or religious 
education to stir, awaken, stimulate, and refine this 
predisposition (Anlage des Gemlites). This Anlage is 
envisaged as itself quite independent of the stimulus, just 
as the eye as an organ is quite independent of seeing. It is 
possible that Otto ontologised too much this predisposition, 
and this will be discussed later. At base, Otto's position 
is that this capacity is just there, in everyone: it cannot 
be deduced by reasoning, only called into play through use in 
personal experience. In this sense it lies beyond • pure 
reason,' although it is also an aspect of human reason in the 
deepest sense. 
To clarify this is to anticipate the fuller discussion in 
Chapter Two, but it may be helpful here just to set the 
scene. The Anlage which is open to the numinous plays a 
central role in Otto's thought. Its reality is bound up with 
Otto's claim to the priority of feeling in our knowledge of 
the holy. A number of passages in DH are significant, 
although they do not conclusively answer any question about 
what Otto thought the Anlage actually is. The chapter 
entitled "The Holy as an A Priori Category Part One" 21 has 
quite a lot to say, but Otto has not set out to answer our 
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specific question. 
And the only way we can throw any light upon the 
whole region of sub-human psychical life is by 
interpreting it once again as a sort of 
'predisposition' (Anlage) at a second remove, 
i.e. a predisposition to form the predispositions 
or faculties of the actual developed mind, and 
standing in relation to this as the embryo to the 
full-grown organism. But we are not completely 
in the dark as to the meaning of this word 
• predisposition'. For in our awakening and 
growth to spiritual maturity we trace in 
ourselves by some sort the evolution bywhich the 
seed develops into the tree - the very opposite 
of 'transformation' and 'epigenesis' by 
successive addition. We call the source of 
growth a hidden 'predisposition' of the human 
spirit, which awakens when aroused by divers 
excitations. That there are 'predispositions' of 
this sort in individuals no one can deny who has 
given serious study to the history of religion. 
They are seen as propensities, 'predestining' the 
individual to religion ... (IH 115; DH 140) 
19 
DH Kapitel 422 depends throughout on the analysis of 
specific feelings and the comparison of natural and numinous 
feelings. Here we find again Anlage and Anlage des Gemtites, 
and the metaphor of something which takes a reflection, or a 
screen which can register the shadow, tempts to a semi-
physical conception. (". numinous is reflected in the 
mind in terms of feeling" IH 12a; ". wird es angebbar nur ~~~--~~-=~~~~--~
sein durch die besondere Geftihlsreaktion die es im erlebenden 
Gemtite ausl6st." DH 13a) 
The existence of the Anlage as revealed by relevant activity, 
is parallel on the other side to the absolute reality of the 
unseen, the holy itself, who'se being is not inferred but 
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apprehended directly in human experience. Otto claims that 
the holy is a priori and the reality without which no human 
religious experience would be possible. To search out and go 
some way to clarify what this might mean is within the 
capacity of all. Once the human capacity is aroused, 
however, the predisposition becomes a search and an 
impulsion. (IH 116a, DH 14lc) 
Travels in Egypt, India and the Far East no doubt stimulated 
Otto's interest in non-rational expressions of religion, and 
greatly expanded his awareness of the non-rational as 
essential to all genuine religion, whether Christian or non-
Christian. His interest in Indian religion began therefore 
well before the publication of DH and the first edition 
(1917) contained just one illustration, the face of the 
goddess Durga of Bengal, and one appendix, Otto's own 
translation of the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavad-Gita. 
1.3 Current directions in R.E. 
(1) Teaching World Religions 
The teaching of a range of major world religions has been a 
feature of R.E. since the late 1960s. Impetus and direction 
were given to this by the Lancaster Project under Ninian 
Smart and Donald Horder 23 • Under the heading of 
phenomenology, the intention was to get pupils to take 
religion seriously by empathy with religious adherents and by 
examining and evaluating the evidence, much of which was all 
around them. But in spite of, or perhaps precisely because 
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of, the good material provided by the Project, the general 
mood was that world religions offered a chance for R.E. to 
prove itself as an empirical field of study. Many teachers 
failed to see the study of world religions as a religious 
question. It appeared at first to be in response to social 
strains with the arrival of large numbers of Muslims, Hindus 
and Sikhs and afterwards their school-age children. Soon the 
exotic character of unfamiliar practices gave new scope for 
exploring sight, sound, smell and taste, and made a change 
from the sterile methods of Bible learning previously in 
widespread use. All this was welcomed with enthusiasm by 
teachers and pupils alike. 
But this change of study material, which in many schools was 
pushed through with enthusiasm akin to a stampede of buffalo, 
brought with it the seeds of its own corruption. As social 
education it could be valuable if handled intelligently, but 
the religious basis was 
Even as multicultural 
ignored in a flurry of phenomena. 
education it could be vapid, 
representing religious and cultural practices as exotic 
behaviour indulged in for no obvious reason by strange groups 
who had little in common with normal British kids. The late 
inclusion of Christian symbolism, rites and festivals did 
nothing to allay the feeling that this was a kind of 3-D 
television tour among 
discuss the feelings 
society's eccentrics. Attempts to 
of religious adherents themselves 
bordered on voyeurism. Unles~ there is a clear sense that 
this is religion and unless the phenomena can be seen as 
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response to the meeting with the Holy within the human soul 
and mind, there is no anchorage in reality. The impression 
that religious practice is just a hobby which appeals to some 
people as a leisure activity is otherwise confirmed rather 
than challenged. 
In the 1960s it was sometimes claimed that teaching world 
religions would offer pupils a chance to choose "a faith to 
live by" 24 • But in many cases the effect has been the 
opposite of what was intended. If all religions are optional 
why indeed choose any of them? An appreciation of Otto's 
contribution to the study of religion will help to anchor 
religion in reality and at the centre of human experience. 
If R.E. is to consist of more than the assimilation of facts, 
then there must be acceptance and recognition of pupil-
attitude and pupil-response. Religion, like politics, 
demands a position on a scale of values, and, while R.E. does 
not demand the same kind of pupil commitment as is shown by 
many religious people, it must be seen that commitment is 
central to religion. Modern R.E. in theory at least 
recognises that pupils who are not given the opportunity to 
respond are being sold short. 
(2) Experiential Methods 
Recent work on teaching religion in the UK has shown more 
interest in personal response· and commitment. For example 
the teacher's guide How do I teach RE? 25 advocates three 
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components of R.E. at all levels. The area called 
"individual patterns of belief" is added to the two more 
familiar areas: the explicit which is the faith and tradition 
of living religions (here called "traditional belief 
systems"), and themes of "shared human experience" seen as 
ultimate questions which make up the implicit. "Individual 
patterns of belief" should be seen in the 1990s as "pupil-
response"26 and this is in a sense the engagement required 
for learning any subject. The book represents these three 
areas diagrammatically as wheels encompassed with a driving 
belt or series of belts: whichever wheel starts into motion 
must turn the others also. Thus the personal element has 
come to be seen as essential to modern R.E. 
Other attempts to express this threefold analysis of 
religious education appeared in the 1980s, for instance in 
the Durham Agreed Syllabus27 of 1982 which was arranged into 
Concepts, Skills and Attitudes. This seems to echo Kant's 
division of the human understanding (Vernunft) into pure 
reason (intellect); practical reason (morals); and 
aesthetics. Schleiermacher made much of this, and Otto's KFR 
is largely concerned with developing, as he thought, the 
Kantian system. William James also separates belief, action, 
and the will to believe, making these out to be three aspects 
of the human psyche - defined in various terms but referring 
respectively to intellect, morality and "the enthusiastic 
temper of espousal." 
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Since 1988 the Education Act requires schools to foster 
spiritual development. This is expressed as follows: 
the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and 
physical development of pupils at the school and 
of society28 
Even before the renewed commitment to "spiritual development" 
was called for in the British 1988 Education Act, religious 
educators have been turning attention to exercises and 
techniques for doing this. The Nottingham Project of David 
Hay has successfully tried out classroom exercises in 
meditation, creative imagination and non-conceptual 
communica t ion29 . This trend also needs underpinning from 
Otto, whose work has much to contribute to the growth of 
interest on the affective in R.E, because it can be 
dangerously vague unless in the educator's mind at least it 
has been soundly based in theory. Renewed study of Otto can 
meet this need, especially as the central doctrine of DH is 
the integration of rational and non-rational as warp and 
weft, which represents the essential belonging together of 
concepts, skills and attitudes in R.E. 
It should be added that interest in religious experience as 
a possible approach for education began in 1969 with Sir 
Alister Hardy and the Religious Experience Research Unit he 
set up30 . Interesting as these accounts of childhood 
religious and nature mystical experiences were, the essays in 
analysis never seemed to be b~sed on any theory the scholar 
could get to grips with. 
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(3) The Need to make Progress 
Just as it seems difficult to fit spontaneous religious 
experience into a syllabus, for much the same reasons it 
seems difficult to analyse pupils' response into a kind of 
scale of progression. Yet any plan for a teaching programme 
whether over a year or over the whole school career, i.e. 
from ages five to sixteen, would seem to require development. 
The teacher needs to know when progress is being made, 
whether stages need to be reinforced or repeated, and the 
public too, particularly parents, have a right to know what 
their children are learning. As this is quite a new feature 
of experiential R.E. and one which this thesis is intended to 
promote drawing on the development of certain ideas of Rudolf 
Otto, discussion is better left to a later chapter, 
(4) Using the Phenomena to Communicate 
For the last twenty-five years R.E. has drawn on the 
phenomena of world religions to communicate certain ideas, 
emotions and forms of understanding. One of the aims of this 
thesis is to show how the work of Rudolf Otto can contribute 
to this in a particular way through the application of his 
schematisation, and for this reason a fuller discussion 
belongs first in Chapter Two (section 2.6.2) and later in 
Chapter Five (section 5.4). 
The nineteenth century controversy between science and 
religion, which was strongest in English-speaking countries, 
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still lingers on in a number of schools. The attitudes to 
evolutionism and to Darwinism (as opposed to the evidence for 
and theory of evolution put forward by Darwin and serious 
researchers) prompted Otto in the ftrst decade of the 
twentieth century to champion the reality of religion. In his 
book Naturalistische und religiose Weltansicht (NRW) and an 
article "Darwin and Darwinism" which was republished with 
minor revisions twice more. he stood for the integration of 
religious values and religious truths with the reality of 
human life, and against the suggestion that religion and 
natural science were equally valid but had no meeting points 
- a theory that usually went on to maintain that scientific 
knowledge was public knowledge and religion just a private 
matter. In particular he argued against the relativism of 
popular Darwinism where truth or reality is defined in terms 
of usefulness31 • The kind of loose thinking about modern 
science which Otto opposed filtered down into the schools 
over two or three generations. In the 1970s Martin and Pluck 
(1977) found a naive faith in scientism widespread among the 
15-25 year-olds they surveyed. And this has not gone away, 
although there is evidence that the tide is turning, partly 
perhaps due to the high quality of some religious programmes 
on television. Otto's thought, however, has a great deal to 
offer here. 
Otto's basis is the reality of the holy, independent of 
phenomena and feelings although only discoverable by their 
means. In the course of religious education, the often 
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enjoyable exercises in affective R.E. stimulate the feelings 
and constitute phenomena of a striking order. Meanwhile Ute 
study of different religions and practices also provides 
phenomena of a different sort, and these two approaches are 
increasingly used in primary schools and at Key Stage 332 • 
If Otto's position is sound, then there is a basis for 
drawing both these lines of approach together for serious 
philosophical study at Key Stages 4 and 5. Otto makes it 
possible for religious experience to play a part in argument 
instead of being either disparaged or else crudely thrust in 
as a deus ex machina to confound the philosophers. 
Experience clearly contrasts with reasoning at the reflective 
and analytical level. But Otto's fundamental thesis is that 
within the depths of human reason the holy is to be 
disclosed, and this, if true, makes it possible for religious 
education to be centrally religious. His further thesis, 
that every human being has a predisposition which can be made 
aware of the holy, must also be taken seriously. For unless 
this is accepted, there can be no justification for including 
R.E. in the Basic Curriculum for every child. 
1.4 Criticism of Otto's position 
Any system of religious education which is to be derived from 
Otto is susceptible to some of the criticism which his work, 
especially Das Heilige, provoked. His outline description of 
the numinous begins from human experience, but it has been 
argued that religious education should not begin here, that 
human experience is altogether too formless unless it is 
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guided by doctrine or traditional practice. Similar 
objections can be raised against experiential approaches to 
religion, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, 
section 5.3. 
In fine, objections to Otto's method can be classified into 
two. First and fundamental is the objection that knowledge, 
that is taught conceptual knowledge, must precede experience 
if such experience is to be recognisable as religious 
experience. Otto has no answer to this because it is 
fundamentally opposite to his whole approach and his 
epistemology. The other group of objections centres on the 
imprecise and sometimes slippery use of words and phrases in 
sacred contexts, and here too Otto can certainly be shown to 
be at fault. Not the least of the ambiguities concerns his 
use of inverted commas, a feature too frequent in some kinds 
of religious writing in the present age. It can be hard to 
make out what he is actually saying. 
Two critics in particular raised these two kinds of 
objections. They are Josef Geyser in Intellekt oder Gemlit? 
(loG) and Friedrich K. Feigel in "Das Heilige" kritische 
Abhandlung tiber Rudolf Ottos gleichnamiges Buch (Feigel) 33 . 
A discussion of their objections will throw light on aspects 
of Otto's work and on characteristics of religious education 
which may be linked to it. 
To start with human inner experience means drawing on 
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psychology. While Otto himself claimed that he used 
psychology to bring out something deeper and a priori, the 
question whether DH is to be read as a work of religious 
psychology first and foremost is one which must be discussed 
in the context of Otto's philosophical background, 
accordingly in Chapter Two. But it is convenient in this 
chapter to include criticism from Feigel which also relates 
to this problem. But first place is given to Geyser and his 
objection to starting a study of religion from the 
experiential. 
Joseph Geyser, who was both a philosopher and a psychologist, 
attacks Otto at the heart of his theory. This is of course 
Otto's claim to the primacy of fee 1 ing. Geyser repeatedly 
makes it clear that he thinks rational concepts give rise to 
emotions and not the other way round, and he even asks if it 
is possible to separate non-rational moments at all (loG 5, 
6' 23). 
As Otto sees things, the feelings he describes 
bring about the original content of the idea of 
God. In my view the feelings presuppose rather 
a definite concept of divinity and enlarge it on 
the feeling side. (loG 18; C. 315) 
Whether the feeling of religious blessedness is 
in itself specifically unique or not, it has 
obviously got to be aroused by some sufficient 
cause. For my part I find sufficient cause on 
the one hand in deep and thoughtful consideration 
of the divine characteristics and their 
relationship to mankind, and on the other in the 
influence of grace, sacrament and prayer. This 
does not suit Otto's thesis. He puts things the 
other way round and makes feelings of blessedness 
be the origin and cause of the concept of the 
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loving characteristics of God. (loG 24. not in 
c.) 
Similar assertions are made for most of the characteristics 
in Otto's analysis of the numinous. 
Geyser accepts that concepts do not alone account for our 
knowledge of God without remainder: 
It is obvious that God in his essence can never 
be exhaustively grasped by our concepts . . An 
adequate knowledge of God would only be possible 
by means of immediate vision . . Instead we have 
got to make use of the conscious powers in order 
to exalt God indirectly and mediately by their 
means as well and as far as we can at present 
manage. The conscious powers we require are in 
the first instance intellectual or rational, i.e. 
conceptual thought involving statement and 
entailment So anyone who knows God's 
characteristics, thinks them over. and brings 
them into his inmost soul (zu Gemiite fiihrt), will 
inevitably be moved towards God in some way 
through feelings and emotions too. (loG 10; C. 
308-9) 
Geyser does not come from the tradition of Protestant piety 
in which Otto grew up and which shaped the emotional 
development of Schleiermacher and Fries also. Geyser says he 
is a Catholic who believes the Church's teaching about grace 
and the spiritual life, sacraments and prayer. (loG 24-5; not 
in C.) 
These theories of Otto's have only the names in 
common with church doctrine, anyway that of the 
Catholic Church. (loG 32; C. 322) 
This means that Geyser's repeated challenge to Otto to 
furnish proof for his basic assumptions is by definition 
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impossible to meet. Geyser simply represents a contrary 
point of view. 
We keep coming back to the same point that the 
feelings must have a definite cause, and 
therefore in the last resort Otto has got to 
demonstrate how and by what means the religious 
feelings he describes arise. (loG 29; C. 320) 
Otto of course would believe that he has done this. The 
causal chain cannot go back indefinitely and the numinous is 
not so much the cause of the feelings as directly perceived 
within them. But this is not acceptable to critics with 
Geyser's background and training. 
Finally Geyser refuses to accept Otto's claim that human 
beings possess a special faculty or disposition (Anlage) 
which is open to the numinous. There is simply no need from 
Geyser's viewpoint for such an entity to exist at all. (loG 
16; c. 313) 
A longer perspective is taken by Friedrich K. Feigel (1929 & 
1948) who comments first of all on the enormous popularity of 
Das Heilige which he attributes to the needs and spirit of 
the time. Feigel sees DR as speaking to a generation for 
whom the War, with its destruction, defeat and starvation, 
represented the Unholy, and which laid an axe to the 
foundations of rational theology, raising questions of 
theodicy and challenging the whole of Western culture. He is 
surely right in this assessment. Faced like Job with such a 
catastrophe, the human race, Feigel suggests, could only 
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receive the same kind of answer that Job received, the sheer 
irrationality of God's power, put moreover with psychological 
force. "I will lay my hand upon my mouth." (Job 40.4) (Feigel 
1-3) 
Before wading in with detailed criticism, Feigel remarks: 
At first reading you get the feeling that here 
the author has grasped the living depths of 
religion in a most pregnant sense, but on second 
and third reading another feeling replaces the 
first: the book is totally lacking in scientific 
foundation and goes from one superficiality to 
another. (Feigel 6c) 
Otto's book is a book to read, not to study. And 
precisely so because by being so often allowed to 
gaze from the shimmering surface to the purple 
depths of "presentiment" and to feel them, the 
reader is saved the duty and trouble of serious 
scientific study. (Feigel 7a) 
Feigel's basic criticism is t·o say that Otto has pulled in 
religious psychology in order to find his religious object, 
and that the convolutions he has had to employ have the 
effect of muddling what should have been a psychological 
study (Feigel 10). The root of his criticism therefore is 
against Otto's method, Otto's use of empirical evidence to 
justify or support ontological knowledge. The phrase to 
which Feigel returns is that Otto has put bios (empirical 
evidence) above logos (reasoning) (Feigel 4b,8b, and 98a) 
because his starting point (Ausgangspunkt der Untersuchung) 
is the psychological-actual (das Psychisch-Tatsachliche) 
which has nothing to do with the normative (NormgemaBheit und 
Normwidrigkeit) (Feigel 17b). "This kind of metaphysics is 
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blatantly hypostatised psychology" (131c). 
Feigel's own position is similar to that of Geyser in that he 
believes religion has an intellectual, not an emotional or 
ritual origin and basis. For Feigel it is simply obvious 
(unzweifelhaft 49b) that questions of causality are the most 
important and that the religion of primaeval man began not 
with feelings but with his seeking answers to intellectual 
questions Why? and From what? just as tirelessly as we can 
see "in every normal heal thy child" (Feige 1 48c) . 
Furthermore Feigel maintains that ancient man (like children 
again) divided the world into masculine and feminine before 
neuter was ever thought of and that therefore both the 
Numinous (neither masculine nor feminine) and impersonal 
expressions like "it's spooky here" must be later 
developments (Feigel 48bc), and so do not represent religion 
in its earliest phase. To maintain the intellectual essence 
and origin of religion (along the lines of E B Tylor) Feigel 
expressly contradicts R R Marett (Feigel 48c), the 
anthropologist to whom Otto referred and from whom Otto 
claimed support34• 
Feigel rightly finds "Feeling" the crux of Otto's case and 
the meeting point of his reason with his psychology. He 
discusses what Otto meant by feeling at length and in several 
contexts. He points to a confusion between the object felt 
and the cause of a particular·feeling. From Otto he quotes: 
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A deep joy may fill our minds without any clear 
realisation upon our part of its source and the 
object to which it refers, though some such 
objective reference there must always be. But as 
attention is directed to it, the obscure object 
becomes clearly identified in precise conceptual 
terms. 35 
The words Grund oder Objekt are seized on ("its source and 
the object to which it refers") , and the oder (or) as 
evidence that Otto has simply taken cause and object as 
obviously the same (Feigel 37b). Feigel maintains that they 
are often different, and that a cause can be subjective, that 
is, either not related to an existent object at all, or if it 
is related to an object then the relationship of causation is 
the result of inference, an intellectual process, and not 
direct apprehension as claimed by Otto. Further, Feigel 
thinks that a feeling of joy is really a mode of feeling, as 
when we feel joy in looking at a tree or house. Joy is not 
the content of the feeling, but the feeling itself is joy. 
"Seeing relates something subjective to the tree as object, 
and joy is itself totally subjective." (Feigel 38c-39a) 
Feigel also criticises Otto for imprecision in his use of 
terms for sensation (Empfindung), feeling (Gefiihl), idea 
(Vorstellung) (Feigel 37a), and later he says Otto has 
confused the terms feeling (Gefiihl), intuition (Intuition), 
perception (Erschauung) (Feigel 9lc) which he seems to use 
almost interchangeably. There is some truth in Feigel's 
assertion that in the first case Otto has taken over James's 
uncritical use of words, perpetrating the confusion of 
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James's reality-consciousness (Feigel 37a). In the second 
case, the fault goes back to Schleiermacher and his use of 
Anschauung36 . 
There is some confusion also in the way Otto uses the words 
"natural" and "non-natural." Feigel devotes a section 
(pp.13-35) to The Qualitative Difference of the Numinous 
Feeling from "natural" Feelings. Distancing himself somewhat 
from Schleiermacher37 , Otto states that the feeling of 
absolute dependence is qualitatively different from all 
natural feelings. But what, asks Feigel, are "non-natural" 
feelings supposed to be? (Feigel 14c). Feeling as such 
belongs to the natural, and especially so when Otto considers 
the feeling for the numinous to be a general capacity inborn 
in humankind (Feigel 15ab). Otto does indeed call the 
feeling for the numinous "a primal element of the soul" (ein 
seelisches Urelement DH 151a; "a primal element of a 
psychical nature" IH 124b), which is not to be dismissed as 
supernatural but considered along with other primal elements 
of the psyche such as "pleasure or pain, love or hate, all 
faculties of sense-perception such as susceptibility to 
light, sound. consciousness of space and time" (IH 124c; DH 
151b). Here is ground for Feigel to see a contradiction: how 
is the feeling for the numinous expressed in Scheu (dread) 
not natural when Otto is able to give an example of his horse 
Diana showing the same kind of dread at the sight of a dead 
horse (Feigel 24c)?38 
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In claiming the feeling of dread for a basic element of the 
soul (or psychical nature), Otto would have general support 
from psychologists, says Feigel, inasmuch as every kind of 
feeling is different and not to be reduced to others. But 
Otto claims the capacity for dread as "witness to a 
completely new function of experience and standard of 
valuation, only belonging to the spirit of man" (IH 15c; DH 
17b). Feigel further says that if this numinous dread is 
most clearly seen in primal man, then it is absurd to call it 
a "preliminary step" (Vorstufe) to religion and not religion 
i tse 1 f. There are certainly problems here with Otto's 
terminology. 
At the end of his study Feigel takes up another general 
point, a critic ism which can be made against a number of 
books of popular religion. This is Otto's frequent use of 
inverted commas, sometimes called "Goosefeet" (Ganseflil3chen) 
in German. Feigel accuses Otto of using these whenever he 
wants to borrow a natural word or concept belonging to 
"normal" life to express something which belongs to the 
wholly other. Thus the numinous quality of "gooseflesh" has 
to be expressed with "goosefeet": one might speak of 
"numinous goosefeet." (Feigel 125b) 
Much of Feigel's book is concerned with detailed criticisms 
of varying quality. Some of these concern the use of words, 
and it must be freely admitted that Otto was not as careful 
in his words as a strict philosophical training should have 
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made him. For instance, it is quite clear from reading DH 
that the numinous is discovered by means of experiences, not 
caused, inferred, or invented by them. But Feigel quotes 
from p .162 of his edition of DH (not the one currently in 
print), "the numinous feeling actually invents the numinous 
object" - then adds in brackets "or rather discovers it." 
(Feigel 40a) . These words do not seem to be in current 
editions of DH so probably Otto himself removed this 
misunderstanding long before Feigel's second edition of 1948 
(from which the Feigel references are taken), and before John 
Harvey's English translation. It is quite clear, however, 
that Feigel wants Otto to say "invents" because it supports 
his contention that Otto has no proof for his idea of the 
numinous at all. 
This section 1.4 should have drawn attention to two of the 
main problems in Otto's approach which also apply to any 
programme 
approach. 
for religious education using the experiential 
The basic philosophical criticisms are discussed 
in greater detail in the section of Chapter Two devoted to 
Das Heilige. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
CONSISTENCY AND DEVELOPMENT THROUGH OTTO'S MAIN PUBLICATIONS 
2.1 Why Otto seems inconsistent 
The purpose of this Chapter is to trace the main 
characteristics of Otto's thought through his publications. 
Several critics have accused him of muddle and inconsistency, 
and these accusations must be taken seriously. In the last 
resort, if he is shown to have been inconsistent in his main 
ideas then it can no longer be claimed that he has a method 
or approach which can be adapted for practical purposes like 
religious education. The best that could be hoped for would 
then be to select ideas which seem to show promise on a 
piecemeal bas is. Further, if as some maintain, Otto's 
psychology is unconnected to his philosophy, or even at 
variance with it, then his whole project falls to pieces. 
For this reason it is necessary to go at some depth into his 
epistemology and in particular his use of the term a priori. 
This in turn leads to the consideration of the relation of 
rational to non-rational, and to Otto's own peculiar brand of 
schematisation. This Chapter will consider most of his 
books, but the main emphasis, especially in connection with 
his use of a priori and schematisation, will be on Das 
Heilige (DH). 
The criticisms raised by Geyser and Feigel go to the root of 
his whole enterprise: that is, Otto's claim that religious 
experience is a valid starting place, if not the only valid 
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starting place, for the study of living religion. But this 
Chapter must begin· with the remarks of two more modern 
critics, both of whom maintain that his philosophy as 
expounded in Kantisch-Fries'sche Religionsphilosophie (KFR) 
is at variance with his phenomenology and his empirical 
psychology as seen in DH. It must be shown that this claim, 
even if upheld, is not the same as saying that Otto's 
phenomenology is at variance with his philosophy tout court, 
because the philosophical position which not only underlies 
DH, but also has clear expression in DH, can be shown to be 
compatible with the rest of the book. That which is harder 
to reconcile is the philosophy of Fries, which is the subject 
of KFR. If there is a serious inconsistency in Otto's 
development, it lies in the philosophy of Fries, which he 
only adopted at the insistence of Leonard Nelson while they 
were colleagues at Gottingen, and appears to have backed away 
from subsequently. At any rate the philosophical position 
evident in DH can be shown not to be dependent on Fries. 
It has been strongly argued by a number of scholars that 
there is a serious break and inconsistency between Otto the 
philosopher as evidenced in KFR, and Otto the phenomenologist 
at work in DH. S(Z)ren Holm1 and David Bas tow2 have both 
argued this in different ways, and they receive some 
contemporary support in a 1919 letter written to Otto by the 
phenomenologist Edmund Husserl: 
The metaphysician (theologian) in Dr Otto has, it 
seems to me, carried away the phenomenologist 
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Otto on his wings, and I am thinking of the 
angels who veil their eyes with their wings. But 
I still think this book will have a lasting place 
in the history of genuine philosophy of religion 
and especially phenomenology of religion. 
You know from our Gottingen years how highly I 
always esteem you. 3 
Holm states simply that Otto has tried to make a mixture of 
two different things or two different periods of professional 
life. 
Otto started as a philosopher of religion with 
the book "Kantisch-Fries'sche 
Religionsphilosophie" which was published in 
1909 ... Otto wanted to use Jacob Fr. Fries and 
de Wette to get out from Kant's position. 
A leading idea of Fries was the romantic Ahnung, 
In a corresponding way Otto wanted in "Das 
Heilige" to find a religious Urdatum which stood 
behind empirical forms of religion and explicated 
them. ( 71 be ) 
So, continues Holm, while Otto's a priori is philosophical-
transcendental in KFR, in DH the "a priori" is empirical-
emotional, i.e. an Urdatum or UrphAnomen. "An Apriori cannot 
be empirical, it cannot be found in experience, it is not a 
psychical datum" ( 72a). By drawing on Fries and Ahnung, 
according to Holm, Otto crosses over from the Kantian !! 
priori to experience (77a) and his identification of the 
numinous is in effect a conclusion from effects to their 
cause (79c), a conclusion which is anyway insecure at the 
best of times, because given effects may have a variety of 
causes which cannot always be discovered. So Holm's own 
conclusion is to find a serious break between Otto's work in 
KFR and DH. 
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The section on Fries in Chapter Three of this thesis shows 
the influence of Fries in more detail, while the section on 
Kant suggests that Otto is after all justified in DH in 
finding a genuine Apriori in the tradition of Kant and so he 
does not need the support of Fries. Holm is not clear about 
his criticism of Fries, but in considering the Ahnung theory 
as psychological-empirical he appears to support the view, 
contrary to Otto in KFR, that Fries is not a true follower of 
Kant. But Holm does not go on to find the place of DH in the 
Kantian tradition, as is discussed later in this Chapter. 
Bastow wishes to apply sharper philosophical dissection to 
Otto's 'Theory of Religion' which he states correctly as 
intended to show that experience of the numinous can yield 
positive knowledge. But it is not clear to Bastow how Otto's 
phenomenological work links to his philosophical position. 
This is not as clear as it might be in The Idea 
of the Holy, though the words of the Foreword are 
very forceful: 'I feel that no-one ought to 
concern himself with the Numen ineffabile who has 
not already devoted assiduous and serious study 
to the Ratio Aeterna'. But I hope to show that 
a full understanding of The Idea of the Holy is 
impossible unless one understands the 
philosophical system taken over from Fries and 
expounded in The Philosophy of Religion. (159c) 
That is why Bastow goes back to KFR, in order to clarify the 
link. But the problem with this is that Bastow overlooks two 
important points, both noticed by Philip Almond in his book 
Rudolf Otto - An Introduction to his Philosophical Theology4. 
These are, first, Otto's waning interest in Fries when he 
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began to study living religions as a result of his travels of 
1911-12 (Almond 1984, 91c), and second, the importance of 
linking Otto's phenomenological work in DR with his 
philosophy in later chapters of the same book. Almond 
correctly seeks to establish Otto's consistency by examining 
consistency within DR (88c), as well as his more questionable 
argument that the philosophy of Fries has set the direction 
for all Otto's work from 19095. 
Bastow is more critical of Fries than either Almond or Holm. 
He ask-s, "What are the possible relationships between a 
comprehensive philosophical system such as Otto took over 
from Fries, and the work of a phenomenologist of religious 
experience?" ( 168a). Bastow does not think that Otto has 
established this relationship in DR, a view which is rejected 
by this Thesis. Bastow concludes that Fries lets Otto down 
in two respects: first that the philosophy of Fries is not 
such that phenomenological theses about religious experience 
can be derived from it, and second that it does not even 
offer a formal similarity to Otto's phenomenology of 
religious experience. The similarity between Holm's and 
Bastow's views will be obvious, and the differences need not 
concern us further. 
There is no doubt that Otto's thought underwent change and 
development. Consideration of his books will show change and 
unfolding6 within a discernible framework. The plan in this 
Chapter is to produce a kind of map of Otto's development and 
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to pick certain landmarks. These include his work on Luther 
(published in 1898), on Schleiermacher (1899), on Darwin and 
Darwinism ( 1903, 1904) , on Kant and Fries ( 1909), and the 
complex work Das Heilige which draws so many strands of his 
thinking together into itself (1917). After that attention 
turns to Otto's work on Indian religion, on liturgy, his 
ethical writings, and his last book Reich Gottes und 
Menschensohn. 
2.2 Otto's First Publication 
Otto's Habilitationsschrift was published in 1898 with the 
title Die Anschauung vom heiligen Geiste bei Luther (AHG) 7. 
Otto's interest in the operation of the Spirit must be traced 
back to this, and indeed to his doctoral theses on Ruach 
Jahweh which preceded it. Some have thought of his 
experience in the little synagogue in North Africa as a 
seminal experience of the holy. This took place during his 
travels in 1911, and has already been quoted in Chapter One8• 
But Otto himself says, 
Indeed, I grew to understand the numinous and its 
difference from the rational in Luther's De Servo 
Arbitrio long before I identified it in the 
qadosh of the Old Testament and in the elements 
of 'relifious awe' in the history of religion in 
general. 
A footnote in DH 123n (not in IH) refers the reader back to 
the Exkurs in AHG10 , and indeed the language especially in 
these few pages is close to parts of Das Heilige. Otto 
himself claims a consistency. 
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Otto states at the outset of AHG that the concept of the 
spiritus sanctus in Luther expresses a two-fold interest: how 
"new life" comes to effect in the religious-moral context of 
inner-life (Gemlit) and will; and secondly, perhaps the 
central point, the relationship and influence of supernatural 
causality on the inner life of man11 . The religious-moral 
content of the inner life is greatly expanded in DH into the · 
relationship between religion and morality through 
schematisation, and reappears in the ethical writings of his 
last few years. Otto denies a supernatural causality over 
and beyond the natural causality of human experience. It is 
clear that these two themes find special expression in Otto's 
later books: the soul (Gemlit) and its life are central to 
Otto's edition of Schleiermacher's Reden, published in 1899, 
and the theme of causality, natural and supernatural, is the 
basis of NRW, published in 1904, while both themes are 
developed together with a greater expanded psychological and 
empirical treatment in DH, published in 1917. KFR, first 
published in ZThK in 1909, seems to be the exception in that 
its theme is not foreshadowed in the thesis AHG, although the 
denial of dual causation is vigorously treated here also. 
The twin themes, the working of the holy Spirit on the inner 
soul of the faithful and the question of causality, recur 
throughout AHG. Although there are plenty of quotations from 
Luther, Otto has to explain on many occasions that Luther 
regarded himself as a faithful son of the Church, that he 
used traditional language, and that in any case what he 
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wanted to say is not always quite clear12 . This is not the 
place to argue Luther's theology. Much more to the point is 
Otto's understanding of Luther's theology, however this may 
have been derived. In the circumstances it would seem 
reasonable to claim the statements and viewpoint of this 
publication as Otto's own without trying to prove whether or 
not they can be justified by the evidence adduced. 
The scholastic reasoning derived from Aristotle on natural 
and supernatural causation is firmly rejected. The medieval 
model is mechanistic and religion requires none of the 
"levers and screws of moral training" 13 to school the will. 
Similarly unacceptable is the dogmatic terminology which 
describes the holy Spirit as causa prima and Faith as causa 
secunda for the new life. Just as there can be no "God of 
the gaps" so there can be no theory of first and second level 
causality. 
There can be no super-psychology working alongside normal 
psychology14 , sometimes expressed as empirical psychology. 
God's activity is empirical 15 , working in the inmost soul of 
mankind and is not any kind of additional or supernatural 
psychological factor. 
In DH Otto stresses the direct and spontaneous interaction 
between the numinous and the human psyche. At the same time 
there are ways of awakening the sensus numinis, and in AHG 
the terms involved in Luther's theology, Spirit, Word, Faith, 
Chapter Two 49 
Life and others demand some discussion of the means of 
communication. God communicates person to person, as when 
two people communicate, says Otto, they use words, gestures, 
and at a distance they may communicate by letter. The means 
are not important. The contact is directly von Geist zu 
Geist 16 . Medieval theology seemed to suggest an ever-
lengthening chain as revelation was passed from God through 
Christ to the Apostles and their successors. According to 
Otto, the converted Christian (der neue Mensch) does not take 
over from the Church the store of feelings, impulses, 
cognitions that have been handed down, but the Church 
transmits the source from which all these feelings etc. 
arise, the preaching of God's revelation17 . The importance 
of this for developing a sense of the numinous is taken up in 
Chapter Five. In AHG there is also a stress on motivation 
and the will which reappears in the articles on ethics. 
Otto's discussion of the means of communication already noted 
suggests the chapter in DH on means of communicating the 
sensus numinis: it is not teachable but can be aroused. In 
AHG also Otto quotes Luther's statement that the gift of the 
Spirit can only be understood by the pious, while the enemies 
can never understand how the spirit is given18 . This notion 
which makes the personal subject alone responsible for final 
conviction is cardinal in DH. 
The objectivity of the Spirit's working is assumed in AHG 
rather than stressed, but by the time he wrote DH Otto was 
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well aware that he was open to attack on this ground. 
2.3 Otto's edition of Schleiermacher's "Reden" 
In 1899 Otto produced a centenary edition of Schleiermacher's 
Reden19 , a book which not only caused a great stir in 1799, 
but was heavily influential for protestant theology and more 
generally throughout the nineteenth century. Although 
Schleiermacher addressed himself to a readership different 
from those who were dominant in Otto's time, there can be no 
doubt that in his struggles to base religion in the depths of 
the human soul and experience, in fact to make an existential 
appeal to what we should now call the implicit, 
Schleiermacher had much to offer Otto for his own time and 
his own problems. 
Otto str~sses the feelings side as "feelings, presentiment 
(Ahnen) and experiencing." 20 Religion, beside cognition and 
action, is the third human sphere which to the questions 
"What can we know?" and "What ought we to do?" adds, "What do 
we experience in our soul (Gemtit)?" 21 Schleiermacher in his 
Reden, says Otto, discovered • this third continent of the 
intellectual world' 22 , and reference may be made to Otto's 
later essay on how Schleiermacher discovered the sensus 
numinis23 • Here is the clear basis that was to become the 
backbone of das Heilige. 
To be able to fee 1, to contemplate, to sense, we need a 
Fahigkei t 24 • This question of Fahigkei t and the Vermogen 
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psychology, reappears in DH and is expanded into the theory 
of the Anlage25 , a psychological capacity with almost 
physiological implications which was to give Otto trouble at 
the hands of his critics, notably Geyser. Here also are to 
be seen the first hints on education and communicating the 
numinous, put later: "ohne Gemiitsbildung keine Religion." 26 
A fuller consideration of Schleiermacher's influence on Otto 
is the subject of section 3.3 in Chapter Three. 
2.4 Darwinism, Naturalism and Religion 
Darwin and Darwinism were keenly discussed even while Otto 
was at school. The advance of natural sciences had deeply 
changed educated thought since Schleiermacher had published 
his Reden in 1799. In 1904 Otto published Naturalistische 
und religiose Weltansicht (NRW) 27 . 
Otto had published an article on Darwinism in 190228 . That 
this remained a lively topic for him is shown by the 
reprinting of his NRW in 1923 and 1929, and by his slender 
book Darwinismus und Religion29 being republished in a 
slightly altered form in his book of essays Siinde und 
Urschuld30 under the title "rationale Theologie gegen 
naturalistischen Irrationalismus." The topic of course is 
the relation of religion to natural science, and more 
particularly to positivistic thought forms which were 
culturally dominant at the turn of the century. 
According to F. Delekat writing in 193031 Otto had 
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considerable success. If one drive in Otto's developing 
thought was the need to relate religious feeling to 
philosophical theology, then a second drive arose from the 
need to establish religious claims to truth. This was not to 
claim exclusive truth for one particular faith in the way 
that was exploited by Barth and Bultmann, but the need to 
establish the fact that all religion is actually concerned 
with reality and is not just a closed system. There is no 
doubt that Otto did believe in the superiority of 
Christianity over other religions, a note which surfaces 
again in DH, but his case lay in the claim of any religion, 
of religion as such, to be in touch with reality in a deep 
and more significant sense than was the case with the natural 
sciences then taught. 
No actually existing form of religion is so 
entirely made up of "feeling", "subjectivity" or 
"mood", that it can dispense with all assumptions 
and convictions regarding the nature and import 
of the world. In fact, every form, on closer 
examination, reveals a more or less fixed 
framework of convictions, theoretical 
assumptions, and presuppositions in regard to 
man, the world, and existence: that is to say, a 
theory, however simple, of the universe. 32 
The dominant world view around the turn of the century placed 
enormous faith in experimental and natural sciences, 
especially physics, but also in evolutionary theories derived 
from biology. The result was the assumption that religion 
was simply a leftover from a more primitive stage of man's 
development, which would be perfectly acceptable at the 
private personal level, a source maybe of comfort, but that 
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it could have no meaningful role at the social level, 
precisely because religion was of no practical use. The use-
value question provides the lihk with Darwin and Darwinism 
according to which organs, aptitudes and faculties whether 
physical or cultural only survive insofar as they contribute 
not to the individual but to the success of the species as an 
on-going group. 
Finally, we have a 'Darwinian' theory of the 
understanding, which endeavours to solve by the 
principles of biological advantage Pilate's 
question "What is truth?" This theory is 
embodied in pragmatism and in the notion of the 
economy of thought. Finally, the very word true 
is to be understood as practically synonymous 
with the word useful. 33 
Now religion is interested most acutely in this 
question of the possibility of objective 
truth. 34 
For there is this outstanding difference between 
religion and all "moods" . . that it lives by 
the certainty of its ideas, suffers if they be 
uncertain, and dies if they be shown to be 
untenable, however charming or consoling, sublime 
or simple they may be. Its theories of the world 
are not poems: they are convictions, and these 
require to be first of all not pleasing but 
true. 35 
Darwin and Darwinism represented for Otto two separate 
problems. Otto thought that Darwin himself was simply a 
researcher who had no religious or metaphysical 
presuppositions. Obviously he knew nothing of Darwin's 
correspondence or diaries in which can be seen his long and 
difficult struggles with the presuppositions and expectations 
of his age. What was startlingly new about Darwin's theory, 
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Otto emphasises, is that it posits the transmutation of 
species and the growth, through the help of environmental 
circumstances, of quite neworgans and abilities, as 'higher' 
forms of life evolve from lower. This is not development 
(evolution, unfolding) in the way an oak grows from an acorn, 
an acorn containing all the traits of the developed oak 
within itself from the start. Darwin's theory is brutal 
addition: totally new factors are added, seemingly by chance. 
To call it evolution, Otto claims, is a misuse of language. 36 
Although it is clear that 'addition' was a stumbling block 
for Otto, his religious reaction was not one of 
confrontation. Otto stressed instead the religious questions 
of origin and purpose37 . Religion is concerned with a more 
basic kind of truth than natural sciences, and must go beyond 
physical and biological questions to see through them and in 
them something of the mystery and to sense something of the 
purpose. This is summed up in NRW Chapter I I I 38 as a 
threefold religious interest: the feeling of mystery, the 
feeling of contingency, and the sense that there is a purpose 
to it all. Two supplementary points should be added: one is 
that Otto is still consistently using the terms feeling and 
presentiment (Gefiihl, Ahnung) 39 which are central in the 
language of the romantics and Schleiermacher, and are also 
part of the foundational structure of his thought in DH. The 
other is the relationship of the infinite to the finite. It 
is quite wrong, says Otto, to picture the infinite as coming 
into the finite. The infinite is ever to be perceived within 
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and through the finite. 40 
Religion itself consists in this: believing and 
experiencing that in time the Eternal, in the 
finite the Infinite, in the world God is working, 
revealing Himself, and that in Him lies the 
reason and the cause of all being. 41 
55 
Otto's controversy with Wundt can usefully be seen also 
within the framework of the religious claim to truth. The 
second volume of Wilhelm Wundt' s magisterial 
Volkerpsychologie appeared in 1906 with the section entitled 
"Mythus und Religion." Otto reviewed this in 191042 , and went 
to the heart of Wundt's theory that religion had evolved from 
primitive beliefs in spirits. In this Wundt's thesis was 
similar to the British anthropologist E. B. Tylor43 . Enough 
has been said about Otto's standpoint in NRW, and later of 
course in DH, to make clear that he could not accept any 
notion that religion could have evolved from something else. 
That is why he says the numinous is sui generis and basic. 
The issue is not really about vagueness in Wundt's forms of 
expression, although Otto made play with this. It is easy 
now to see that because in Wundt's time modern psychology was 
thought of in terms of the clinical work with individuals 
largely practised in his day, he wanted to find means of 
expression to cover observational and social psychology. 
Behind Wundt's notions, however, lurks the spectre of 
reductionism which counts religion as a metaphenomenon, 
dependent on social norms and patterns, and religion is thus 
denied any authenticity precisely as religion, that is as 
having its own direct access to and expression of reality. 
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The link with Darwin and Darwinism is now clear. 
Wundt's paper, with his emphasis on myth-building and group 
fantasy, would seem to concede to the positivistic world-view 
of the time that religion is marginal to the real concerns of 
mankind. Delekat puts the controversy in this context, and 
at the same time commends Otto's handling of it. 44 
2.5 Otto's wPhilosophy of Religionw 
Section 2. 1 earlier in this Chapter suggested that there 
could be problems with Otto's reliance on Fries. The purpose 
of this section is not to discuss these problems so much as 
to note the main thrust of Otto's book about the philosophy 
of Fries, Kantisch-Fries'sche Religionsphilosophie und ihre 
Anwendung auf die Theologie (KFR), published in 1909, with a 
view to seeing how this book also reflects and develops 
constant concerns in Otto's thought. Many comment a tors 
consider this book cardinal for understanding Otto's thought 
and development. But a more detailed evaluation of Fries's 
philosophy and its relevance to Otto must be left until 
Chapter Three where section 3.4 treats of Fries's influence 
on Otto, and how far it was effective for Otto's thought. 
Schleiermacher expressed eloquently the appeal to feeling. 
His style was oratorical, and Otto knew that greater 
precision in analysis was needed. The direction in which to 
look was, however, already indicated. In his second Rede 
Schleiermacher draws out a third quality, the natural 
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counterpart to thought and action, and no less in worth and 
splendour45 : this quality is contemplation and feeling. 46 
It takes place within consciousness or on the edge of it, 
just as Otto had seen it when he wrote AHG as the work of the 
holy Spirit. 
The sources for the philosophy of Fries, apart from his own 
books, are Leonard Nelson's Progress and Regress in 
Philosophy47 and Otto's KFR which is warmly commended by 
Nelson at the end of his book. Nelson's interest in Fries 
was primarily epistemological: if most judgements depend on 
other judgements, there must ultimately be some which are not 
dependent but immediate48 • Otto's interest was additionally 
to make use of Fries's Ahnung theory which bridged the divide 
which seemed to keep the Kantian noumenal and phenomenal 
apart. To find immediate knowledge, Fries used Kant's term 
deduction (in the sense of leading down) for the process of 
tracing a judgement back to some item of immediate knowledge. 
In the same way, Fries thought he could overcome the division 
between the phenomenal and the noumenal by finding objective 
certainty in the immediate knowledge which was discovered by 
deduction. This he claimed to find in a psychological datum 
which confirmed inherent and original certainty for immediate 
knowledge. This datum is also called a "Feeling for Truth" 
or Wahrheitsgeftihl, and is an obscure act of the faculty of 
judgement. Thus, although unclear and non-conceptual, it 
also belongs to Reason. Otto in explaining this immediate 
knowledge as "dim and unconscious .. it is dormant" (PR 58a, 
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KFR 41a) notes also that William James "made extensive use of 
the Unconscious, the Subconscious, in his interpretation of 
religious phenomena." 49 Thus this "obscure act" takes place 
in the human subconscious. 
The Wahrheitsgeflihl remains obscure until it is resolved by 
being put into the form of a judgement. This is a process 
which requires abstraction to bring it to consciousness, i.e. 
from particular to universal. Otto gives as an example the 
unconscious awareness that a straight line is the shortest 
distance between two points (PR 58c; KFR 41c), which only 
becomes conscious when it is put into the form of a universal 
judgement. Otto also refers, in a section on the laicisation 
of religion, to the same process when Kant's moral philosophy 
still retains its basis to be found in the obscure moral 
feelings of ordinary people. He instances Kant's Foundation 
for the Metaphysics of Morals ( Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der 
Sitten) as a "Transition frdm the Ordinary Moral Judgemerits 
of Reason to the Philosophical" (PR 36ab; KFR 21a). 
But if the psychological argument is followed through, the 
evidence for this immediate knowledge can only come from a 
psychological datum. We need psychological proof for the 
existence within ourselves of an immediate knowledge which 
underlies all metaphysical judgements. The knowledge is 
immediate and independent of all experience, hence a priori, 
although only experience can bring it to our consciousness. 
In this way, Nelson adds, the reform of Kant's philosophy 
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which Fries took on is a reinstatement of the old theory of 
Ideas of Socrates and Plato (Nelson 1971, 190a). Otto too 
speaks of anamnesis~ a reference to the calling to mind of 
truths supposedly known clearly before birth, but since birth 
buried deep in the subconscious. 
The question which is raised by Fries's philosophy centres on 
the use of psychology to bring out his theory. The Feeling 
for Truth is brought to light by self-examination in 
psychological introspection. But if it is in any way itself 
dependent on psychology, then it is at best a posteriori, and 
not as claimed by Fries, Nelson and Otto. Otto quoted from 
Kant himself in support of this claim, which will be put in 
context in the next section. Yet Ansgar Paus in his 
Religioser Erkenntnisgrund remarks, "even Kant stirred 
suspicion of psychologism by incautious expression especially 
in the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason" 50 • 
With Fries's philosophical stance Otto linked two followers. 
De Wette and Apelt. In 1910 Otto published a new edition of 
the Metaphysik by Ernst Friedrich Apelt, and for this reason 
Paus pays particular attention to Apelt's work in his 
evaluation of Otto's philosophical base. Paus quotes Apelt 
on this central problem: "All our knowledge begins with 
experience, but not all our knowledge derives from 
experience. "51 (Paus 54b) 
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Otto's r.esta tement of Fries's thought 
Otto's book, commended by Leonard Nelson for its clarity, 
describes the system of Fries at length. 
clearly stated in outline, but the 
This system can be 
details are less 
convincing, and Otto was criticised for following Fries. 
Baldly stated, Fries posits three different types or modes of 
knowledge. These are: factual knowledge (Wissen), which is 
derived from sense-experience; secondly metaphysical 
knowledge (Glaube) like causality which as Hume showed cannot 
be de~onstrated without presupposing its own validity; and 
third the feel for truth, the presentiment of certainty which 
grounds the whole system (Ahnung or in the spelling Fries 
used Ahndung). It is only by means of Ahnung that rational 
beings can achieve a level of certainty in ordinary knowledge 
and experience, because Ahnung provides the link between the 
spatio~temporal and the changeless-eternal. By means of 
Ahnung it is possible to know and intuit the eternal within 
the finite. "Man ahndet das Ewige in dem Endlichen." (Fries 
passim) 52 
Otto attributed to Fries two discoveries. The first is that 
there are metaphysical truths which are derived neither from 
perception nor from reflection, but are immediate and !! 
priori; secondly, such knowledge is obscure. The obscurity 
of such knowledge chimed in with Otto's experience of mystery 
in religious devotion, and it allowed him to claim that such 
knowledge though obscure is nonetheless immediate, and so 
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does not need justification. Immediate knowledge cannot be 
justified in principle because any philosophical reasoning to 
try and justify it is both a petitio principii and denies its 
status as immediate knowledge, opening up the prospect for an 
infinite regress. Bat how can knowledge be both immediate 
and obscure? 
The answer to this can be found by consulting personal 
experience. There are truths which even small children know 
and act on but do not know that they know. 
Kant's categories, by means of which alone we can handle 
sense experience, are examples of knowledge which is both ~ 
priori and can only be known after some empirical or 
psychological process has brought them to notice. But the 
categories as they are known are limited by time and space. 
To imagine them as complete requires us to negate. these 
limits, i.e. to negate the negation, and thus reach a rea~ity 
that transcends the limitations of sense-perception. Otto's 
chapter on The Speculative Ideas (KFR and PR VI) shows the 
use of Fries's system. The big leap forward, according to 
Otto, comes with Fries's development of the Speculative 
Ideas. 
Fries begins this development by stating that Speculative 
Ideas represent metaphysical objects of which no definite 
knowledge can ever be obtained. We may speak of completed 
categories for instance, but our knowledge of them must 
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always be incomplete and incompletable. Now our experience 
of ordinary knowledge comes by conceptualisation of 
perceptions, and that means that incomplete knowledge may be 
due to either of two possibilities. Either we have a clear 
concept but lack any perception which can be brought under 
it, and these cases Fries called Logical Ideas; or else we 
have perceptions which we are unable to bring under any 
concept, and these Fries called Aesthetic Ideas. 
Otto makes use of both these. In Chapter VI of KFR he uses 
the Logical Ideas: 
We have now found the positive foundation of the 
"Ideas" of reason, as laid in reason's immediate 
and fundamental knowledge of the necessary 
synthetic unity in the" essence Of things, a 
knowledge in itself obscure and deeply hidden. 
The "Ideas" express in clear and distinct terms 
what is dimly outlined in this immediate 
knowledge. Fries sets forth very clearly how the 
Ideas must be presented to the consciousness. 
They are to express the View of the Universe, 
which, as opposed to the inadequate view afforded 
by time and space, expresses the essence of 
things, not as presented to sensuous perception 
in space and time, but as conceived by reason 
pure and simple, i.e. according to the "principle 
of completeness." (PR ~lab) 
Examples include the Idea of Absolute Being and the Idea of 
Eternity. Eternity may be schematised under cruder notions 
of the end of the world, the day of judgement, heaven or the 
twilight of the gods. After this Otto goes on to expound the 
Aesthetic Ideas, and this is the subject of Chapter VI I 
headed "The Ideas come to Life." 
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Thus by themselves and for themselves the Ideas 
are frigid and void, would remain so and never 
guide to religion, unless they first received 
that great and individual Content which gives 
them life, which acts on character and will, from 
a quite different region. (PR 91c) 
In this way Otto goes on to make use of the Aesthetic Ideas, 
those which are felt in experience, but for which clear 
concepts are lacking. "Not by faith alone can we in 
conviction confront the world of Appearance with the true 
one, the World of Idea;" (PR 92c). We should note in passing 
that faith is the form of our apprehending the Logical Ideas, 
the concepts for which we lack perceptions. For Otto goes 
straight on to make use of the Aesthetic Ideas: "we can 
become aware of the latter as a reality, and a reality 
fraught with blessing, by experience. This . comes 
about, apart from any precise middle term, in Feeling alone, 
and indeed in a feeling which cannot be resolved into a 
conception." (PR 92-93) 
Further on in the same chapter Otto draws out the value of 
the two sorts of incomplete knowledge which are designated by 
the Logical and the Aesthetic Ideas. It is the Logical Ideas 
which give the structure of Faith, and Faith is needed to set 
limits and to provide a framework to "soaring flights of 
speculation." At the same time religion is more than such 
metaphysics, which are anyway expressed still in negative 
terms, as unlike anything we can experience. Otto goes on: 
For a positive affirmation on the Infinite, an 
"intellectual intuition" of the kind that 
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Fichte's school loved to describe, would be 
necessary. But no such intuition is granted to 
us. Our intuitive perception is wholly confined 
to the sensuous. It follows that a 
"comprehending" knowledge, a knowledge of the 
Infinite in positive concepts, is not possible 
for us. The Infinite for us is still the 
Incomprehensible. But what the comprehension 
cannot achieve we may achieve in the Feeling. 
Feeling, with Knowledge and Faith, gives a third 
kind of real knowledge, one which combines and 
unifies both of these "Ahnen". Obscure 
sentiments of the beautiful and sublime in all 
its phases, in the natural and spiritual life, 
have us in their power: and so we understand 
without any medium the Eternal in the Temporal, 
and the Temporal as an appearance of the Eternal. 
Intelligibly enough, positively, although beyond 
our powers of expression, the world of Faith here 
manifests itself in the world of Knowledge by 
means of "Ahnung". (PR 100-101) 
This positive content, which eludes our 
comprehension and can only be manifested to our 
conceptual knowledge if the barriers to our 
knowledge are again lifted, is revealed to us, 
however, in individual Feelings, capable in 
themselves of clear differentiation, particular 
definition, and of being communicated ... But in 
the feeling of devotion we attain by degrees a 
positive actual knowledge of it, quite solid and 
stable, if, indeed, utterly incapable of being 
expressed. (PR 132ab) 
By Kant's transcendental method the limits which had been 
conditioned and required by experience are removed 
metaphysically, and we can gain knowledge through speculation 
of the ideas in their pure form. By negating the limits in 
the case of each of the categories, we get a complete 
(according to Kant) system of speculative ideas which include 
Immortality, Freewill and others. These ideas can never be 
experienced in their pure form on Kant's system because 
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experience limits them through time and space. An ideal 
might not, however, be real. Erich Gaede 53 says that for 
Kant the speculative ideas exist only in reason, and are not 
actually existent objects like for instance the Ideas or 
Forms of Plato. It is well known that Kant's epistemology 
divides things into phenomena and noumena, of which only the 
noumena are really real, but they are beyond our experience 
and we cannot know anything about them. Fries felt that Kant 
had already in several places indicated access to secure 
knowledge of reality, and that this only needed to be pulled 
together and systematised. Thus Fries, according to Nelson 
and Otto, is to be seen as a faithful follower of Kant, who 
clarified certain inconsistencies and rectified certain 
errors, to forge a complete philosophical system whose key is 
Ahnung. 
Fries drew on Kant's third critique which he saw providing 
the basis he wanted to earth the ideas of the other two in 
the certainty he felt, albeit dimly, yet which was not 
derived from experience, i.e. it was purely a priori. Fries 
felt that this was a form of direct, unmediated cognition 
which is both unmistakable and certain. "This doctrine of 
the infallibility of direct cognition is the heart of the 
philosophy of Fries," said Weia (1912, 17). Otto wrote: 
The source of Fries' doctrine of "Ahndung" - so 
far as it is not just the positive experience of 
the man himself - is the Kantian Criticism of 
Judgement. In this conne~tion, whoever hears the 
word with discrimination and compares other 
utterances of Kant, some quite early ones, is 
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bound to see that this important theory was 
already present as a companion of his theory of 
ideas. (PR 23; KFR 9) 
Ahnung is found most clearly in the feeling or aesthetic side 
because aesthetics is an example of unmediated consciousness. 
Central to the theory are the three modes of knowing, Wissen, 
Glauben, and Ahnden, which indicate respectively theoretic, 
ideal and feeling-conditioned knowledge. Fries's book 
Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung54 expresses this with considerable 
clarity (Gaede 3): "Wir wissen urn das Endliche, wir glauben 
an das Ewige, wir ahnden des Ewigen im Endlichen." ("We know 
the finite, we believe the eternal, we feel the eternal in 
the finite. " ) Aesthetic ideas reveal value and so give 
objects their higher significance, and this means that they 
act as communicators between the finite and the infinite. 
"The eternal significance of things (of this world) can only 
in pure feeling be known through Ahnung . . . In the beauty 
and sublime aspects of nature we become aware of the eternal 
in the finite" (Im Sch5nen und Erhabenen der Natur ahndenwir 
das Ewige im Endlichen.) (Gaede 1935, 15) 
Otto saw this system as a philosophical expression of what he 
had described earlier, as he makes explicit in KFR. This is 
the testimonium spiritus sancti which places the ultimate 
validity of religious truth in the heart of the ordinary 
believer. In this it tends to move against both 
ecclesiastical ritual and the~logical authority. Otto sees 
this line of Reformation thought reaching a peak in the Age 
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of Enlightenment by making Christianity both reasonable and 
directly available to ordinary non- intellectual people in its 
plainness, simplicity and helpfulness. This affects the way 
people see the relations between natural and supernatural. 
"Aufklarun~" theology aims at a 
reconciliation between belief in God and the new 
understanding of the universe according to the 
laws of Nature, now that the old semi-
supernatural Aristotelian views of nature and the 
old Ptolemaic views of the universe had 
disappeared. 55 
The 'proofs' of scholasticism are laid aside, and "the 
'layman's' self-help now becomes a declaration of the rights 
of 'feeling' as opposed to reflection. n 56 The result is that 
people see "Being in nature and Happening under the laws of 
Nature are nothing but the working of God, that Nature 
itself is nothing more than the form of the universal divine 
operation; n 57 
2. 6 "The Idea of the Holy" and the basis of religious 
knowledge 
One chapter in particular in The Idea of the Holy58 relates 
most obviously to education in religion. There are three 
sections. In the first, Otto notes that there is much in 
religion which can simply be passed from mind to mind by 
concepts, words and school instruction. What cannot be 
taught in this way is the numinous base and background, and 
the discussion of this occupies the much longer second 
section of the Chapter. This is central to the present 
Thesis and it becomes clear that much of DH is in fact about 
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this too, that is about means of stimulating awareness of the 
numinous and about means of expression. The third section is 
called 'Means by which the Numinous is expressed in Art' and 
provides a number of examples of religious phenomena, many 
others of which appear in other parts of the book. 
In the brief section on "Direct Means" Otto mentions reverent 
attitude and gesture as in worship, and the use of ideograms 
and schematisation by which appropriate terms are used to 
arouse or to indicate numinous experience of which the other 
must have had some previous awareness. This is of necessity 
an indirect approach, and these key terms are discussed more 
closely in the following sections of the Thesis. 
But in view of the previous book on the philosophy of 
religion, it is necessary also to investigate Otto's use of 
the term A priori. What Otto meant by this term is important 
because the application of Otto's method to religious 
education depends on an understanding which does not allow a 
wedge between the phenomena and knowledge of reality. That 
is why it is essential to try to clear this up in the next 
few pages. The a priori concerns the essence and means of 
knowing. What Otto meant by "schematisation" is important 
too because it seems to offer a key to understanding 
religion, both religion in general and particular religions, 
through and by means of the phenomena of religion. The fact 
that this is already commonly used as a teaching method does 
not absolve students from trying to see how phenomena and 
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understanding are essentially related. It could be said, 
therefore, that while both topics concern the same problem, 
the theme of DH and indeed of much of Otto's work, the ~ 
priori directs attention in the first place to knowing, while 
schematisation begins with rational concepts or perceived 
phenomena as a route to understanding something that is 
already albeit obscurely known. 
2.6.1 The religious 'A priori' 
The early part of DH is clearly religious phenomenology as 
was recognised from its first publication. It leaves a 
powerful impression on the reader, as was noted by Feigel, 
and many either read no further or, if they do, forget the 
later chapters which deal with the religious a priori. Thus 
the first question is whether these two parts of the book are 
consistent and really belong together. Linked to this is 
another question which centres on Otto's credentials as a 
philosopher of religion, and seeks to determine whether 
Otto's a priori is recognisably in the Kantian tradition, or 
whether, as many have maintained, it is really an Urdatum or 
Urphanomen and Otto is guilty of psychologism on the same 
pat tern as Fries59 . These are important questions because 
if Otto cannot be considered a philosopher of religion in 
this book which is at the heart of his thesis, then, valuable 
though his phenomenology is for the study of religion, he 
will be unable to provide the philosophical anchorage which 
is required. Those who study him may feel with him in the 
depths of the soul, but unless they can be sure with Otto 
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that the numinous is in some sense a reality, they are left 
with a general emotionalism, interesting as a psychological 
state, but not religious experience that a religious person 
would recognise. A closer discussion of Kant and the basis 
of knowledge is to be met in the next Chapter under the 
sources for Otto's thought. Meanwhile this section will 
concentrate on how Otto applied that basis of knowledge. 
Otto is still accused by some60 of changing from philosophy 
in KFR to phenomenology in DH, although he obviously himself 
believed that the two books were entirely consistent. But it 
is necessary to establish consistency 
aspects of Otto's work within DH itself. 
be tween these two 
Otto speaks of the 
complex idea of the holy which is constituted essentially out 
of rational (conceptual) and non-rational (intuited) aspects 
in all its phases, except perhaps the very crudest and these 
are sometimes called pre-religious - a phrase which got Otto 
into trouble with Feigel and other critics. Otto draws on 
psychology in his description of the sensus numinis, and felt 
that he had justified this intellectually through his 
adaptation of the philosophy of Kant and Fries. Instead he 
has been accused of exchanging the philosophy of 
transcendental idealism for pragmatism in the style of 
William James and of Peirce, or else of having abandoned 
philosophy altogether. 
The treatment of the non-rational is developed at length in 
DH, both by the wealth of examples from religions all over 
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the world, and in particular by the clever device of the 
sensus numinis which refers also to the human psyche and thus 
allows an analysis by reflection as it were of the Numinous 
itself. It is these two factors which seem to have changed 
Otto from a philosophical theologian working a priori into a 
psychologist who works a posteriori and a phenomenologist. 
The theological interest reasserts itself at the end of the 
book, although it is not far below the surface throughout, 
but some readers have either ignored this, or finding it hard 
to fit with what they think Otto must have meant, have 
regarded it as an aberration, or a sentimentalism for old 
time's sake. Otto himself wrote in the 1920s: 
The aim which led my research was neither the 
study of religion (ein religionsgeschichtliches 
Interesse) nor religious psychology. It was 
theology and in fact Christian theology. 61 
The first difficulty is met in the first chapter where Otto 
makes it quite clear that the basic category in religion, the 
holy, consists of both rational and non-rational elements. 
But the fact that rational elements cannot exhaust what is 
meant by the holy serves to underline the fact that the non-
rational, for which Otto coined the term 'numinous', is more 
basic and is the essential element of religion before ever 
the rational ideas came into focus. 
Harvey explains in his Translator's Preface to IH62 that he 
has chosen to use non-rational as a translation of irrational 
on the grounds that 'irrational' both in English and German 
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sounds as if it is in some way antirational, when what Otto 
means is something outside the field of rationality 
altogether. On the face of it, that which is not rational 
cannot be derived from philosophy, so any philosopher of 
religion is faced with the dilemma: either a system is to be 
constructed which is as rational as possible, or space must 
be allowed for some basic force or entity which is just there 
and cannot be rationally accounted for. The first route 
gives us the god of the philosophers which never seems to 
match up to the experiences of religion, and this means that 
the system is challenged by evidence a posteriori. Otto 
chose the other alternative, and in this his basis for 
religion is in parallel to the epistemology of Nelson and of 
Fries. 
Now the rational and the non-rational elements of the holy 
stand in a special relationship to each other. The non-
rational cannot properly be described: it can only be felt, 
or else concepts can be applied to it in the way that Otto 
brings out in his discussion of the 'ideogram' and 
'schematisation', which form the subject of section 2.6.2 of 
the present Thesis. The problem of the relation of the 
rational to the non-rational is the problem of the relation 
of philosophy to phenomenology. 
Theodor Siegfried takes the subtitle of DH as the guiding 
thread of Otto's endeavour: 
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If the general guiding thread is the question of 
the relationship of the rational and the non-
rational, then it is at once clear that this is 
a formal theme. It does not contain any 
theological axiom, whether orthodox or liberal. 
Instead it is a heuristic principle for 
clarification. Even before we have any idea how 
fruitful this principle can be shown to be, it 
reveals itself as a specifically scientific 
principle, or rather a spec\fic principle for 
questioning and for research. 3 
Otto writes repeatedly of the human capacity (Anlage) or 
capacity of the inmost mind (Anlage des Gemlites) as the locus 
for the meeting or fusion of rational and non-rational64 . 
The numinous cannot be proved, but can be awakened, Otto 
maintains, in the human consciousness. In this way the 
numinous can be indicated. 
Otto claims that human beings possess this special faculty or 
disposition (Anlage) which is open to the numinous. The 
Anlage plays a central role in Otto's thought. A number of 
passages in DH are significant, although probably not 
conclusive, for the question of the reality of the Anlage. 
The chapter entitled "The Holy as an A Priori Category Part 
One" 65 has quite a lot to say, but Otto has not set out to 
answer this ontological question. 
And the only way we can throw any light upon the 
whole region of sub-human psychical life is by 
interpreting it once again as a sort of 
'predisposition' (Anlage) at a second remove, 
i.e. a predisposition to form the predispositions 
or faculties of the actual developed mind, and 
standing in relation to this as the embryo to the 
full-grown organism. But we are not completely 
in the dark as to the meaning of this word 
'predisposition'. For in our awakening and 
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growth to spiritual maturity we trace in 
ourselves by some sort the evolution by which the 
seed develops into the tree - the very opposite 
of 'transformation' and 'epigenesis' by 
successive addition. We call the source of 
growth a hidden • predisposition' of the human 
spirit, which awakens when aroused by divers 
excitations. That there are 'predispositions' of 
this sort in individuals no one can deny who has 
given serious study to the history of religion. 
They are seen as propensities~ 'predestining' the 
individual to religion . . . o6 
DH Kapi tel 467 depends throughout on the analysis of specific 
feelings and the comparison of natural and numinous feelings. 
Here we find again Anlage and Anlage des Gemlites, and the 
implied metaphor of a glass which reflects, or a screen which 
can register the shadow, tempts to a semi-physical 
conception. 
Consideration of the Anlage des Gemlites emphasises the 
problem of Otto's use of the term a priori which is held in 
tension between two extremes. One is strictly 
epistemological (and derives directly from Kant), the other 
psychological. Otto wanted to hold these two together by 
locating the a priori within the human soul (Gemlit) which he 
interpreted as something more fundamental than reason. 
There is no doubt that Otto's language could have been more 
precise, in spite of his disclaimer (frequent in DH) that his 
subject eludes conceptual thought and verbal description. In 
his later writings (Das Geftihl der Verantwortlichkeit, 
originally published 1931) 68 . he describes the feeling of 
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responsibility, the consciousness of being oneself under 
obligation, as a basic, simple Datum (Boozer 150b). Like 
other primary data (Urdata), what it is cannot be described 
clearly, although the others can for the most part be clearly 
seen. Then Otto brings in the simile of an object under a 
blanket. This is worth quoting. 
In this it is as if a blanket lay over it which 
prevents us forming a concept. We feel it under 
this blanket to an extent, and we can "discuss" 
it in that we can apply different concepts to it 
and can say with certainty, this one applies, 
that one does not. But it never comes out from 
under its blanket, and if we think we have caught 
it and can now pull it out, it escapes us once 
more. It leaves us in the end with the 
embarrassment of an ontological "Impasse" and an 
axiological Antinomy. We have it "in feeling" 
and can speak of it therefore as a feeling of 
responsibility. (Boozer 150c) 
The unknown here has a considerably empirical character, and 
seems to place Otto firmly among the phenomenologists, 
working a posteriori. But this is not fair to him. In fact 
the situation was never totally clear and reviews of DH take 
different sides on this issue. 
Feige169 • as might be expected, is forceful here, but misses 
the subtlety of the position Otto has taken over from Kant. 
He baldly maintains that Otto's philosophical language is a 
sham and an attempt to conceal his psychologism by using 
Kantian terms. And by following Fries he has actually 
increased the distance between Kant and himself (Feigel 
69bc). What Otto is really writing is psychology, or worse, 
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psychologism, which is empirically derived psychology dressed 
up in philosophical terms, and therefore his philosophy of 
religion is unreal and indefensible. Feigel claims that Kant 
clarified once and for all the distinction between them: the 
concept of apriori belongs to the sphere of reason, while the 
innate belongs to the empirical (Feigel 66a). And now Otto's 
attempt to explain "the non-rational factor in the idea of 
the divine and its relation to the rational" (subtitle of IH, 
DH) is according to Feigel impossible, and the very 
suggestion a contradiction. How can "the idea of the divine" 
be non-rational? This is anabsurdity (Unding) (Feigel69b). 
But Feigel did not leave the problem there. Although 
apparently his mind was already made up, he takes some pages 
to examine the non-rational moments of the Holy in relation 
to the apriori. Here, with reference to Kap. 16 of DH70 , he 
records Otto's claim to go "deeper than pure reason" (DH 
139a) to the "ground of the soul" (Seelengrund- DH 138a): it 
is here that knowledge (Erkenntnis) of the holy is to be 
found. But again Feigel denies Otto the right to apply 
"idea" or "knowledge" to the non-rational ideas: "What can be 
understood anyway by non-rational ideas? Ideas are rational, 
or they are not ideas." (Feigel 71b). And he sums it up by 
saying: "The falsity of Otto's claim . only needs to be 
noticed, not proved" (Feigel 71c). His position remains the 
same, that Otto has gone even further than in his book of 
1909 (KFR) and that DH is fundamentally a work of religious 
psychology, or psycho log ism in that it dresses its psychology 
Chapter Two 77 
in philosophical disguise. 
Among those who would not accept Otto's a priori as Kantian 
is Ernst Troeltsch. Troeltsch reviewed the first edition of 
DH in Kant-Studien for 1919 in which he says that Otto 
indicates clearly current problems in the philosophy of 
religion, but handles them in a different way from 
Windelband, whose book (fortuitously of the same title) had 
recently appeared. While Windelband follows neo-Kantian 
theory to seek a basis for the validity of religious ideas, 
Otto is using the neo-Friesian "anthropological critique" 
which is essentially a psychological analysis, and from this 
position tries to answer epistemological and other 
philosophical questions ( Troel tsch 65c) . Troe 1 tsch sees this 
as following up an article of his own "Die SelbstAndigkeit 
der Religion" of twenty years earlier71 in which he too was 
looking for a historical-psychological basis for religion. 
The kernel of Otto's work is psychological analysis, and his 
epistemology boils down to a reliance on underivable 
psychological givens which can only be handled by 
understanding and intuitive feeling. So the work under 
review is psychology of religion with supplements from 
epistemology and "historical philosophy". 72 
Troeltsch agrees to Otto's application of the term Apriori to 
the Numen, to mean that it is underivable, independent, 
spontaneous. But he stresses that this Apriori is not 
related to Kant's Apriori (70bc), and adds that Otto needs to 
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distinguish between what is psychological and what is 
epistemological (71b). Otto's claims to be following Kant 
Troeltsch describes as a smash and grab raid when Otto takes 
Kant's schematisation, a theory which can have no relation to 
psychology (72). At the end Troeltsch says that Otto's work 
brings out again the reformation doctrine of the Spirit as 
Schleiermacher had done, and to this has applied Fries's 
teaching about the relevant human disposition or Anlage. 
K. Bornhausen had already dealt with the question of Otto's 
use of a priori in his 1910 review of KFR in Zthk 73 • It is 
directly relevant to the theme of DH. Although Otto 
correctly, according to Bornhausen, explains Kant's critique 
where Kant describes human perception as "obscure knowledge", 
Otto abandons Kant where he follows Fries's theory for the 
grounding of the validity of the categories. The focus must 
be on the term Apriori, through which the categories have 
their validity. For Kant, knowledge a priori is independent 
of all experience, and for it he sought transcendental proofs 
in pure reason. Otto, however, is putting ~orward anApriori 
which is even more basic than the Apriori, i.e. goes beyond 
the Apriori, and that is impossible because it would be 
outside reason. Whatever it might be, Otto's use of the term 
Apriori is not justified. Otto claims that he is using the 
transcendental method to find and ground "the unity and 
necessity of all being", that is, going beyond all human 
reason into areas only accessible to Glauben, Ahnung, and 
Geftihl ( 351-2). Otto's method, following Fries, is not 
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kritisch-transszendental but psychologisch-anthropologisch. 
Bornhausen describes the use of the word ~transcendental" by 
Otto and Fries as "shimmering like a chameleon." (35lb). 
Bornhausen suggests some pages later (361-2) that when Otto 
speaks of "transcendental idealism" as transcending reason, 
he has confused Transcendental with Transcendent, inasmuch as 
religion is transcendent. What Kant puts forward is the 
means to transcend experience, sense-perception, in order to 
find the possibility of knowledge in the ground of the 
intellect. Related to this is the question of the 
possibility of experience, which could be psychological 
experience, but the question is not about psychology itself. 
The transcendental question therefore is about the form of 
knowledge and how it is possible; whereas the question of the 
content of knowledge is a psychological question. Otto and 
Fries, concludes Bornhausen, see transcendental idealism as 
something belonging to the realm of ideas and yielding 
knowledge of things in themselves, not limited by time and 
space. 
Otto's position received more sympathetic treatment from 
others who saw more clearly what he was trying to describe 
and why he had to call on psychological, empirical evidence 
in order to bring to notice something that was not itself 
dependent on such data, but only revealed by their means. 
This is in line with some of the writings of Kant. Siegfried 
made two contributions to the Marburger theologische Studien 
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of 1931, one of which is entitled Grundfragen der Theologie 
bei Rudolf Otto74 . Two pages of this long article in 
particular help to clarify Otto's use of the Apriori. What 
follows is virtually a paraphrase of pp.22-23. 
Siegfried speaks of four moments in Otto's Apriori, all of 
which depend on Kant's definition, but develop it and go far· 
beyond. The first moment is that Otto's Apriori is not 
formal but object-related (gegenstandlich). If one were to 
see God as the Housekeeper or Maintainer of the world, this 
is made possible because of an Apriori capacity (Vermogen). 
Siegfried acknowledges that this has aroused the accusation 
that Otto has psychologised Kant's Apriori. But the Apriori 
relates to content, and the content is God as Maintainer and 
Creator in contrast to anything empirical. This content goes 
beyond any knowledge derived from experience and cannot be 
deduced from it. In fact this Apriori brings out the fact 
that this knowledge of God is independent and contrasted with 
empirical knowledge or knowledge from experience. This is 
not a psychologising because the Apriori concerns an object. 
Even though Otto reaches his famous description by means of 
an analysis of the human feeling reaction, yet the object 
itself is not affected or touched. This is the first moment. 
The second is that the Apriori describes the living 
relationship between God and man, both in reality and in 
potential. This relationship is Apriori because it cannot be 
derived from other premisses. If the divine is the object 
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which comes in the form of the religious Apriori, then the 
religious Apriori also includes the uncondi tionedness or 
absoluteness of the divine. 
This Apriori emphasises its uniqueness and this leads thirdly 
to the idea of a religious capacity (Anlage). If we allow 
the term Apriori to God's freedom and living revelation, it 
must also describe on the human side the capacity through 
which revelation is actualised. The fourth moment is the 
relationship of this capacity to other human capacities, in 
short the relation of revelation to people in the world, thus 
involving the concept of mind-soul capacity (Vermogen) which 
in particular includes the reason. 
Siegfried's analysis seems to cover Otto's uses of Apriori, 
and suggests too the possibility of a multiplicity of 
Aprioris in the religious sphere. This appears confusing if 
A.Qriori is thought of, as sometimes in Otto, as a content, 
rather than content-related. But as a mode for the non-
derivabili ty of knowledge, pre~mmably Apriori is neither 
single nor multiple, and not related to number at all. 
Karl Heim published an article on "Otto's Category of the 
Holy and the Absolute Claims of Christian Faith" part of 
which is relevant here75 . He im begins from Otto's DH and 
wants to explore the ways in which two dangers can be 
avoided: one is to claim Christianity as the supreme and 
absolute religion to which all others are subordinate, and 
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the other is to champion a timeless and eventless rational 
religion to which all actual religions including Christianity 
are opposed. To ground his basis for religion, Otto needed 
Kant's Apriori (18c). This Otto finds in the Gemlit (not as 
Kant in the Vernunft), "and thus brings about what Troeltsch 
demands, a religious Apriori free from dogmatic and 
metaphysical rationalisation." (19c). 
Another perceptive review is that by Georg Wobbermin76 , who 
was a psychologist. After noting that DH is now 383 pages 
long while the 1917 edition was 192, he goes to the heart of 
the matter when he says that Otto follows two tendencies (as 
noted also by Troel tsch). One is a psychological analysis of 
religion in which Otto follows on and takes further the work 
of Schleiermacher. The other tendency is to follow Fries and 
the neofriesian school in trying to find foundation for the 
Holy as a category Apriori. In fact, Wobbermin continues, 
Otto wants an Apriori in order to hold these two tendencies 
together. Wobbermin thinks that Otto's psychological 
analysis is good, although he has some differences in detail 
which he discusses in the rest of this review. 
R. F. Davidson77 suggests that the work of Troeltsch on !!. 
priori influenced Otto. In seeking to free religion from 
aesthetics, Otto found Troeltsch's suggestion of a plurality 
of aprioris could help him. Thus in DH he completed the move 
from thinking of the apriori as the presupposition of reason, 
however engaged, to thinking of apriori as a mode of the 
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reason's activity, and so different in knowing, in 
appreciating beauty, in ethical sense and in the response to 
the numinous. 
Kant's philosophy makes a distinction between a priori 
categories of theoretical understanding on the one hand, and 
a priori categories of meaning and value on the other. 
Davidson clarifies this when he commends Troeltsch for 
distinguishing the a priori of science from that of ethical-
religious-aesthetic forms of value judgement, in opposition 
to the Marburg school of neokantians (before 1914) 78 • 
Troeltsch did not develop this clearly, but Otto seems to be 
correct in claiming Kant's authority, and justified when he 
goes one step further and posits a third category of a priori 
for religious consciousness which is distinct from the moral 
and aesthetic. This is because Otto's understanding of ~ 
priori in religion is not epistemological but axiological. 
If this is correct, it would explain why Otto did not reply 
to those critics, like Geyser, who demanded to know on what 
he based his knowledge of God. Otto's a priori is a category 
of consciousness and not of theoretical knowledge. Davidson 
writes: 
Consequently Otto is able to identify the 
category of the holy as the religious Apriori and 
to define its nature with some degree of accuracy 
and comprehensiveness; while Troel tsch could 
only insist upon "the existence somewhere in 
religion of an a priori .element" which he was 
never actually able to identify. (Davidson 168-9) 
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In 1953 Joachim Wach published a talk79 entitled "Rudolf Otto 
und der Begriff des Heiligen". Wach maintains that in DH 
Otto has indeed produced an answer, and a new answer, to the 
question of the religious apriori (205b), a question probably 
first brought to him by Troeltsch when they were colleagues 
at Gottingen (205a). This he found, Wach continues, by his 
examination of the uniqueness of religious experience and by 
his demonstration of its constitutive categories. Thus Otto 
has shown that mystery is an objective quality (210b). This 
became possible because Otto saw that the basic problem of 
knowledge is not so much "How is knowledge possible?", but 
rather "How is experience possible?" (209a), a problem which 
required seeing the foundation work of Kant in a new light. 
Otto has demonstrated that "only the innermost, the idea of 
the holy itself, can be the measure for the value of a 
religion as religion"80. 
Wach at any rate thinks that Otto has a valid philosophical 
method which he has used to at tack the psycho log ism of 
Feuerbach (and by implication Freud too) in ways not unlike 
the methods of the Austrian school of Husserl and Scheler 
(207b). At the same time by his deep analysis of religious 
experience, he has uncovered the basic "sense" of religion 
( 207b-c) which is in its way parallel to the "sense" for 
morality established by Kant. 
2.6.2 How Otto used ·schematisation' 
The term 'schematisation' (Schematisierung) was used by Kant, 
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and Otto claims to be re-using Kant's term for his own 
purposes. The context for this is the relationship between 
the rational and the non-rational, and therefore between the 
philosophical system and the phenomenology in Otto's thesis. 
Given Otto's own claim to be following Kant, it is not 
surprising that commentators have compared Otto's use of the 
term with that of Kant, and usually found it to be 
interesting, but not in the last resort the same or even a 
legitimate piece of appropriation. In analysing Otto's use 
they have kept closely to the rational schematising the non-
rational, or even to the way the moral may be said to 
schematise the numinous, as this is clearly stated in Otto's 
writings. But it is not all so clear. A breakthrough comes, 
however, if the way Schleiermacher used schematisation is 
taken into account, and this offers a rather different 
picture, and one which is not only more helpful in 
understanding Otto, but one which suggests a real connection 
between religious phenomena and ultimate reality. This last 
is of central concern for religious education. 
Kant's Schematisierung is to be discussed in this section 
first and comments on Otto's use of the term compared to 
this. Then attention will be turned to Schleiermacher and 
the way prepared for a closer application of schematisation 
in Chapter Five, section 5.5 of this Thesis. 
In KFR Otto notes correctly that in Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason the Categories are schematised by time and space which 
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alone make them patient of experience by rational beings. 
When the limitations are negated, then the speculative ideas 
are revealed in their pure metaphysical form. Kant's Schema 
serves to make perceptible the content of the abstract 
concepts, and at the same time to show up the ca tegor ial 
structure of what is perceived. In Otto's work, however, the 
Schema which he ascribes to Kant is used to demonstrate 
something quite different, and not in relation to time and 
space at all. Instead Otto applies his Schema to the 
rational and the non-rational. In Kant's system, time and 
space make the rational perceptible: in Otto's, the rational 
is supposed by schematisation to make the non-rational 
susceptible to reasoned analysis. What Otto has done is to 
use a device which will make something which is unclear 
susceptible to systematic consideration. In Kant pure 
causation is made perceptible when schematised by time, and 
for Otto pure intuited awareness of something real is 
schematised by the rational and brought within the field of 
philosophy. There is a sort of parallel. Geyser finds 
Otto's use of Kant's term "unfortunate" (nicht sehr 
glticklich, loG 29). 
Otto also uses the term 'ideogram' in ways which suggest a 
close connection if not identity with schematisation. The 
process may be called schematisation but the coded term or 
phrase which carries the schema may be called an ideogram. 
These two terms must be briefly compared, because with the 
ideogram, Otto seems to be on surer ground. It is all very 
Chapter Two 87 
well for Feigel81 to complain that Otto has failed to 
establish the objectivity of what the ideogram purports to 
represent, but this is not the responsibility of the 
ideogram. Frick82 reemphasises Otto's point that no-one can 
appreciate the numinous in religion who has not had the 
experience. One must have had the experience in order to 
make sense of the ideogram. This means that an ideogram has 
a definite relationship to what it represents. On this 
point, P. Brunner83 , comparing Otto and James, notes that 
while in James analogies are somewhat arbitrary. for Otto the 
ideogram must be appropriate. Frick makes clear that this is 
essential and further that it must be possible to tell 
whether an ideogram is appropriate or not. Otto is definite 
on this point: 
And that the schematism is a genuine one, and not 
a mere combination of analogies. may be 
distinctly seen from the fact that it does not 
fall to pieces. and cannot be cut out as the 
development of the consciousness of religious 
truth proceeds onwards and upwards, but is only 
recognized with greater definiteness and 
certainty. (IH 45; DH 61) 
Thus the ideogram acts as a stimulus to recalling something 
of which the hearer is aware. In this. says Frick. it is 
like good poetry. But this is only the first part of the 
meaning of Otto's ideogram. What it recalls escapes us 
conceptually, yet not entirely, and thus it is no fantasy, 
not arbitrary, but disciplined and controlled. Because it is 
non-rational, it does not use ordinary logic and 
epistemology, but it has a kind of logic (Frick uses inverted 
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commas) of its own. 
The chapter on Luther in DH deals in part with the connection 
between the moral-rational and the non-rational sacred in the 
complex idea of the holy84 . 
Otto speaks of the ideogram at this place too (IH 107b; DH 
132b): wrath, fire and fury are said to be "excellent 
ideograms" for the non-rational element of awe-fulness, the 
tremendum. The connection here is closely akin to the 
connection of schematisation, if not identical in effect, the 
only difference being that the ideogram is a word or brief 
phrase which acts either as an express ion or else as a 
trigger for one particular aspect of the non-rational. The 
ideogram must be seen to be valid on the one hand; on the 
other it must be seen to be an ideogram and not a 
description. "If such an ideogram is taken as an adequate 
concept," writes Otto, "the result is anthropomorphism." 
(ibid.) 
In an earlier passage on how the ideogram represents the 
relation between rational and non-rational Otto distinguishes 
deep joy in religious terms from deep joy in other contexts. 
A deep joy may fill our minds without any clear 
realization upon our part of its source and the 
object to which it refers, though some such 
objective reference there must always be. But as 
attention is directed to it the obscure object 
becomes clearly identified in precise conceptual 
terms. Such an object cannot, then, be called, 
in our sense of the word, • non-rational' . But it 
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is quite otherwise with religious 'bliss' and its 
essentially numinous aspect, the fascinans. Not 
the most concentrated attention can elucidate the 
object to which this state of mind refers, 
bringing it out of the impenetrable obscurity of 
feeling into the domain of the conceptual 
understanding. It remains purely a felt 
experience, only to be indicated symbolically by 
'ideograms'. That is what we mean by saying it 
is non-rational. (IH 58c-59a; DH 76bc) 
In his use of the ideogram Otto shows a further possibility 
when he discusses Plato's contribution to the rationalising 
of religion. Both Plato and Aristotle were invoked by 
medieval schoolmen, and in Plato's philosophy the deity has 
become The Idea of the Good, something purely rational and 
conceptual. But Plato knew this was too narrow in that, to 
quote Otto, 
He (Plato) grasps the object of religion by quite 
different means than those of conceptual 
thinking, viz. by the 'ideograms' of myth, by 
'enthusiasm' or inspiration, 'eros' or love, 
• mania' or the divine frenzy. . No one has 
enunciated more definitively than this master-
thinker that God transcends all reason, in the 
sense that He is beyond the powers of our 
conce1v1ng, not merely beyond the powers of 
comprehension. (IH 95ab; DH 117ab) 
Here it is not a case of the rational schematising the non-
rational, but rather that a form of words - in this case a 
Platonic myth - serves as an ideogram for an inexpressible 
idea. J P Reeder (v.inf.) is not the only critic who 
suspects that Otto simply equates the verbal with the 
conceptual with the rational. Yet the Plato example would be 
a case where he does not do this. At the start of the book, 
when Otto is first introducing the rational and the non-
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rational, he wrote, 
All language, in so far as it consists of words, 
purports to convey ideas or concepts; - that is 
what language means; - and the more clearly and 
unequivocally it does so, the better the 
language. And hence expositions of religious 
truth in language inevitably tend to stress the 
'rational' attributes of God. (IH 2a; DH 2b) 
90 
John P. Reeder discusses Otto's application of schematisation 
within an article on the relation of the moral to the 
numinous85 • He introduces schematisation as Otto did in DH 
by quoting the context of the psychological theory of the 
Association of Feelings, and its parallel the Association of 
Ideas. This theory was a commonplace in pre-Freudian 
psychology, and is found in Schleiermacher and in William 
James. It is a not altogether convincing theory that one 
idea can give way to another according to a pattern without 
having an essential connection. Otto may well have picked 
this up from James (VRE 217) when he studied his psychology, 
but Geyser is not unreasonably critical (loG 26). 
Indeed the theory of Association does not seem at all helpful 
because Otto is trying to say that there is an a priori link 
between the schema and the thing schematised which is more 
than an analogy. Frick's remarks on the ideogram clarified 
that relationship, and it will help if they can be applied to 
this too. Reeder accepts that the way ideograms and 
schematisation work are the same (Reeder 266b), although he 
earlier thought they might be contrasted (265b), but that was 
not his considered view. 
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Otto gives his own summary of how Kant's use of this device 
is as a "necessary connexion" "according to principles of 
true inward affinity and cohesion" (IH 45a; nach Prinzipien 
innerer wesensmaf3iger Zusammengehorigkeit DH 61a). 
An instance of a connexion of this latter kind -
an example, indeed, of an inner a priori 
principle - is (following the theory of Kant) the 
connexion of the category of causality with its 
temporal 'schema', the temporal sequence of two 
successive events, which by being brought into 
connexion with the category of causality is known 
and recognised as a causal relation of the two 
The fact the two belong together is here a 
necessity of our reason. On the basis of such a 
necessity the temporal sequence 'schematises' the 
category (IH 45b; DH 61ab) 
The instance of cause and effect is a particularly important 
one. David Hume appealed to an extreme form of empiricism to 
deny the validity of causation, and it is known that Kant 
wished to counter him by finding in reason arguments to 
invalidate Hume's extreme scepticism. Schematisation 
provides such an argument, because the purely rational 
category of cause and effect which is admittedly not 
perceptible by purely empirical sensation, is accessible to 
reason as a pure a priori. Once the necessary connection of 
this rational concept with temporal succession is brought 
out, then the succession acts as a schema to the rational 
category to give us cause and effect. It must of course be 
emphasised that this connection between succession and 
category is a necessary one, because any suggestion of chance 
coincidence would support the scepticism of Hume. 
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Otto now presen.ts his own version of schematisation in a 
passage that follows directly the previous citation: 
Now the relation of the rational to the non-
rational element in the idea of the holy or 
sacred is just such a one of 'schematization', 
and the non-rational numinous fact, schematized 
by the rational concepts we have suggested above, 
yields us the complex category of 'holy' itself, 
richly charged and complete in its fullest 
meaning (IH 45c; ergibt uns die satte und volle 
Komplex-Kategorie des Heiligen selbst im 
Vollsinne, DH 6lb) 
It is a little confusing that Otto uses the word Kategorie to 
mean something quite different from what in Kant has become 
a technical term for the twelve purely rational, simple and 
a priori Categories. The confusion is further compounded 
when it is seen that in Kant a temporal succession which can 
be experienced schematises a distinct and rational concept, 
while for Otto it is the clear, rational concept (e.g. 
"spirit, reason, purpose, good will, supreme power, unity, 
selfhood" IH lab; DH lab) which schematises the non-
conceptual, indistinct and non-rational which is the 
numinous. Many commentators have noted this contrast86 . 
Has Otto just "made a grab" for Kant's term (so Troeltsch) or 
is there in fact a similarity which could turn out to be 
valid and instructive ? Two points can be made in Otto's 
favour, although Otto does not himself explicitly make them. 
The first concerns the range of the factors which provide the 
schema. Succession in time is not exclusively bound up with 
causality but can be found in many other contexts. Similarly 
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Otto's list of rational ideas such as reason, purpose and 
power have many applications apart from the holy. The 
necessary link between moral and sacred is an additional § 
priori factor. The second similarity is connected with these 
applications in that examples can be found empirically both 
of succession in time and of cases which exhibit power, 
purpose and reason. Thus there is a closely parallel 
connection between what is readily accessible and that which 
is more obscure: viz. temporal succession with the category 
of causation in one case, and power and purpose with the 
numinous in the other. In both cases that which is 
schematised - for Kant causation and for Otto the numinous -
is accessible immediately to human reason as pure a priori, 
in the one case as a pure and rational concept, in the other 
as a non-conceptual presentiment. 
After a lengthy consideration of Kant's use of 
schematisation, and several leading authorities on the 
subject, the reader is left with the feeling that it is at 
best ambiguous. Reeder also points out that Kant used the 
same terms for the process and the result of'schematising. 
Perhaps Otto can be forgiven, therefore, for applying his own 
interpretation. There can be little doubt that Otto is using 
Kant's term in a different way. It is less clear how far he 
thought he was changing it. 
For both Kant and Otto it is necessary to see and to stress 
the necessary connection between schema and what is 
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schematised. Otto says of the rational attributes in 
religion: 
They are • essential' (and not merely 
'accidental') attributes of that subject, but 
they are also, it is important to notice, 
synthetic essential attributes. That is to say, 
we have to predicate them of a subject which they 
qualify, but which in its deeper essence is not, 
nor indeed can be, comprehended in them. (IH 2b; 
DH 2b) 
Of the rational concepts which schematise the sacred, Otto 
gives most attention to the moral, the concepts of good, 
absolute goodness. 
But this 'holy' then represents the gradual 
shaping and filling in with ethical meaning, or 
what we shall call the 'schematization', of what 
was a unique original feeling- response, which can 
be in itself ethically neutral and claims 
consideration in its own right. (IH 6b; DH 6bc) 
The connection itself is not only essential, but also .2, 
priori as Otto explains later on. 
not only the rational but also the non-
rational elements of the complex category of 
'holiness' are a priori elements ... But the 
same a priori character belongs, in the third 
place, to the connexion of the rational and the 
non-rational elements in religion, their inward 
and necessary union. (IH 136a; DH 165ab) 
Commentators connect Otto's use of Schema and Schematisation 
with Kant, and rightly so as he himself makes this derivation 
explicit. But the link is also found in Schleiermacher, and 
this use of the term appears closer to that of Otto. As Otto 
edited the Reden early in his scholarly career, the 
likelihood of influence is strong. 
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In the third Speech, that on education for religion, 
Schleiermacher suggests that religion can only be felt and 
contemplated through intuition of the universe, that is 
through reflection on natural phenomena in the first 
instance. 
I know that every religion whose schematism was 
either the heavens or organic nature proceeded 
from the intuition of the world. Polytheistic 
Egypt was for a long time the most perfect 
guardian of this disposition in which - it can at 
least be surmised - the purest intuition of the 
original infinite and living being may have 
wandered in humble toleration close beside the 
darkest superstition and most absurd mythology. 
(Cr. 157c-158a: R.168) 
The next stage allows art to schematise the sense or 
awareness of the divine. It appears here that Schleiermacher 
means that the phenomena of religion, whether natural 
phenomena or man-made artefacts, are the schematism for 
religion itself, which must remain at least partly hidden and 
only accessible to feeling in the sense discussed earlier. 
This is a little clearer, perhaps, in a passage a few pages 
earlier: 
In our relationship to this world there are 
certain transitions into the infinite, vistas 
that are hewn through, before which each person 
is led so that his sense might find the way to 
the universe and upon whose sight feelings are 
stimulated that, to be sure, are not immediately 
religion, but that are, if I may say so, a 
schematism of the same. (Cr. 150a; R.153) 
Now it seems to be the feelings stirred by the universe which 
schematise the true feelings -of religion, but it is almost 
certainly a mistake to try to analyse Schleiermacher's use of 
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schematism so precisely. In a footnote Crouter adds, 
"Schleiermacher makes free use of the Kantian term 
"schematism" it is difficult to see how, on Kant's 
terms, religion could constitute a schema." (Cr.150n) Yet 
Schleiermacher does not say that religion is a schema for 
something else, but that the phenomena can be a schema for 
religion. 
This is very different, but has with it two implications. 
The first is that, as Otto made clear, it is vital if 
schematisation is to work that there be an essential and not 
an arbitrary connection between schema and what is 
schematised. The second is to suggest that it is possible to 
develop an understanding, and not an entirely rational 
understanding of religion by consideration of the phenomena 
of religion. Here consideration includes study, discussion, 
reflection and any means which help towards clarification. 
These methods are taken up again in Chapter Five of this 
Thesis. Thus consideration of Schleiermacher' s use of 
schematism rather than Kant's suggests another and an 
important possibility for understanding Otto's use of the 
term. 
Otto also shows that schematisation has a part to play in 
practical terms. The main clue comes at the end of an 
important chapter in DH on "Analogies and Associated 
Feelings" 87 . To illustrate the importance of schematisation 
Otto invokes two lengthy analogies. The first is the erotic, 
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in which ordinary affections stand for the rational in love 
which serves to schematise the sex instinct, which is non-
rational, or, as Otto hastens to add, below the rational. 
This is in contrast to the numinous which is above all reason 
(IH 46-47; DH 61-63). The second analogy is "the state of 
mind induced in us by a song set to music" (IH 47c; DH 63c). 
Programme music apart, in a song the words express the 
rational and the music the non-rational, and both belong 
together. Programme music, however, presents "a musical 
'rationalization' in the bad sense" because it implies that 
"the inner content of music is not - as in fact it is -
something deep and mysterious" (IH 48c; DH 64b). But the 
basic point is that, as in religion, so in music, the 
rational serves to schematise the non-rational to make a 
composite whole. The rational also helps us to consider and 
reflect on the non-rational, as is suggested in the following 
words: 
We can only succeed in very partial and 
fragmentary fashion in 'schematizing' the non-
rational factor in music by means of familiar 
incidents of human experience. (IH 49a; DH 64c) 
This suggestion is then greatly expanded and clarified in the 
chapters on Means of Expression of the Numinous (IH IX; DH 
11), and The Earliest Manifestations (IH XV; DH 17), and The 
Cruder Phases ( IH XVI; DH 18). Manifestations which also act 
as triggers relate to the triggers for ecstasy in Laski's 
book as discussed in Chapter Four, and the sequence of 
development of numinous consciousness from earliest 
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manifestations and its cruder phases might also be unpacked 
in relation to religious education if only Otto were a little 
more systematic. 
2.7 Indian Writings 
Otto's Indian writings form a characteristic aspect of his 
work, and in this they do not represent a new departure. Two 
things can be noted at the outset which link in with his 
previous work. One of these is the stress on the numinous as 
non-rational which is salient for Otto in manifestations of 
Indian religions, and the other is the note of inwardness in 
that strain of mysticism which centres on the 'god within.' 
Otto certainly regarded Indian forms of religion as important 
manifestations of the holy in both rational and non-rational 
forms, but he chose to emphasise the non-rational. In two of 
his books he also compares aspects of Hindu religion with 
corresponding aspects of Christianity, in both cases pointing 
out essential contrasts as well as parallels. 
Das Heilige88 in the first edition had just one illustration. 
Its strangeness to Western European eyes forces it on the 
reader's attention: it is the fearsome form of the Bengali 
goddess Durga, black-faced, with many teeth, and holding a 
severed head in one of her four hands. Yet in Bengal she is 
first and foremost the goddess of love, the mother, refuge 
and security. Apart from illustrating both the tremendum and 
the fascinans, the picture was no doubt intended to make an 
impression of stark irrationality. 
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Otto travelled to India for the first time in the autumn of 
1911, and visited Karachi, Lahore, Calcutta and Orissa, 
before going on to Burma, Japan and China89 . But he had 
begun his studies of India's religious Weltanschauung even 
before this, as is shown by a brief review published in ThLZ 
during 1911 of ten books related to oriental religions90 . 
From material collected on this and a second visit in 1927-8, 
as well as a fairly detailed study of Sanskrit texts, Otto 
gave two lecture series outside Germany. At Oberlin College, 
Ohio, USA, he gave the Haskell lectures (Winter 1923-4) on 
Western and Eastern mysticism. These were written up as 
Wes t-os t liche Mys t ik ( 1926) 91 • In 1926, at the in vita t ion 
of Birger Forell, who became his travelling companion for the 
last great journey, Otto gave lectures at Uppsala on Ramanuja 
and Indian Bhakti religion. These lectures were the basis 
for Die Gnadenreligion Indiens und das Christentum. (1930) 92 
In addition he translated several Sanskrit texts into German, 
some for the first time, and wrote a number of articles. He 
also translated and published with a short introduction the 
address given by Rabindranath Tagore at Marburg in the summer 
of 193093 . 
In DH Otto had attempted to discuss in some detail the non-
rational in religion. In MEW he was able to develop this. 
In particular, mysticism appeared to him to represent 
religious experience par excellence. 
Chapter Two 
Otto writes: 
Mysticism enters into religious experience in the 
measure that religious feeling surpasses its 
rational content, that is, as I have said 
elsewhere, to the extent to which its hidden, 
non-rational, numinous elements predominate and 
determine the emotional life. (MEW 141a; WoM 
164a) 
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When Otto came to study Sanskrit scriptures, and especially 
the writings of Sankara (Vedantist of the advaita school, 9th 
century AD), he was struck by the very close parallels and 
similarities in idea and in language to the writings of 
Eckhart in spite of the vast differences in religion, 
culture, time and space between these two mystics. 
After acknowledging that mysticism of any provenance has 
something generally in common, Otto draws out differences. 
In the first section of WoM Otto shows that both Eckhart and 
Sankara were seeking after knowledge rather than emotion, and 
he quotes a large number of linguistic and conceptual 
similarities (or even identical expressions, once translated 
out of Latin or Mittelhochdeutsch (mhd) and Sanskrit) 94 . In 
the last section of the book he deals with differences, and 
these are important. Otto was in no sense a syncretist, and 
he was deeply conscious of the differences between religions. 
Otto's sense of the essence of a religion was noted by some 
of his contemporaries95 . This sense, if it is admitted, has 
links with one of the two ways of knowing noted in the 
section on Schleiermacher in Chapter Three, as it is an 
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example of starting from the essence in contrast to the way 
that starts from the outside. As J W Hauer, reviewing WoM in 
CW 1929, pointed out, Otto has a feel for religion and for 
particular religions. His sensus numinis is not general or 
vague, and he is able to find his way to the centre (Zentrum) 
of Sankara's doctrine as well as that of Eckhart. It is as 
if he is able to feel out the differences. The similarities 
are close, striking and real, but they have not been arrived 
at by the same route. The religious background and history 
in each case is very different, and Otto explains this 
closeness in terms of convergence, because for both mystics 
their doctrines are based on deep religious experience. 
Experience of the numinous has brought them close, not the 
logic of their philosophy and theology. 
Otto is aware that it is not possible to analyse fully 
mystical experience and that it is only possible to compare 
the way it is expressed. Hence the similarity, even 
identity, in the expressions used. But he does not just 
record them. One of Otto's greatest contributions to the 
study of religion is his ability to reflect. It is perhaps 
this which has marked him out and which illustrates his own 
closeness to the mystics. 
In a strange way the whole religious spirit of India seems to 
echo the conviction and experience from which Otto had 
started. The god within, at its extreme the Upanishadic 
identity of Brahman and Atman, expressed for Otto from an 
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alien and non-Christian culture the testimonium spiritus 
sancti internum which he had found in Luther. 
This can be illustrated from an Advent music video shown on 
BBC 2 on the 13th December 1992. Called "The Cry of Mary" it 
sets the music of Francis Grier to scenes of the Bengali 
countryside. Grier, who knows India well, makes his theme 
the God within, movingly expressed by the figure of the 
mother-to-be who is Mary in the weeks before the birth. 
Grier remarks that if you ask a group of Indian children 
where God is, the Christians will point upwards, but the 
Hindu children will point to their own hearts. This can be 
seen in the Hindu environment again and again, manifestations 
of divinity recognised in nature, in good deeds, in holy 
persons, in offerings and in animals. 
The Soul 
Otto's descriptive analysis in DH was made possible because 
he was able to discuss the impression which the numinous 
leaves on the psyche. The work of God in the soul is hidden. 
Quoting from Eckhart: 
Now you will ask: How does God work without an 
image in the depth and essence of the soul? That 
I cannot know. (MEW 25c; WoM 29-30; BUttner 
vol.I, p.40). 
"The numinous nature of the soul" is mentioned (MEW 143b; WoM 
167a). "We maintain that in mysticism there are indeed 
strong primal impulses working in the human soul" (MEW xvia; 
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WoM 2ab) . The work of God can even be expressed as "the 
birth (Eingeburt) of God himself in the depths of the soul". 
(MEW 32 footnote; incorporated into the text of WoM 37-38). 
But eternal truth in the soul is not the private possession 
of any individual (MEW 72c). It is rather an enduring 
something which realises itself on occasion in the empirical 
consciousness, and Otto quotes from Augustine: 
In ipso primo ictu, quo velut corruscatione 
perstringeris, cum dicitur "veritas," mane, si 
potes. 
And as Augustine here indicates that the 
realisation of the significance of the concept 
"Truth" comes as a flash of lightning, so Eckhart 
from time to time implies the same with regard to 
the knowledge that God is one's own being. (MEW 
34c; WoM 40a) 
This knowledge is "unprovable because self-evident, needing 
no proof, because itself giving to all proof the ground of 
possibility." (MEW 72b; WoM 85a). If this statement were in 
DH it would support the a priori basis of the numinous. It 
is this element which speaks directly to the reader, or 
listener in the case of Eckhart's preaching "causing the 
truths proclaimed to blossom in the very soul of the reader 
through the creative power of his language." (MEW 36c; WoM 
41b). The concentration on salvation rather than knowledge 
is behind Eckhart's love of life, and it is from this that 
"he derives his expression 'the budding and blossoming' of 
God in the ground of the soul." (MEW 177a; WoM 205a) 
For him the soul is a counterpart and image of the Godhead 
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(MEW 205-6; WoM 239-240). Yet precisely here Otto finds one 
of the differences between the two masters: 
Sankara knows the atman in us, but this atman is 
not the soul in the Cl1ristian and Eckhartian 
sense: it is not "soul" as identical with 
"Gemilt," infinitely rich in life and depth, a 
place of ever fuller experience . . (MEW 206b; 
WoM 240bc) 
Sankara's soul-mysticism is not Gemiltsmystik96 (ibid.) 
With Eckhart the "soul," das Gemilte, the inner 
citadel, the spark, is more profound, tender and 
emotional in experience (gefilhlsmal3iger, 
gemiltvoller bestimmt) than the inward atman of 
Sankara. There is nothing of the Seelenvoll 
(fullness of spirit) about Sankara's atman. (MEW 
78c; WoM 91c) 
It is plain that there can be no mediator between God and the 
soul. No priest or sacrament is needed, and this thought 
goes straight back to Otto's reading of Luther in AHG, and is 
repeated in different ways in KFR and DH. 
Popular religion 
Popular religion is the religion of devotion, love and grace 
brought out in music, liturgy, art and scripture, as amply 
illustrated in DH. Eckhart, himself a mystic master, was 
also a popular Dominican preacher in the vernacular when he 
was based in the Rhineland. In Eckhart Otto found a return 
to the roots of religion which answered to the experience of 
the later pietist movement in which Otto had been brought up. 
Eckhart's scholarly background, albeit still clad in the garb 
of medieval scholasticism, helped Otto to seek a deeply 
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rational basis (in the sense of reason beyond reason already 
referred to), rather than the evanescence of emotions. 
Otto's book on Bhakti religion has four chapters. The third 
opens with these words: 
There is another thing even more important than 
this clear and definite course of reasoning 
regarding God. It is that here we are dealing 
with a genuine religion and religion of 
experience. Religion is here no mere fringe of 
sentiment furnishing a border to the rest of our 
life, but is conceived as the true meaning of 
l i f e its e l f . ( I RG 4 4 ; GR I C 2 9 ) 
This underlines the desire of the faithful for salvation and 
experience of salvation in religions of East and West. 
The last chapter of GRIC brings out Otto's methodology. A 
group of well-intentioned Christians had proposed an inter-
faith service in which believers of all the theistic faiths 
might unite in saying the Lord's Prayer (IRG 65; GRIC 45). 
Otto protests. However close the outward and even linguistic 
similarities, to get to grips with a religion one must seek 
its centre, to get what Otto calls the feel of a religion. 
No matter that adherents of various theistic faith traditions 
subscribe to the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of 
God, the Lord's Prayer remains a Christian prayer, deeply 
rooted in the prophetic tradition of Jesus and the Hebrew 
prophets. The phrase "Thy Kingdom come" includes an 
understanding of judgement which is not at home in Hindu 
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tradition (66c-70), as Otto understood it. Although 
Christian mystical theology speaks of the Godhead far removed 
from the usual attributes of the personal God, this divinity 
is not unconcerned with the changes and chances of the world 
(70-72). 
Christianity sets a positive value on the world, which at the 
coming of Christ will be transformed and transfigured into 
the Kingdom ( 72). This is in strongest contrast to the 
extreme monism of Sankara who attributes to the world neither 
value nor reality, and contrasts also with the doctrine of 
Ramanuja for whom the world is God's plaything. There is an 
ethical concern too, and Otto quotes from the First Epistle 
of John (IV. 20) to stress that God is concerned with the 
Christian's relationship to the neighbour. A further 
difference is that Christianity is centred on history (85). 
Another contrast lies at the heart of salvation. The 
Christian speaks of being redeemed from sin and guilt: the 
Hindu from bondage to the material world. 
These contrasts represent a "changed axis." (87). J. Wach, 
who had been one of Otto's students, lays emphasis on this 
expression, "change of axis". The two religions are not 
totally different, and they cannot be inasmuch as both relate 
to the holy, and indeed have much in common, but they are 
centred quite differently, like different wheels on different 
axles, albeit rotating in the same direction. Hauer stresses 
Otto's "sense" for the essence of each religion in drawing 
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attention "auf die eigentUmliche Atmosph~re, die Tonfarbe, 
den Eigengeruch der Erscheinungen. "97 
In MEW also the differences become clear. Otto writes, 
But here too, if one knows how to penetrate to 
the inmost heart, the spirit and therefore the 
essence of experience is not the same. Christ is 
not at bottom, the same as Krishna. Just as 
little is mysticism "the same" in the East and in 
the West; Christian mysticism is not Indian 
mysticism, but maintains its distinctive 
character, clearly explicable by the ground from 
which it rises. (MEW 165c) 
For Eckhart, God is the living and dynamic God. God is not 
a static being, but a living process (170c) as is shown in 
the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. God is life and God 
gives life, and God's joy in life Eckhart compares to the joy 
of a galloping horse: 
It is like a horse turned loose in a lush meadow 
giving vent to his horse nature by galloping 
full-tilt about the field: he enjoys it and it is 
his nature. And just in the same way God's joy 
and satisfaction in His likes finds vent in his 
pouring out his entire nature and His being into 
this likeness. (MEW 172a) 
Otto describes Eckhart as the "Gothic man" who strives after 
God. The allusion is to Gothic architecture whose soaring 
arches aspire to heaven (184). Yet this in not the path of 
works, but the way of transcendent prayer and "numinous 
rapture" (185bc). 
Otto sums up: 
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It must be added that apart from the doctrine of 
Justification, Eckhart, with his mystical 
ontology, theology, soul-doctrine and ethics, has 
in view religious and spiritual facts which 
stripped of their mystical clothing, prove to be 
fundamental facts of religious experience. These 
are recognized by him with a clarity and 
penetration which is rarely found. This is 
particularly true of his teaching with regard to 
the ground of the soul. (MEW 204b; WoM 237-8) 
The last chapter of MEW brings in the Christian understanding 
of agape. And it is true that there is a special tradition 
of Western Christian mystics for whom the active, involved 
life seems tQ arise as an essential consequence of their 
close spiritual company with God. One may instance Eckhart 
himself, his busy pastoral responsibilities and his popular 
preaching98 • Then there is St Teresa of Avila whose mystical 
writings are a classic and refer to her ceaseless activity in 
reforming, administering, and founding new religious houses. 
Most remarkable of all, perhaps, is St Catherine of Siena, 
who worked it seems tirelessly in the hospital beside the 
cathedral, and still made time for mystic prayer. 
Hauer concludes his review of WoM: "This book points beyond 
Das Heilige, or perhaps it would be better to say it develops 
what was contained in the earlier book. WoM belongs very 
closely with DH, and if it sometimes conflicts with DH or 
even with itself, this is only proof that it is no "cleverly-
worked book" ("ausgekltigelt Buch") but communicates life with 
its contradictions- and for that we are grateful to Otto." 99 
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2.8 Liturgical proposals and experiments 
A number of articles and books illustrate Otto's interest in 
liturgical reform in the 1920s. Particular mention may be 
made of -=Z=u=-=r __ =E=r-=n=-=eO-'u=e"--'r'---'u=n=g=-----'u=n=d=----=A=u=s=-g=e=s--"t-=a=l'--"t'-"'u=n=g"-----"d=-=e"-=s 
Gottesdienstes100 , and Chorgebete flir Schule, Kirche und 
Hausandacht 101 • How these were put into practice is 
described by an American who visited Marburg at the time102 . 
Otto had his ideas put into practice in a chapel in Marburg 
(now the University Church). Meland also devotes a chapter 
to Heiler103 • The contrast is interesting. Heiler had been 
a Roman Catholic and became a Lutheran. He saw the Lutheran 
Church as preserving among Protestants the catholic 
sacraments, and therefore considered Lutheranism to be the 
true bridge church for the ecumenical reconciliation of 
Christians. In another chapel in Marburg, St Michael's 
chapel, Heiler put his ideas into practice. At the same time 
Otto was trying out his reforms. Otto's proposals had two 
roots. One was the Anglican liturgical tradition which had 
impressed him in England, especially responsorial psalms. 
The other, more obviously relevant to this thesis, derived 
from the Quaker practice of silence. Otto had been impressed 
by this in America. 
Otto wrote about this in "Schweigender Dienst" an essay 
printed in ANB104 • He notes three uses of silence in 
worship: 
Devotional 
character. 
Silence may 
There is the 
have a 
numinous 
threefold 
silence of 
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Sacrament, the silence of Waiting, and the 
silence of Union or Fellowship. (IH 211a) 
The third silence is the completion of the 
waiting and the sacramental silences. (IH 212b) 
In Marburg today, the High Church Movement holds its services 
in the University Church, and the Michaelis chapel is used 
only occasionally. There remains no successor to Otto's 
liturgical innovations. 
2.9 Writing on Ethics 
Otto had been invited to give the 1933 Gifford Lectures in 
Glasgow105 , but had to ask for postponement because of 
illness. In the event he was never able to give them. He 
had already published a number of articles in this field and 
had given some lecture series in the 1920s, as well as 
leaving some further notes, so it is possible to have a good 
idea of the way his work was leading. In DH Otto had 
distinguished the moral from the numinous, and yet had shown 
that they belong together by an a priori bond as rational-
moral schematises the non-rational-numinous. His work on sin 
and guilt follows from this. 
Otto was engaged on working out his ideas on ethics during 
his last years, when he also published his last book Reich 
Got tes und Menschensohn ( 1934) 106 • In this book he follows 
We iss and A. Schweitzer in stressing the eschatological 
significance of Jesus, and, as previously in DH, numinous 
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aspects of his ministry. Davidson quotes the phrase "the 
nimbus of the numinous surrounded Jesus." 107 
Five articles, whose substance was to have been incorporated 
into the Gifford Lectures, appeared in journals in Otto's 
lifetime, but a sixth, with the title intended for the whole 
series "Autonomie der Werte und Theonomie", was first 
published in 1940 in a book edited by Otto's friend Theodor 
Siegfried, together with a note (Nachwort) by Siegfried108 . 
This important paper connects related issues which can be 
traced through Otto's work over nearly forty years. The 
immediate stimulus was the appearance of Nikolai Hartmann's 
Ethik. The effect on Otto was not unlike that produced by 
Wilhelm Wundt in 1910, and Otto studied Hartmann's book 
closely, even taking it (with very few other books) to the 
clinic where he spent his last sad weeks after his fall. 
These six essays, together with an introduction and scholarly 
notes by Jack Stewart Boozer, appeared in print under the 
title Aufsatze zur Ethik in 1981109 . 
Other papers exist in manuscript or note form among Otto's 
papers, and H-W Schutte lists the titles of six, but 
considers them beyond recovery (mtissen als verschollen 
gelten) 110 . Other writings relevant to ethics have been 
studied by Reinhard Schinzer. These are in Otto's hand for 
lectures in dogmatics given· in the Summer Semester 1927, 
together with some earlier notes for lectures given over two 
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semesters a little earlier, in SS 1924 and WS 1924-5. 11l 
Schinzer begins by relating Otto's understanding of worth to 
DH. The "Kontrastharmonie" between tremendum and fascinans 
has captivated the attention of too many readers, while the 
most important moment, according to Schinzer, is the 
Augustum. The Augustum is the holy as the highest value and 
the source of all values (Schinzer p.l). Study of these two 
lecture series has convinced Schinzer that Otto's central 
concern is neither knowledge nor being, but value. 
The first essay in Boozer's collection is "Wert, Wlirde und 
Recht", originally published in 1931112 , and it makes the 
usual distinction between pleasure and value, in that 
pleasure must be subjective "for someone", but value is 
objective, whether anyone actually values it or not (Boozer 
69-70). Otto goes on to ask the question whether "value for 
me" is not really a secondary consideration, to which the 
primary is my own value, what am I there for? (Boozer 70a). 
This links with DH and the quotation from James: "I felt I 
was if possible the less real of the two." Earlier in the 
same article, Otto uses a similar idea over the question of 
Good and Evil: "That people are interested in this question 
is the least part of the matter. It is not that someone puts 
the question out of interest: the question presents itself." 
Man does not need to ask this question. "He does not ask, he 
feels himself asked: Is that "good" that you have done? Are 
you not bothered about "good" and "evil"?" (Boozer 58b & c). 
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The second emphasis deriving also from the Augustum is the 
nature of God. God is the God who saves. Knowing God is not 
for the sake of knowledge as such, but for salvation 
(Schinzer p.3-4). This supports Otto's assertions in WoM 
written in these same years. Schinzer also finds in these 
lectures stress on religious experience (Schinzer 5, 27 etc), 
as well as problems to be discussed in the context of 
Boozer's collection, notably autonomy and heteronomy 
(Schinzer 12-13), the aesthetic ( 19-20), and holiness as more 
than goodness (p.10ff). 
In his introduction Boozer remarks that there is a distance 
between the posthumous piece, "Autonomie der Werte und 
Theonomie", and the other five, in that "Autonomie" shows a 
more obviously christian-ethical standpoint (Boozer 25a). 
This is because it tackles directly the relationship between 
God's will and the Good as an independent standard, as the 
title indicates. But it is not far below the surface in all 
of them, and it could be said that the problem is touched on 
in Otto's writing of all dates. In all six pieces Otto's 
basic position hinges on the Holy as value, even as supreme 
value (Boozer 223a). Thus religious (christian) ethics 
includes secular ethics, but also more. Boozer summarises, 
with particular reference to "Das Geflihl 
Verantwortlichkeit" (4. in the series), as follows: 
The following conclusions can be drawn about his 
religious-christian ethics: 1. Guilt and sin are 
each separate and unique in quality, albeit 
related to each other. 2. Guilt cannot include 
der 
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sin, but sin can include guilt. 3. All human 
beings have feelings of guilt. 4. All human 
beings have the capacity to feel sin, but 
feelings of sin are not realised in all cases, 
and are not in fact felt by all human beings. 5. 
The fundamental and straightforward nature of the 
human relationship to what is real and true 
produces both guilt and sin. 6. A full 
understanding of sin includes that of guilt with 
its special quality unimpaired, but sin also 
includes qualities which go beyond guilt. (Boozer 
25c) 
This is already familiar from Otto's other writings, as well 
as the lectures which Schinzer studied. It can also be 
derived from DH, and in essays which were published as 
appendices to some editions of DH, then separately as Sunde 
und Urschulde und andere Aufsatze zur Theologie and Das 
Gefiihl des Oberweltlichen (both 1932) 113 . 
Davidson asserts that Otto has made a fundamental error here 
in claiming "a rigid separation" between the sacred 
(Davidson's word for the non-rational aspect of the holy) and 
the good, "the most serious de feet . " 114 Davidson has 
exaggerated in claiming "a rigid separation" but it seems 
that Otto has used imprecision to try and have the 
relationship both ways: to maintain that morality is separate 
from the sacred in that the numinous can be found without the 
good, as in Chapter XI of the Bhagavad Gi tall5, and also 
that the moral is contained in the holy, and serves to make 
the numinous accessible to man by schematisation. 
Otto addresses Hartmann's "Antinomies" of which the principal 
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one is the autonomy of the good in and for itself as against 
theonomy, the antinomy between the law of morality and God's 
will. This, says Otto, "has been known since ancient times, 
has been unsolved since ancient times, and in my opinion is 
in principle insoluble for human thought . . " (Boozer 219a). 
Hartmann stresses the total autonomy of ethical value, 
absolute and a priori, without which it does not deserve the 
name. Otto replies: 
Let us first consider the following. Our 
theoreticians of value are excellent 
phenomenologists and respect what Goethe called 
a primal phenomenon (Urphanomen). These primal 
phenomena include also the feeling of the holy 
(which theoreticians of value must of course 
consider as a feeling of value), and its reality 
as at least an actual experience cannot be 
doubted. We may say further: if with remarkable 
absence of prejudice in favour of naturalistic 
judgements our theoreticians of value open 
themselves with equal seriousness to the 
testimony often quite gentle and quiet of our 
often quite obscure feelings of value, which 
appear what is more according to their own theory 
in such stark contrasts, even antinomies, and 
recognise here the foundations of their 
scienti fie knowledge, they will have to take 
seriously such primeval and widespread feelings 
of value like that of the holy. (from "Autonomie" 
in Boozer 219c) 
Yet Otto is aware that the feeling for the holy is not a 
legitimate starting point for a bare treatment of ethics 
(Boozer 220a). But it does raise the subject of the 
relationship between the holy and the moral, and at the level 
of basic awareness a priori. 
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In the third article of Boozer's book, "Das Schuldgeftihl und 
seine Implikationen" (published 1931 116 ), Otto writes at 
length about feeling: "the word feeling .. does not mean an 
emotion, but a kind of knowing, indeed a kind of non-
conceptual and preconceptual but totally direct kind of 
knowing. "117 A little earlier in a long footnote Otto goes 
into still more detail (Boozer 260-261) 118 . 
In another article, "Wertgesetz und Autonomie" the second in 
Boozer119 , Otto speaks of Desiderata as the goals of human 
efforts, ideals of feeling and heart (die Ideale des Geftihls 
und des Gemtites), in that we become sensitive to these as 
ideals before they become demands (Postulata) {Boozer 117a). 
Otto develops this when he speaks of "making sense" of 
circumstances. Making sense can be rational, but it can 
alternatively consist of a non-conceptual understanding, 
understanding by feeling, as when notes seem to arrange 
themselves into a tune (Boozer 120a) . Thus we can have a 
presentiment of sense (Sinnerahnen) which goes further than 
knowing sense (Sinnerkenntnis), in that we feel more sure 
than we can know (121c). 
2.10 Last conversations 
Although much of DH is about arousing a sense of the 
numinous, apart from part of the Chapter on 'Means of 
Expression of the Numinous' Otto did not give much attention 
to the need to educate others. But in a book published in 
1925120 he writes of the church's need to re-educate the 
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bulk of its members, who are still the industrial working 
class. Although he does not go into details it is clear that 
he expects such groups to be allowed to set their own agendas 
and to be enabled to take part in decision-making. While the 
central message of Christianity is not in question, Otto 
calls on the church to open its naive certainties for 
discussion. He argues that if Christianity is to be relevant 
to the people, they must themselves decide what really is 
relevant to their interests and their needs. It is 
significant that Otto is looking forward to changes at a time 
when others were looking back with regret to the past, the 
secure days when German protestantism enjoyed the support of 
"the pious Hohenzollerns" and the princes . 121 
Other writings take further Otto • s hopes for a style of 
education which respects and indeed requires the experiential 
participation of students. Karl Klissner's conversations with 
Otto, published as Rudolf Otto Verantwortliche 
Lebensgestal tungl22 , deserve special mention because the 
sharing of feelings and experiences among a group is stressed 
in order to clarify them and by this means to appreciate 
their significance. The conversations, many of them while 
walking through the woods and fields round Marburg, or 
sitting by the camp fire in front of a forest hut, range over 
a number of social and moral issues. But interesting as they 
are, they have about them something of the air of last 
conversations. 
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This Chapter has given an outline of Otto's thinking and 
highlighted aspects which are relevant to religious 
education. But this has not been in an eclectic way, because 
the main sinews of his thought, the essential bond between 
the essence of religion and the phenomena, a bond which 
presupposes the a priori and is indicated by schematisation, 
are also essential to the task. The next Chapter takes this 
a stage further, not simply in discussing the sources for 
Otto's thought, but by suggesting that an understanding of 
Otto makes some of those who inspired him also available to 
students of the late twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
SOURCES FOR OTTO'S THOUGHT AND INFLUENCES ON HIM 
Two main reasons can be put forward for giving special 
attention to the thinkers and writers who appear to have been 
especially influential for Otto's work. By going a little 
behind his writing it is possible perhaps to see his thought 
taking shape and at the same time a dimension is added which 
can enrich the modern reader's appreciation of him. 
Secondly, Otto's writing then becomes a kind of prism through 
which these influential people themselves become available, 
possibly in a new light. By seeking out Otto's sources 
modern readers are encouraged to meet them for themselves. 
The survey of Otto's work in Chapter Two has already 
introduced the sources, but special treatment in this chapter 
helps us to understand them better and to appreciate how they 
have contributed to Otto's thought. It is not possible to 
arrange them in an order which might approximate to their 
order of influence: in fact the influence of Eckhart, Kant 
and Schleiermacher remained strong throughout Otto's career. 
They are arranged therefore merely in the chronological order 
in which they lived. 
3.1 Meister Eckhart (c.1260-1327) 
Eckhart's surviving writings, and in particular the popular 
sermons in mittel-hoch-deutsch (mhd), stress again and again 
the immediate action of God in the soul. The soul or ground 
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of the soul is the innermost and most subjective part of the 
person. This doctrine is of obvious relevance to Otto and 
supports his main thesis in DH. A modern understanding of 
this doctrine is also relevant for religious education, and 
in particular that aspect of R.E. that seeks to elicit 
pupils' response and engagement at a personal level. 
Although Eckhart preached in the first place to Christians, 
Otto extended the emphasis on immediacy to adherents of other 
religions, and by implication to anyone with a sense for the 
numinous or transcendent, even in a non- religious sense. 
Such people are met in Laski's Ecstasy. It thus applies to 
anyone whose inborn Anlage or predisposition can be developed 
to a capacity for religious experience, and therefore to 
everyone. This must be the assumption behind universal 
religious education as is required by law in Britain today. 
Otto's interest in Eckhart comes into prominence in WoM first 
published in 1926. This is a relatively late book in Otto's 
career, but it is known that Otto had read some of Eckhart's 
work from long before, and certainly before he wrote DH. A 
few references to Eckhart (as well as other Rhineland mystics 
Tauler and Suso) occur in earlier editions of DH and so come 
into the English translation IH. Later editions of DH refer 
to Eckhart more as well as to what Otto wrote in WoM. As an 
example, a note on religious humility is referred to R R 
Marett (IH 20a) but in later editions the same passage is 
referred instead to Eckhart· (DH 23a). This suggests a 
returning to Eckhart rather than a discovery of the mystic 
Chapter Three 129 
for the first time in the 1920s. No doubt also the fact that 
Eckhart had combined mystical writing and preaching with a 
very active life appealed to Otto, whose own activities as a 
Member of Parliament, in experiments to reform protestant 
liturgy, his collection of religious artefacts from all over 
the world and his Religious League for Mankind are noted 
elsewhere. 
It is true that as a student Otto came strongly under 
Ritschlian influence and, as noted in the section on Ritschl, 
Ritschl was opposed to mysticism. On the other hand Otto's 
own background in Hanoverian pietism may have included folk 
traditions linked with Eckhart and other mystics influenced 
by him. If this is so, then Otto would have come under 
Eckhart's influence before he studied Ritschl and learnt his 
antipathy to mysticism. Study of Eckhart's sermons does give 
some support to Ritschl's criticism in the matter of being 
ahistorical, especially Eckhart's teaching that the birth of 
God in the soul is outside time, but on the other hand there 
are also moral aspects to Eckhart which contradict Ritschl's 
conclusion that mysticism entails no moral action. 
Oliver Davies1 relates that interest in Eckhart revived at 
the time of the German Romantic movement, that is, from the 
last two decades of the eighteenth century, when an 
enthusiasm for mysticism and for the Middle Ages was being 
fostered. The poetry of Novalis is perhaps the best known 
example, but there were many others. Consequently Otto could 
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have come across Eckhart in the course of his work on 
Schleiermacher (though Schleiermacher does not mention him), 
if he was not already aware of him from other sources. 
Before Pfeiffer, however, very little of Eckhart's work had 
been published. 
At the present time it is not possible to say when or how 
Otto first read Eckhart. Published editions were certainly 
available to him. Pfeiffer in 1857 made available the 
original mhd text of the manuscripts he consulted in numerous 
libraries and monasteries across the German and Austrian 
empires, as well as Strassburg and Basel. He did not use 
Latin texts and indeed had no access to Vatican libraries2• 
These texts had been written down by Eckhart's hearers, many 
of them nuns (so Walshe3), and there are variations in the 
spelling. Pfeiffer also includes some short anecdotes about 
Eckhart. Otto could also have seen later publications such 
as H. Buttner's popular translations into modern German (1903 
and many reprints), A. Spamer's critical discussion of the 
texts and their authenticity ( 1909), and translations by 
Spamer (1912) and by Lehmann (1919). It seems, however, not 
unreasonable to suppose that Otto had read Eckhart through 
Pfeiffer and the mhd text, which he would surely have used in 
preference to any modern translation. In WoM Otto does not 
give references for his quotations, but some were later 
supplied for the posthumous third edition by Mensching who 
refers, not always with certainty, to Pfeiffer, Buttner and 
Lehmann. Walshe (1987) says that Eckhart scholarship has 
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over 120 years completely superseded Pfeiffer, and yet he 
still follows Pfeiffer's order (for reasons explained in his 
Preface). Walshe notes that Sermon One4 is a good 
introduction to Eckhart's topics and style: "This sermon 
epitomises some of the most important aspects of the whole of 
Eckhart's teaching" (Walshe 12b, note 1). 
Sermon One contains ideas and expressions that directly 
relate to DH. And to see them in the context of Eckhart's 
teaching would go a long way to meeting criticisms expressed 
when DH was published, in that the emphasis is put on an 
existential justification rather than a philosophical one. 
But Otto sought instead to base his argument on Kant's 
writing rather than on a mystic, although mystics are quoted 
in support. Foremost among these terms is Seelengrund, a 
phrase which appears as two words frequently in Eckhart and 
refers to the essence of the person which is not accessible 
to rational knowledge. Seelengrund is used by Otto to denote 
the innermost part of the soul itself, from which the basal 
knowledge arises a priori, that is from within, though 
aroused by external stimuli yet in no way dependent on them5. 
Otto relates this to Kant, but Kant does not use the term 
Seelengrund6. Calling this "pure reason" in the profoundest 
sense, which must be distinguished from both the pure 
theoretical and pure practical reason of Kant, Otto adds, 
"Wir nennen sie den Seelengrund." (DH 139a) 
Here is an instance of Eckhart's use of the phrase from the 
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Sermon which opens Pfeiffer's collection: 
Und also gebirt got der vater sinen sun in warer 
einunge gotlicher nature. Sehet, in der selben 
wise und in keiner andern gebirt got der vater 
sinen sun in der sele grunde und in irm wesenne 
unde vereinet also mit ir. Wan were da iht 
bilde, so enwere da niht wariu einunge, und an 
der waren einunge lit alliu ir selikeit. 
(Pfeiffer 1857, S.6, ZZ.l0-15) 
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The coming to birth of God the Son in the ground of the soul 
does not relate to historical time. It is a very frequent 
topic in Eckhart's preaching and another example may be 
quoted from Sermon L, although the 'ground' is not mentioned. 
In die sele kumet der sun unde gebirt sich dar in 
mit allem dem, daz got geleisten mac: vater, sun, 
heiliger geist, allez mit einander in einem 
lfiterm wesende. (Pfeiffer 1857, S.166, ZZ.17-19) 
This birth is closely linked to two further points which are 
fundamental to the train of thought in DH. One of these is 
the knowing which is not intellectual, and the other is the 
unmediated contact of the numinous with the soul. Quoting St 
Paul's ecstasy in this connection, Eckhart says: 
After he had been caught up into the third heaven 
where God was made known to him and he beheld all 
things, when he returned he had forgotten 
nothing, but it was so deep down in his ground 
that his intellect could not reach it. (Walshe 
9c; Pfeiffer 8.32-6) 
Hence it is an "unknown knowing" (Walshe 9a) or "daz unbekant 
bekentnisse" (Pfeiffer 8.18). 
This not-knowing makes her wonder and leads her 
to eager pursuit, for she perceives clearly that 
it is, but does not know how or what it is. 
(Walshe 8c-9a, his italics; Pfeiffer 8.13-15) 
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This relates directly to non-conceptual knowing in Otto's 
argument and the doctrine of presentiment or Ahnung which 
Otto tried to adapt from Fries. There are many similar 
passages in Eckhart. The question what can be meant by 
knowledge which relates to something other than the intellect 
is a well-known problem in studies of mysticism and is 
discussed as such in Chapter Four. 
Otto encountered this kind of thinking and this kind of 
phraseology in his reading of Eckhart as well as other 
mystics, some of whom are quoted in DH. It is not possible 
to say at the present time whether Otto had studied Eckhart 
early enough and thoroughly enough for this study to give 
direction to his writing of DH, and whether Eckhart rather 
than Kant provided the original basis for Otto's claim to a 
non-rational understanding, an understanding that is deeper 
than reason because it occurs in the ground of the soul. It 
can of course be related to Kant's Third Critique, but it 
need not have originated there. In fact it comes across more 
strongly from Eckhart, with Kant providing academic 
respectability. 
In Eckhart too can be found the immediacy of God's action in 
the soul (Walshe 3c; Pfeiffer 4.40-5.3). As Otto shows in 
AHG, this immediacy is also central for Luther, who is 
acknowledged to have been influenced by Eckhart. If further 
the work of God in the · soul can be equated with 
Schleiermacher's feeling of the Universum as something 
Chapter Three 134 
immediate (in the first instance) and unselfconscious, then 
we have the encounter with the Numinous which is central for 
DH. Eckhart tries to explain the essential subjectivity of 
the soul or self in saying that it can have no image of 
itself: 
But for a man to receive an image in this way, it 
must of necessity enter from without through the 
senses. In consequence, there is nothing so 
unknown to the soul as herself. Accordingly, one 
master says that the soul can neither create nor 
obtain an image of herself. Therefore she has no 
way of knowing herself, for images all enter 
through the senses, and hence she can have no 
image of herself. And so she knows all other 
things, but not herself. Of nothing does she 
know so little as of herself, for want of 
mediation. (Walshe 4bc; Pfeiffer 5.18-25) 
This seems to be echoed in Schleiermacher, because it 
reflects religious experience in every age: The intuiter is 
intuited (Schleiermacher R.55; Cr.104b) and the experiencer 
feels "if possible the less real of the two." (IH 23a) 
But the immediacy of the birth of God, or the unmediated 
encounter with the numinous, is also an area for reflection. 
As soon as it is considered it loses its immediacy, but this 
is the only way it can be discussed, compared and written 
about. Eckhart knew this as did Otto, but Otto developed 
conscious reflection and discussion to suggest stages of 
development. Eckhart too is aware of the need for images and 
evidences in order to discuss and attempt to indicate an 
experience which is essentially ineffable, image less and 
without concepts. 
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Ich wil iu in dise rede beweren mit naturlicher 
rede (Walshe translates "I shall make use of 
natural proofs" which seems too strong), daz ir 
ez selber grifen milgent, daz ez also ist, swie 
ich doch der geschrift mer gloube dan mir selber: 
aber ez get iu mer in unde baz von bewerter rede. 
(Pfeiffer 4.17-20) (Walshe has "it is easier and 
better for you to learn by means of arguments 
that can be verified" - 2c) 
This is no doubt a necessary method which Otto develops by 
using religious phenomena to disclose the a priori essence of 
religion in the awareness of the numinous. In particular 
Otto takes up the notion of schematisation from Kant on the 
one hand, and from Schleiermacher on the other. This is 
discussed in the relevant section 2.6.2. 
Otto found an integrity in Eckhart which answered his need to 
make religious experience in the soul the meeting place for 
the human and the divine mystery, as well as the spring of 
activity. A modern commentator, who does not mention Otto, 
brings out some relevant aspects of Eckhart's teaching, 
emphasising that Eckhart had a profound knowledge of the 
human heart 7 • 
He realized, above all, that the question of God 
is at the same time a question about Man. I 
cannot know God unless I know myself. Religion 
has its origin and its meaning in the human 
heart ... The sublime and glorious reality which 
we call 'God', is to be sought first and foremost 
in the human heart. If we do not find him there, 
we shall not find him anywhere else. If we do 
find him there, we can never lose him again; 
wherever we turn, we shall see his face. (Smith 
1987, 4c) 
And again, 
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He understands very clearly that spiritual life 
only has meaning when it is related to what goes 
on inside us. It is no use preaching Christ to 
people so long as Christ is seen merely as 
someone external to ourselves, a vague, shadowy 
figure who spoke a foreign language and died 2000 
years ago. We need to know and experience Christ 
as a living force within us, energizing, healing, 
making and unmaking, leading us to greater 
awareness, compassion and wholeness. So Eckhart 
writes: 
"St Augustine says: 'What does it avail me that 
this birth (the birth of Christ, the Son of God, 
in eternity) is always happening, if it does not 
happen in me? That it should happen in me is 
what matters.' We shall therefore speak of this 
birth, of how it may take place in us and be 
consummated in the virtuous soul." (Smith, 1987, 
6a) 
The basis for development which Eckhart offered Otto is now 
clear. Eckhart's thought supports the basic principle of DH. 
This is the immediacy of the divine (or numinous) encounter 
in the soul at a level beyond that of reason in any 
intellectual sense. Possibly Otto found this in Eckhart or 
the pietistic tradition before he studied Kant, especially 
Kant's Third Critique. But it can be seen that what is 
experienced at the existential level (mysticism) finds an 
explanation at the philosophical level, and when writing for 
a scholarly readership it can be no surprise if Otto sought 
his main justification among the philosophers, using mystical 
writers only in second place as support. 
3.2 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
Kant's writings are cardinal for the development of German 
and Western philosophy from the beginning of the nineteenth 
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century, and in the following two centuries many later 
thinkers either developed, modified or reacted against his 
thought. It would have been impossible for Otto not to have 
been influenced by him, and Kant's thought and Kant's 
terminology can be seen at the heart of Otto's system, in the 
Gemtit and Seele. 
It is clear that Otto was deeply influenced by Kant, and 
perhaps by the Critique of Judgement8 mast of all. In the 
First Part of this Kant discusses aesthetic judgement which 
he divides into the beautiful and the sublime. While Kant's 
transcendental method applies to both and was adapted by Otto 
for his discussion of the holy, it is clear that Kant's 
treatment of the sublime is particularly close, in that for 
the sublime, pleasure is irrelevant and aspects of awe, 
terror and mystery have a place which resurfaces in Otto's 
discussion of the numinous. 
The foundation of Kant's philosophy in general has been held 
to be his discovery of the synthetic a priori9. This means 
that by the use of reason it is possible to attain new 
knowledge which is not analytic {i.e. not already contained 
in the definition of terms), but which at the same time owes 
nothing essentially to experience. Thus it is a priori in 
that it is a principle or principles of thought whose 
existence or reality cannot be established by either evidence 
or argument, yet which alone makes the relevant area of 
knowledge possible. This is expounded in Kant's first 
Chapter Three 138 
critique, the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). 
In his third critique, the Critique of Judgement (1789-90), 
Kant goes further. Because judgement of the beautiful and 
judgement of the sublime do not depend on concepts, both are 
to that extent subjective. Yet such judgements are at the 
same time both universal and necessary, so here Kant claims 
to establish a subjective synthetic a priori. It is this 
aspect which forms the basis for Otto's philosophy in DH. 
Otto is indebted to Kant in particular for the discovery of 
the subjective a priori. Once this is clearly understood, a 
distinction opens out which sets the empirical work of 
psychology apart from the theoretical work of philosophy, and 
at the same time shows the link between them. If Kant's 
influence is seen in this respect, and if Otto's 
transposition from the aesthetic to the holy is considered 
legitimate, then much of the critic ism of Geyser and of 
Feigel simply falls away as irrelevant. 
It must be recognised that Kant gave a very particular place 
to religion, against which Schleiermacher reacted (see 
section 3.3). This is clear in Kant's Religion within the 
Bounds of Reason Alone (1792-3). For Kant, pure religious 
faith arises from the moral disposition10 , which means that 
religion is known by reason and is not dependent on 
revelation or historical development. By placing religion 
within the framework of morality Kant has barred access to 
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God. Indeed Kant applies the word Holy to the good will 
which is the basis on which the moral law is built, as is 
expounded in the second critique, the Critique of Practical 
Reason (1788). The good will alone is absolute good and all 
others are relative in consequence. 
Yet it is in the context of ethics that Kant reveals a basis 
for morality in natural or untutored sense. Otto describes 
this in his notes on Kant, which stem from his university 
teaching on Kant since 1906. These are published in Otto's 
1930 edition of Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten 
(GMS) 11 . In his Introduction Otto picks out the main ideas 
of the book, among which is Section 5. "Double Meaning of 
Feeling" (GMS 27-8). 
The categorical imperative is presented as 
starkly objective. It makes stark demands on me 
and its validity rests upon no "interest" or 
"feeling". Both of these Kant understood first 
and foremost as "sense-conditioned interest" and 
as empirical feeling of pleasure and pain, or 
inclination, disinclination, natural sympathy 
etc. Later he himself distinguishes "a pure 
interest of reason itself" from simply "sense-
conditioned" interest. And from feeling as 
emotion of pleasure and pain he occasionally 
distinguishes "feeling" as a preconceptual form 
of knowledge. Since this has no conceptual 
clarity, he calls this feeling also "obscure 
feeling" (and occasionally he calls it 
"unexplicated concepts"). This "feeling" must be 
clearly distinguished from feeling in the other 
sense. It is precisely in this sort of "feeling" 
that all our moral knowledge is first of all 
given to us. In his investigation Kant himself 
presupposes it to be already present. It is for 
him a special kind of "judgement". And the first 
section of his book could have had this title: 
Transition from the common obscure feeling-
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knowledge for morals to conceptual and 
methodically clarified knowledge. His 
discussions of the will, duty and imperatives are 
intended here as the first explication of what 
everyone already knows "in feelings". This 
"feeling" is not emotion, affect, inclination or 
interest, but obscure knowledge, admittedly in 
need of clarification, but still objective. 
As if to underline this point, Otto introduces his discussion 
of Kant's main ideas with a note on the word Sitten (GMS 22). 
He explains that Kant could as well have used the word Moral 
in the title in place of Sitten. Sitten means ethics, but it 
also means habits, customs. Otto says that Kant purposely 
chose this word because he wanted to show the way in which 
ethics as a refined philosophical science arises from the 
popular sense of right and wrong. This common sense existed 
long before philosophy methodically clarified and 
systematised it to produce the science of Ethics. 
In the Critique of Judgement Kant returns to the basis of 
morality within common humanity: 
. the man in the street, when he says that 
deceit is wrong, bases his judgement on confused, 
but the philosopher on clear grounds, while both 
appeal in reality to identical principles of 
reason. (M.71a; $.15; K.228) 
Kant goes on to state that this common sense is first a 
subjective principle, second is determined by means of 
feeling only, not concepts, and third has universal validity. 
Kant expressly distinguishes this common sense from common 
understanding (which is also sometimes called common sense) 
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in which judgement is based on concepts. (M.82-83; $.20; 
K. 238). These three points, especially the universal 
validity, are vital for establishing a subjective synthetic 
a priori. 
we do not have to take our stand on 
psychological observations, but we assume a 
common sense as the necessary condition of the 
universal communicability of our knowledge . 
(M.84a; $.21; K.239) 
In making judgements of taste, universal validity is claimed, 
not that everyone will agree, but that everyone ought to 
agree, that is that the judgement has universal validity. 
(M.84bc; $22; K.239). Kant continues, 
This indeterminate norm of a common sense is, as 
a matter of fact, presupposed by us; as is shown 
by our presuming to lay down judgements of taste. 
But does such a common sense in fact exist as a 
constitutive principle of the possibility of 
experience . ? Is taste, in other words, a 
natural and original faculty . ? (M.85a; $.22; 
K.239-240) 
If the answer to both these question is Yes, then Kant has 
provided a basis which Otto can adapt for religion. Otto 
will maintain, first, that there is a common sense for the 
numinous, and second, that this is a natural and original 
faculty for every human being. This Kant does in fact 
provide in a way which Otto was able to re-use. The method 
is that of transcendental deduction thereby revealing a basis 
which is purely a priori. 
The first step is to establish universal necessity. Kant 
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writes: 
The obligation to furnish a Deduction, i.e. a 
guarantee of the legitimacy of judgements of a 
particular kind, only arises where the judgement 
lays claim to necessity. This is the case even 
where it requires subjective universality, i.e. 
the concurrence of every one, albeit the 
judgement is not a cognitive judgement, but only 
one of pleasure or displeasure in a given object, 
i.e. an assumption of a subjective finality that 
has a thorough-going validity for every one, and 
which, since the judgement is one of Taste, is 
not to be grounded upon any concept of the thing. 
(M.135a; $.31; K.280) 
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Otto presents in a similar way the contrast between the 
religious a priori and the empirical and psychological: 
seeking to account for the ideas in 
question, we are referred away from all sense 
experience back to an original and underivable 
capacity of mind implanted in the 'pure reason' 
independently of all perception. (IH 112b; DH 
137b) 
Otto quotes the opening words of Kant's first critique, The 
Critique of Pure Reason, to stress the distinction and the 
relationship between the a priori and the empirical: 
That all our knowledge begins with experience 
there can be no doubt. For how is it possible 
that the faculty of cognition should be awakened 
into exercise otherwise than by means of objects 
which affect our senses? . . But, though all 
our knowledge begins with experience, it by no 
means follows that all arises out of experience. 
(quoted in IH 112-113; DH 137c) 
Just as Kant knew the universal moral law which was not 
itself dependent on experience but the knowledge of it was 
revealed by experience, so Otto claimed the same was the case 
with human knowledge of the numinous. The numinous does not 
Chapter Three 143 
depend for its existence or its reality on being perceived or 
felt, but this is how it is in fact known. 
It issues from the deepest foundations of 
cognitive apprehension that the soul possesses, 
and, though of course it comes into being in and 
amid the sensory data and empirical material of 
the natural world and cannot anticipate or 
dispense with those, yet it does not arise out of 
them, but only by their means. They are the 
incitement, the stimulus and the 'occasion' for 
the numinous experience to become astir, and, in 
doing so, to begin at first with a naive 
immediacy of reaction - to be interfused and 
interwoven with the present world of sensuous 
experience, until, gradually becoming purer, it 
disengages itself from this and takes its stand 
in absolute contrast to it. The proof that in 
the numinous we have to deal with purely a priori 
cognitive elements is to be reached by 
introspection and a critical examination of 
reason such as Kant instituted. (IH 113; DH 138) 
From this Otto further explains the position with regard to 
Kant, by stating (also after Kant) that empirical knowledge 
(emphasis on knowledge) depends on two factors: that which 
is derived from sense-impressions, and that which the faculty 
of cognition supplies from itself when sense-impressions 
present the need for i t 12 • That which arises from the 
faculty of cognition is a priori, and while revealed by 
sense-impressions, it is in no way dependent on them. This 
is the central issue here and therefore needs further 
development. 
Otto opens the relevant chapter "The Holy as an A Priori 
Category, Part 1" 13 by reminding readers that the 'holy' has 
two components, rational and non-rational. In both of these 
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(his emphasis) the holy is a pure a priori category. Later 
in Chapter XVII "The Holy as an A Priori Category, Part II" 14 
he restates this by saying that not only are both rational 
and non-rational aspects of the holy a priori elements, but 
the connection between them is a third a priori element 15 . 
So in reverting to the earlier passage, it can be seen that 
the numinous is a purely a priori category encountered in the 
faculty of cognition when outward, or inward, senses give 
occasion. 
Kant repeats the distinction between sense-impressions and 
the faculty of cognition in his third critique, The Critique 
of Judgement, employing now the word "intuition", which comes 
to the fore again in Schleiermacher (see next section). Kant 
speaks of intuition a priori and intuition which is 
empirical, and illustrates the distinction with the example 
of the Anatomist who first lectures on the human eye, and 
then provides empirical evidence by dissection. In this 
passage Kant is drawing a parallel with a priori statements 
which must be demonstrated. Otto's complex idea of the holy 
eludes description, but the parallel is illuminating. 
While rational (i.e. conceptual) aspects of the holy go back 
to that which is a priori in pure reason, Otto maintains that 
the a priori prerequisite for knowledge of the non-rational 
is deeper than pure reason "at least as this is usually 
understood," and refers back tb the fundus animae, the bottom 
or ground of the soul (Seelengrund) 16 . This must be an 
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"original and underivable capacity of mind implanted in the 
'pure reason' independent of all perception." 17 This is a 
third type of pure reason, alongside the pure theoretical and 
the pure practical reason of Kant, "higher or deeper than 
they" (IH 114a; DH 137a). 
"The facts of the numinous consciousness point therefore . . 
. to a hidden substantive source, from which the religious 
ideas and feelings are formed, which lies in the mind 
independently of sense experience" (IH 113c-114a; DH 138c-
139a). Otto goes beyond the capacity for awareness, however, 
to speak of "posited objects and entities, which themselves 
no longer belong to the perceptual world, but are thought of 
as supplementing and transcending it" (IH 113c; DH 138c). 
Here is the suggestion that numinous awareness must 
presuppose the numinous object, whose presence is, according 
to Otto, directly apprehended in the experience. 
Otto agrees that the task of the psychology of religion is to 
explain the phenomenon of religion. But just as nature can 
only be explained in terms of its fundamental forces and 
their laws when these are presupposed nothing can be 
explained without - so with religion, "in the domain of the 
spirit the corresponding principle from which an explanation 
is derived is just the spirit itself, the reasonable spirit 
of man, with its predispositions, capacities, and its own 
inherent laws. This has to be-presupposed: it cannot itself 
be explained." (IH 114b; DH 139b) 
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The human predisposition (Anlage) then is purely a priori as 
Otto sees it, and he is clearly following Kant, yet 
transposing Kant's argument on aesthetic judgement to his own 
form of religious judgement. The Anlage is aroused by 
stimuli (IH 115b; DH 140b) until it turns into a driving 
impulsion (IH 116b; DH 14lb) and, however much clearer it may 
become, it originates in the obscure a priori foundations of 
thought itself (IH 116c; DH 142a). 
The second chapter on the A Priori18 reinforces the preceding 
argument and gives examples. That of Socrates and 
Adeimantos 19 illustrates well the process by which a 
statement receives immediate assent because it was already 
but obscurely known. 
Now this is the criterion of all apriori 
knowledge, namely, that, so soon as an assertion 
has been clearly expressed and understood, 
knowledge of its truth comes into the mind with 
the certitude of first-hand insight. (IH 137b; DH 
166b) 
In KFR Otto gives a different example, that the shortest 
distance between two points is a straight line. As soon as 
it is stated, perhaps for the first time, the listener 
understands and assents, because this knowledge was obscurely 
present a priori. This illustrates in the Grundlegung the 
obscure sense of right and wrong which is common to humanity, 
long before it is clarified by philosophers. In the context 
of religion, Otto instances widely different figures of gods 
and goddesses in different cultures, 
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All this points to the existence of apt·iori 
factors universally and necessarily latent in the 
human spirit. (IH 140a; DH 169a) 
Other examples are given. 
In this way Otto has linked himself to the transcendental 
method of Kant to establish the a priori within the human 
capacity or receptiveness of mind, which must be presupposed 
if the empirical is to be perceived as religious, or indeed 
made meaningful at all. Psychological factors are then 
complementary to this. 
At the end of his notes on Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik 
der Sitten Otto remarks that Kant had discovered the human 
capacity (Vermogen) for ideas (propositions) of reason which 
go beyond all experience. It is a pity (says Otto) that Kant 
did not develop it. But Fries worked it into his doctrine of 
Ahndung, presentiment, and Schleiermacher presupposes it for 
his discussion of religion which is described in Section 3.3 
following. 
3.3 Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) 
In 1899 Otto brought out a centenary edition of 
Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion, with introduction, 
notes and end-comments (Reden) 20 . He chose the text of the 
first edition both because it was the centenary and because 
this text demonstrates the ~nergetic style of the young 
theologian. 
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The term a priori which Otto borrowed from Kant was not used 
by Schleiermacher. Yet something of the idea behind it is 
the basi~ of religion in the Reden and it could be said that 
Otto borrowed the term from Kant, but the meaning of the idea 
from Schleiermacher. 
In common with Romantic expression at the time, 
Schleiermacher stressed the importance of "feeling". In the 
first edition of his Reden the word Anschauung, usually 
translated 'intuition', is frequently coupled with Geftihl, 
feeling, and in one place Schleiermacher explains the 
difference between them. In the second and third editions, 
however, the word Anschauung was used much less and in a 
different sense, so in places where both words had stood in 
the first edition now Geftihl does duty for both. In addition 
to examining these two words in Schleiermacher and their 
relationship to each other, it is necessary to study the 
train of thought associated with them. Only then is it 
possible to consider how far Otto's reliance on direct 
feeling for his scheme of things, especially in Das Heilige, 
is likely to have been derived from Schleiermacher. 
The basic idea in the Reden is that of the Universum, the 
All, which is both the goal of human intuition (or 
contemplation - Anschauung) and the spontaneous power which 
itself grasps the intuiter. "All intuition proceeds from an 
influence of the intuited on· the one who intuits, from an 
original and independent action of the former, which is then 
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grasped, apprehended and conceived by the latter according to 
one's own nature." (Cr.l04b; R.55). Because the relation of 
humanity to this Universum is by feeling, and not by either 
pure or practical reason, Schleiermacher is simply not 
starting with the kind of basic questions which believers and 
non-believers usually argue over, the existence of God, the 
attributes of God, immortality of the soul, and the rest. 
The basis of the Reden is far removed from dogmatics, and 
when Schleiermacher comes to dogmatics in the Glaubenslehre, 
Christian doctrine is made to stem from a feeling, the 
feeling of absolute dependence. 
This distinction is made clear from the start of the second 
speech. This speech opens with the question "What is 
religion?" (R.38; Cr.96a). Its object is the universe and 
the relationship of humanity to it (R.41; Cr.97c), but, 
although metaphysics and morals may have the same object, 
religion is distinct from them both: "metaphysics and morals 
have .. invaded religion on many occasions, and much that 
belongs to religion has concealed itself in metaphysics or 
morals under an unseemly form." (R.41; Cr.97c-98a) Religion 
is simply "intuition of the universe." (R.4621 ) Further in 
the same speech, Schleiermacher rejects belief because this 
is secondhand and indirect: 
What one commonly calls belief, accepting what 
another person has done, wanting to ponder and 
empathize with what someone else has thought and 
felt, is a hard and unworthy service, and instead 
of being the highest in religion, as one 
supposes, it is exactly what must be renounced by 
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those who would penetrate into its sanctuary. To 
want to have and retain belief in this sense 
proves that one is incapable of religion; to 
require this kind of faith from others shows that 
one does not understand it. (R.l20; Cr.134b) 
This accords with what the young Schleiermacher wrote to his 
father in January 1787: 
I cannot believe that he who named himself only 
the Son of Man was the eternal and true God; I 
cannot believe that his death was a 
substitutionary atonement, because he never 
expressly said so himself, and because I cannot 
believe it was necessary. God, who has evidently 
created humankind not for perfection but only for 
the striving after perfection, cannot possibly 
wish to punish persons eternally because they 
have not become perfect. 22 
Schleiermacher wrote in the first Rede, 
Religion helped me when I began to examine the 
ancestral faith and to purify my heart of the 
rubble of primitive times. It remained with me 
when God and immortality disappeared before my 
doubting eyes. It guided me into an active life. 
It taught me with my virtues and defects, to keep 
myself holy in my undivided existence, and only 
through it have I learned friendship and love. 
(Cr.84b; R.14) 
The identity of religion and feeling for Schleiermacher is 
the subject of this section. 
What Schleiermacher meant by Intuition, Anschauung, is 
clarified for us by Albert L. Blackwell in his book 
Schleiermacher's Early Philosophy of Life 23 • 
Religious consciousness is "immediate" intuition 
of the universe. That i&, it is grounded in our 
instinctive, pre-rational sense of the ultimate 
givenness of our existence in the infinite 
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environment of the universe. this 
fundamental sense precedes any distinct 
representation Religion is grounded in 
immediate experience, not theological 
abstraction, though the latter may serve to 
stimulate and refine the former. (Blackwell 195a) 
The central place to study this is Schleiermacher's Second 
Rede, "On the Essence of Religion". But a remark in the 
First sets the scene: 
I do not wish to arouse particular feelings that 
perhaps belong in its realm (sc. Religion's), nor 
to justify or dispute particular ideas. I wish 
to lead you to the innermost depths from which 
religion first addresses the mind (Gemtit). (R.19-
20; Cr.87a) 
This is explained a little further in the Second Rede: 
Intuition is and always remains something 
individual ( etwas Einzelnes) , set apart, the 
immediate perception, nothing more. To bind it 
and to incorporate it into a whole is once more 
the business not of sense but of abstract 
thought. The same is true of religion; it stops 
with the immediate experiences of the existence 
and action of the universe, with the individual 
intuitions and feelings; each of these is a self-
contained work without connection with others or 
dependence upon them; it knows nothing abou,t 
derivation and connection, for among all things 
religion can encounter, that is what its nature 
most opposes. Not only an individual fact or 
deed that one could call original or first, but 
everything in religion is immediate and true for 
itself. A system of intuitions? Can you imagine 
anything stranger? (R.58; Cr. 105-106) 
Revising the text for the second edition of the Reden (1806), 
Schleiermacher rewrote more than half of the Second Speech 
(Cr. 59c). Intuition (Anschauung) is no longer exclusively 
linked to religion but describes the ability to make theories 
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and gain insight into science and knowledge of all kinds 
(Cr.61-2), and thus used in contexts which are not also 
examples of feeling. The second edition makes a clearer 
separation between religion as the experience of intuiting 
the Universum, and religion in the stricter sense of a body 
of knowledge. In place of intuition the word feeling is used 
frequently to cover the double experience for which the two 
words were used in 1799, although the pair are still found 
together occasionally. The reason for this change suggested 
by Crouter is that Schleiermacher now wished to relate 
religion to other forms of human awareness. (Cr.62). 
"Intuition is now conceived as a level of insight that 
relates scientific-intellectual to contemplative-religious 
life in ways that are antithetical to the 1799 text." (Cr. 
62b) Also: "In sum, the account of religion in 1806, like 
that of 1799, stresses its prereflective and precognitive 
status, though the later version now tries to clarify the 
theoretical matrix in which this claim is made." (Cr. 63b) 
The relation between the Reden and the Glaubenslehre is one 
of the classic questions of Schleiermacher research. The 
Reden were substantially altered in 1806, and some further 
changes made in 1821, the year in which Glaubenslehre first 
appeared24 • Possible reasons for these changes, and in 
particular for Schleiermacher abandoning the word Anschauung 
for religious intuition, are discussed by Wilhelm Graf25 • 
Graf rejects theories based orr the influences of Schelling's 
and Fichte's publications, and looks for intrinsic 
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Graf sees the basic problem in religion's dual 
one hand based on feeling with a parallel 
Gemtits-moment to knowledge and action, and on the other as 
the unifying point of knowledge and action. Graf wonders 
whether this unity point represents a fourth position which 
thus unites Feeling, Knowledge and Action (Graf 182). Otto 
does not make any direct reference to this role of religion. 
Relevant, however, for later discussion would be a possible 
link between Otto's ideas of religious development in DH and 
Schleiermacher's steps or stages of religion, also Otto's 
emphasis on the holy as the binding force which combines 
rational and non-rational as a possible development from 
Schleiermacher. 
In an article in Zthk of 1959 Werner Schul tz 26 develops the 
understanding of feeling in Schleiermacher by comparing the 
idea of feeling in the three editions of the Reden and in the 
Glaubenslehre with his explanation in Dialektik, published in 
1822. Feeling is not an emotion but is always accompanied by 
an affection. If we take this together with the section in 
the Reden about the influence of the intuited upon the 
intuiter, then feeling is an unmediated consciousness which 
is in tension between its source (Grund) i.e. the intuited, 
and the human spirit. This makes it, says Schultz (68-9), 
neither purely subjective nor purely objective, but a 
metaphorical image of true Being. Schultz refers to Otto's 
discussion of mystic union tn WoM, which is the tension 
between human and divine being. 
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Subjectivity 
The section on Kant discussed the possibility of a subjective 
a priori. In a sense all consciousness is subjective. 
Blackwell expresses it thus: 
Religion is subjective, it is true. What else 
may be said of any phenomenon of human 
consciousness? But according to Schleiermacher, 
religious consciousness is grounded in an 
immediate existential relation that is of all 
relations most objective. Our ultimate 
dependence is insusceptible of question; it is an 
inescapable relation; it is absolute. It is, in 
brief, an objective fact. And subjective 
religious consciousness rests upon this most 
objective of facts. So while religious 
consciousness is immediate and in this sense 
subjective, we may also say that it is mediated 
by the full content of our cosmic environment and 
is thus objective. (Blackwell 195-6) 
Otto makes clear that for him too the primal experience of 
religion is first of all unmediated, and secondly that it 
requires reflection if it is to be considered or discussed. 
This can only be described as a process which may involve 
speculative metaphysics, or it may involve mythology, ritual, 
or other forms of traditional religious expression. 
Schleiermacher wrote that his admiration for Plato derived in 
part from Plato's use of myth in contexts, e.g. the end of 
the Timaeus, where concepts fail. This is discussed at 
length by Schultz (op.cit.) who begins by contrasting 
Schleiermacher' s idea of religion as "direct intuition of the 
universe" with "empty mythology". Yet religion needs 
mythology in order to become clear, provided it is understood 
that mythology is an aid, not religion itself. 
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Robert Williams in a 1973 article27 discusses subjectivity 
in Schleiermacher. He notes the similarity between what 
Schleiermacher means by feeling and twentieth century 
phenomenology's concept of the subject-relative life world 28 . 
Williams goes on to write: 
Feeling is not ethical subjectivity, cognitive-
theoretical subjectivity, or emotional 
subjectivity. It is subjectivity as such, 
consciousness itself, the common generic element 
present in all the more determinate and specific 
forms. Feeling, orconsciousness as such, is the 
organ of receptivity, or man's openness to and 
immediate union with being. Consequently, 
feeling is not merely one aspect of human 
existence among others, rather feeling 
(=consciousness) is global human existence as a 
psychophysical totality in its lived union with 
and interaction with the World: "What we here 
call feeling is the immediate presence of the 
whole undivided being, both spiritual and 
sensible, the unity of the person with his 
spiritual and sensible world." (Heinrich Steffens 
Von der falschen Theologie und dem wahren 
Glauben, Breslau 1823). Schleiermacher could 
cite his friend Steffens with approval, for he 
himself had written: "Every feeling is the 
immediate co-existence of the individual with the 
whole." (Die christliche Sitte) 
Williams, like many other Schleiermacher scholars, sees the 
"feeling of absolute dependence" in the Glaubenslehre as the 
fullest and most developed expression of what Schleiermacher 
means by feeling. The emphasis on subjectivity recalls words 
from Eckhart, "There is nothing so unknown to the soul as 
herself," quoted above in 3.1. Perhaps partly because the 
idea lacks precision, it clearly confirmed Otto's own 
experience. 
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Schultz takes it further. This religious feeling is only 
genuine when it relates to a reality which is independent of 
subjectivity (Schultz 79c): the feeling of dependence is a 
movement which is in tension between the real and the ideal 
(Schultz 79b). Natural science focusses on the same reality, 
but with concepts which aim at proof and checking. In 
religion, on the contrary, reality cannot be proved, only 
experienced, without system and without concepts. Scientific 
truth is unemotional, while religious truth binds the 
objective with what is deeply personal. Objectivity in 
natural science is either true or false, but in religion 
objectivity is both true and false in measures which vary at 
different moments (Schultz 79-81). 
Religion as a form of knowledge 
Schleiermacher's admiration for the use of myth in Plato 
should make clear his view that religion is not to be 
identified with either empirical or metaphysical knowledge. 
Religion has a practical aspect it is true, but for 
Schleiermacher it was important to go beyond Kant's view of 
religion as an aspect, albeit an important aspect, of ethics. 
0 
For Kant two traditional religious beliefs were necessary, 
the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul, or at 
least life after death. Ethics demands justice and God must 
guarantee that good is rewarded and evil punished, and as 
this did not infallibly happen in mortal human experience, 
Kant felt he had proved the validity of these two religious 
beliefs29 . Schleiermacher's view of religion can be seen as 
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a protest against all this type of thinking. 
The distinction of religion as a third type of knowledge, 
quite distinct from either metaphysics or morals, is 
emphasised by Otto, and he gives Schleiermacher the credit 
for this discovery, both in Das Heilige and in an article 
(which appeared more than once) on "How Schleiermacher 
Rediscovered the sensus numinis n 30 • The second Rede provides 
several references to the tripartite division of knowledge. 
In a long passage near the start of the speech Schleiermacher 
contrasts religion with the other two mental activities, 
metaphysics and morals (R.41-54; Cr.97-104). Three sentences 
can be taken to represent the drift of the whole passage. 
Therefore it is time to take up the subject from 
the other end and to start with the sharp 
opposition in which religion is found over 
against morals and metaphysics. (R.50; Cr.lOlc) 
Religion's essence is 
acting, but intuition 
Cr.102a) 
neither thinking nor 
and feeling. (R.50; 
Religion shows itself to you as the necessary and 
indispensable third next to those two, as their 
natural counterpart, not slighter in worth and 
splendor than what you wish of them ... Praxis 
is an art, speculation is a science, religion is 
the sensibility and taste for the infinite. 
(R.52-3; Cr.103a) 
Even in the first speech there is a hint of what is to come 
in the phrase: " .. the poorly stitched together fragments of 
metaphysics and morals that ar~ called rational Christianity 
" (R.25; Cr.89c) 
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The Age of Enlightenment had cast religion (where religion 
was not disdainfully consigned to the scrap heap of emotional 
left-overs from a more primitive age) in either one of two 
roles. Religion could be seen as a system of dogmas or body 
of beliefs, which in turn might entail certain attitudes and 
behaviour, some of it ritual behaviour, and it must be 
confessed that considerable stress on right doctrines from 
within religious sects and churches had contributed to this 
view. The other possibility was to think of religion as a 
system of moral encouragements and constraints, but 
especially constraints. Both these ways of regarding 
religion are still widely held. Both are reductionist and 
have the effect of depriving religion of uniqueness as this 
was understood by Schleiermacher and by Otto and others. Yet 
the second at least of these views had received considerable 
support in the work of Kant. 
As Schleiermacher first studied both Kant and Plato31 when 
he was a student at Halle, perhaps we can see also the 
influence of the philosopher Johann August Eberhard, who was 
an anti-Kantian professor of philosophy at Halle. Eberhard 
wrote in the workbook on ethics which he prepared for his 
students that the analytic (a priori) and the synthetic (Q 
posteriori) methods must proceed hand in hand (Blackwell 
53a). Perhaps in reaction to Kant and the many who tried to 
follow or prove his epistemology, Schleiermacher developed 
the conviction that human knowledge must in all spheres 
remain partial. The wise philosopher must simply accept 
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this, a principle fully in accord with Socrates. This was no 
doubt one reason why Plato, following the practice of his 
master, had adopted the dialogue as the vehicle for his 
though t 32 . 
Otto went back to Kant in claiming certainty for the a priori 
or group of a prioris in his understanding of religion. Yet 
he does not claim conceptual knowledge: only to know that the 
ultimate (the numinous) exists. Perhaps this is not all that 
different from Schleiermacher's trust in the Universum, the 
All, in his Reden, which also carries with it no conceptual 
or descriptive information. Yet Otto appeals directly to 
Kant's transcendental method in discovering the basic .!! 
priori principle through empirical means. 
Two standpoints and their unity 
Kant had subsumed the whole of religion under ethics, thus 
making religion basically a rational pursuit and not an 
emotional one. To this Schleiermacher's basing religion on 
feeling stands in the strongest contrast. It is known that 
many of Schleiermacher's contemporaries were deeply troubled 
by the knowledge-faith divide. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi 
wrote in 1791, "What possible relation of the two can be 
thought in human fashion? No philosophy fills this cleft. 
To pass over, there is required a bridge or wing. n 33 
Blackwell comments: "Finding himself stranded between the 
rationalistic philosophy of ·the Age of Reason and the 
orthodox piety of his Christianity, Jacobi tried to pass over 
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to the realm of eternal certainty on the wings of faith -
though he never accomplished this with the security for which 
he wished" (Blackwell 162c). 
Schleiermacher did not share this difficulty only because of 
his romantic sense of the infinite, and his belief that the 
human condition was fundamentally imperfect and imperfectible 
and human knowledge bound to be for ever incomplete. This 
enabled him to enjoy an enviable sense of wholeness, which 
contrasts with Jacobi's complaint to his friend Reinhold in 
a letter (8.0ct.1817) near the end of his life: 
You see, dear R., that I am still the same as 
ever. Always a heathen with the understanding, 
but with my whole heart (Gemlith) a Christian, I 
swim between two currents that do not want to 
unite for me, so that jointly they are 
treacherous. For as the one perpetually buoys me 
up, so at the same time the other perpetually 
pulls me under. (quoted in Blackwell 163c) 
Schleiermacher was shown a copy of this letter by a mutual 
friend, and wrote to Jacobi direct about this: 
It is really nothing other than a reciprocity 
between being buoyed up by the one and pulled 
under by the other. But, my dear friend! - why 
should we not be satisfied with that? 
Oscillation is truly the general form of all 
finite existence, and it is a matter of immediate 
consciousness that this fluctuation proceeds from 
nothing other than the two foci of my one 
ellipse, and I have in this suspension the whole 
abundance of my earthly life ... Understanding 
and feeling remain for me alongside one another, 
but they act upon one another and form a galvanic 
pile. For me the innermost life of the spirit 
consists in this galvanic operation - in the 
feeling for understanding, and in the 
understanding of feeling in which the two 
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poles yet remain always t·emoved from one another . 
. For you the "two currents" do not want to 
unite. Neither do they for me. But you wish for 
this unity and miss it painfully, while I remain 
satisfied with their separation. (quoted in 
Blackwell 164a) 
This relates directly with Schleiermacher' s view that the 
ideal form of philosophical discourse was neither the 
systematic nor the fragmentary, but the dialogue, and is 
further evidenced in his admiration for Plato. 
It is not known whether Otto had read this correspondence, 
although he certainly knew the biography of Schleiermacher 
and the papers of Schleiermacher edited by Dilthey. It is 
notable that Otto dedicated his edition of the Reden in 1899 
to Dilthey as follows: 
Wilhelm Dilthey I dem Biographen Schleiermachers 
I in aufrichtigem Dank und Verehrung gewidmet. 
But Otto's philosophy of religion, or his understanding of 
religion, is only dialogical to the extent that there is 
interaction between the Numinous and the person or people 
(more usually singular) who experience the numinous. But 
this is far from dialogue in the Platonic sense. Instead 
Otto thought he had found a systematic way of understanding 
the numinous by reusing the Ahndung theory of Fries. 
Schleiermacher describes two standpoints: 
Every expression, every product of the human 
spirit can be viewed and ·apprehended from a dual 
standpoint. If one considers religion from its 
center according to its inner essence, it is a 
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product of human nature, rooted in one of its 
necessary modes of action or drives, or whatever 
you wish to call it, for I do not now want to 
pass judgment on your technical language. If one 
considers it from its extremities, according to 
the definite bearing and form it has here and 
there assumed, it is a product of time and of 
history. From which aspect have you considered 
this spiritual phenomenon in order to arrive at 
those concepts that you pass off as the common 
content of everything anyone has ever designated 
by the name of religion? You will hardly say 
that this is a consideration of the first type . 
" (R.22-3; Cr.88bc) 
This links with what Schleiermacher says about the human 
soul: 
Every life is only the result of a continuous 
appropriation and repulsion; everything has its 
determinate being only by virtue of the way in 
which it uniquely combines and retains the two 
primal forces of nature: the thirsty attraction 
and the expansion of the active and living self. 
(R.6; Cr.79-80) 
In this Schleiermacher reflects a fundamental polarity which 
was widely shared in 18th century literary theory, philosophy 
and physics (Cr. 79n). 
His discussion takes up several pages of the first Rede and 
it is clear that he wants to develop this in the light of the 
creative tension already mentioned. One drive seeks to draw 
everything outside into itself, is orientated towards 
enjoyment and works only mechanically on whatever is at hand. 
The other overlooks manifestations because it penetrates them 
(R.6-7; Cr.80). But Schleiermacher affirms that the two 
drives exist in every soul, in which all combinations and 
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proportions of the two are possible. 
Thus it is possible to know an object from two directions, 
from its manifestations or phenomena, with the concomitant 
need to generalise by induction, or alternatively from its 
centre or essence. Schleiermacher wrote in one of his 
Notebooks: 
a theory can arise in a dual fashion - from the 
center out or from the boundaries in. In 
empirical things the second fashion. (Denkmale 
p. 104 entry 120) 34 
This is the familiar contrast between a priori and a 
posteriori, working from an inner knowledge or feel of a 
thing, or else induction from a number of bits of empirical 
evidence. In matters of religion, the essence can only be 
reached at the centre, and the process is therefore from the 
centre out. This is in a way parallel to Kant's Moral Law 
which is essentially independent of phenomena, yet in 
practice is empirically discovered, as Otto also explained in 
the discussion in DH. But it also gives an edge to this type 
of knowledge which is therefore deeper than empirical 
knowledge. 
A very interesting light is thrown on this in an article by 
Terry H . Fo reman35 . Foreman suggests a link between 
Schleiermacher's Reden and Hume's Natural History of 
Religion. He explains that there is a literary genre of the 
18th century which sees "natural history" not simply as the 
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detailed empirical study of nature "from the boundaries in", 
but rather a genre that looks to nature in its essence as a 
norm. Many writers used this genre, including Rousseau and 
much later Karl Marx. On this view all manifestations are 
poor reflections, even deformations of the essence which can 
only be considered from the centre. "A natural history of 
religion" in this sense relates the ways in which human 
culture has deviated from and corrupted the essential 
original. This is indeed the burden of Schleiermacher' s 
Third Rede, "Ober die Bildung zur Religion." 
A special human faculty 
To find the centre, however, 
capacity. This is taken up 
human nature has a special 
again in Schleiermacher's 
Hermeneutik, a series of lectures by Schleiermacher for which 
we have no unmistakable text. The essential quality for 
reaching the centre Schleiermacher calls Divination. 
Otto picks up the idea and th~ term Divination36 and uses it 
in DH with particular regard to types of people, 
distinguishing those who have a creative or prophetic 
capacity in relation to the Numinous, as opposed to the 
generality who have indeed the capacity or Anlage des Gemtites 
to encounter the numinous, but no more. 
Otto does not, however, exploit Schleiermacher's creative 
tension between proceeding either from the centre out or from 
the boundaries in. For Otto, the holy consists of both 
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rational and non-rational woven together, the rational 
aspects relating to VerstAndnis, the non-rational to Ahnung 
(see Section 3.4 following). Schleiermacher had classified 
the gulf between VerstAndnismenschen and Sinnesmenschen, 
types who failed to comprehend each other, and yet who needed 
each other (Foreman 102a). Otto would seem to have expressed 
their psychological interdependence in the essential weaving 
together of rational and non-rational. 
At the same time Otto relies on the manifestations of 
religion to reveal the numinous, a sequence of operations 
which he said he derived from Kant, in the innermost depths 
of the soul ( Seelengrund) 37 • From Schleiermacher he seems 
to have derived the necessity of seeing the infinite through 
the finite, of finding or sensing the essence through the 
manifestations, apparently on the basis of an inner, 
preformed capacity, as noted above. This of course also 
appears in Fries, and some scholars, notably Almond 1983, 
assume that Otto got the whole notion from there. But the 
case for his debt in this matter to Schleiermacher, whom he 
studied before being introduced to the work of Fries, is 
better established. 
In the Reden at least Schleiermacher avoided any kind of 
system and appealed to feeling because this was a quality 
which was instantly understandable for those for whom he 
wrote. The imprecision here ~as an advantage both in itself 
and because it matched the thought world of the Romantics 
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around 1800. By 1900 this had changed. Not only was Kant 
closely interpreted by several neoKantian philosophers, but 
Hegel's systematic philosophy had also attracted followers 
who formed themselves into schools of left and right. 
Advances in psychology meant that psychology, even before 
Freud, was emerging as a science in its own right, oftenwith 
a clinical empirical basis, and was a long way removed from 
being a branch of "anthropology'' (so Kant and Fries), or of 
a philosophy in the speculative sense. Otto's work reflects 
this development in his appeals to human experience, 
especially obvious in the case histories derived from James 
and Starbuck, both psychologists in the modern sense. It may 
be said that Otto represents a bridge between the thought 
worlds of 1800 and of 1900, but the differences sometimes 
strain his terminology. 
3.4 Jacob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) 
The previous sections have indicated how Otto could have 
derived his leading ideas from Kant and Schleiermacher. Yet 
there is no doubt that he was also deeply impressed by the 
philosophy of Fries, at least during the years he was at 
Gottingen under the persuasive influence of Nelson. Modern 
commentators too have stressed the lasting importance of 
Fries for Otto's work38 , and that is why it is necessary to 
include this section. 
It could be maintained tha·t Otto still commended the 
philosophy of Fries in 1931 when he wrote, in English, some 
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notes to The Philosophy of Religion, the English translation 
of his book KFR, including the following: 
Theologians will dispute this problem, the Q. 
priori and General versus the Contingent and 
Historical, till the end of things; and it is 
perhaps a matter of doubt whether a satisfactory 
final solution of the problem will ever be found. 
In my opinion, however, a combination of the 
principles of Fries with those of De Wette and 
Schleiermacher seems to offer a solution, which, 
although it does not appear to me as a final 
oracular statement, has given me a provisional 
Archimedean, a ground that I can s t i 11 rest 
upon. 39 
Obviously he would not want to abandon Fries just when his 
book was being made available to a new and numerous public, 
but the equality apparently afforded to Schleiermacher, who 
had been unfavourably compared to Fries in 1909, suggests 
some revision of views. 
As it is part of the drift of the current Thesis to suggest 
that Fries in fact contributes nothing substantial to Otto's 
thought and its application, and as Section 2.4 has already 
discussed Otto's handling of Fries in KFR, this section will 
concentrate on contemporary criticism of Otto's use of Fries 
to bring out positive and negative aspects. Two who strongly 
opposed Otto's use of Fries were G. Weiss 40 and K. 
Bornhausen41 . 
The article by Georg Weiss which appeared in 1911 begins as 
follows: 
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De Wette's students, of whom the best known are 
the Swiss K. Hagenbach, J. Stahelin and D. 
Schenkel, were more stimulated by his 
theological-critical thinking than by his 
Fries ish philosophy. And whatever of Fries's 
philosophy of religion had perhaps struck home 
with them at first, gradually died away. Even 
Fries's son-in-law, the theologian Th. Henke, was 
not his follower in philosophy. 
It is clear that the philosopher J. Fr. Fries was not highly 
thought of in the early years of the century. Yet Weia goes 
on to relate that the young Got t ingen philosopher Leonard 
Nelson (1882-1927) had started the new Friesish school and 
won over first Rudolf Otto and then Wilhelm Bousset. After 
some no longer illuminating discussion of the philosophy, 
Weia concludes: 
I cannot go into the details here. But when 
influential and acute theologians enter into a 
rna t ter of importance with such warmth and energy, 
then other theologians have an obligation to take 
it equally seriously and to bring out the pros 
and cons from all sides. (Weiss 1911, 732) 
Ansgar Paus42 is more sympathetic, and shows how Fries and 
his followers De Wette and Apelt43 followed Kant in at least 
one point. Paus quotes Apelt on a central problem: "All our 
knowledge begins with experience, but not all our knowledge 
derives from experience."H (Paus 54b) 
Fries starts, as already noted, with the Faktum in the nature 
of the knower. This can only be reached by self-observation, 
a process which is not simply introspection, but a process of 
reflection which brings to consciousness something which has 
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already happened at a subconscious level. Thus the original 
happening is unmediated, while the reflection is mediated in 
thought and consciousness. Paus outlines what Fries means as 
follows: 
If Kant for his part took the trouble to find a 
transcendental basis with the help of the 
principle of the condition for the possibility of 
experience, others after him worked for a basis 
for these axioms by means of inner experience, 
i.e. "psychologically". Fries not only rejected 
the second path because the apriori character of 
unmediated knowledge would be destroyed by it; he 
did not even agree with Kant's attempt to find 
the basis for unmediated knowledge by 
transcendental means, because the "synthetic 
character of metaphysics" would be given away by 
it. Fries sees the solution to this problem in 
the claim that there is a third possibility 
beside these two, to find the basis for axioms 
having their validity in immediate evidence, in 
the unmediated knowledge of reason, which being 
apriori is distinct from any possibility of 
experienced knowledge. (Paus 43c-44a) 
Fries described his method as philosophical anthropology. 
This too is cause for dissatisfaction because anthropology, 
which meant taking the human as a starting point, often meant 
no more than psychology at the time. Even Paus concludes 
that Fries, while avoiding the crude forms of Psychologism, 
steers towards a solution which is open to the accusation of 
psychologism, because he found the basis of knowledge (that 
is the axioms) in a natural, human origin. 
Karl Bornhausen, then at Marburg, reviewed Otto's KFR for 
Zthk (1910) with a long article simply entitled "Against 
Neofriesianism in Theology-". Leibnitz, Kant and 
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Schle ie rmache r raise quest ions and problems which can be 
applied to our own time - Bornhausen mentions especially the 
questions of the last fifty years; whereas Fries, according 
to Bornhausen, is entirely bound to his own time. It is 
therefore surprising that Otto, for whom Bornhausen has 
considerable respect as a theologian, takes the trouble to 
reiterate Fries with a book of difficult diction and old-
fashioned content which even when freshly expressed seems 
strange (346-7). It would have been better for Otto to 
enlarge on his own capable thought, as sketched in the 
Conclusion to this book, or perhaps some of the more 
stimulating ideas of Fries, rather than this obvious and 
comprehensive repristination (eine offene und umfassende 
Repristination, 347). 
Paus is less harsh. Instead of stating the situation as 
"Fries against Kant" {Bornhausen 347c), Paus considers that 
Fries stays close to Kant, except for missing the central 
point, the understanding of Transcendental. Fries speaks of 
"Kant's prejudice," "the prejudice of the transcendental" 
{Paus 40b), and set about to reform the Critique of Reason. 
By altering the approach, he sought to find the basis of 
reason as a Faktum in the knower, and in this he also changed 
the meaning of the term a priori, using it now to describe a 
basis or fact of knowing, rather than as the limit beyond 
which reason could not go. Putting it more strongly, 
Bornhausen says that in following Fries Otto seeks a basic 
knowledge which is even more basic than the a priori, i.e. 
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beyond the a priori, which is impossible (351-2). Kant 
wanted to transcend experience and crude sense-perception in 
order to seek the possibility of knowledge in the ground of 
pure understanding (auf dem Boden des reinen Verstandes, 
362c) . This relates to the possibility of experience, 
including psychological experience, but not to psychology 
itself. Thus the transcendental quest ion (Kant) is the 
question of the form of knowledge, how it is possible, 
whereas the psychological question is the content of 
knowledge (362-4). Fries then went on to claim that we have 
knowledge of things in reality, in themselves, because he 
uses transcendental to overstep the intellect through Ahnung. 
The system Fries worked out is superficially clear, as are 
the writings of Nelson. But the details are complex, 
strange, and unconvincing. Otto's espousal of this system 
earned him adverse criticism, when it seems that everything 
he needed was already available in Kant and Schleiermacher. 
Some commentators, e.g. Almond 1983, see Fries as central for 
Otto's thought, especially in Das Heilige, but it now seems 
clear that the whole Fries-Nelson interlude for Otto was a 
needless distraction. As early as 1910 H. Scholz said as 
much in a review of KFR45 : 
The final chapter develops a programme of work in 
the well-established discipline Study of Religion 
(Religionswissenschaft), which comes close enough 
to the epoch-making demands of Troeltsch, with 
the result that one may well ask whether the 
laborious detour concerning Fries was really 
necessary, or whether to_ link directly to Kant 
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and Schleiermacher would not have been simpler 
and better justified. (col.531c) 
Th. Haering also thought Fries irrelevant to Otto's main 
project in his review of DH in 191746 . It is useless to 
speculate, however, what might have developed if Otto had 
worked instead with Husserl at Gottingen instead of Nelson. 47 
3.5 Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) 
Ri tschl' s influence may have encouraged Otto to pay more 
attention to historical developments in religion, 
specifically German Christianity. Otto came into the 
tradition of Ritschl before he studied Fries, and the 
Ritschlian tradition may have helped him to keep a hold on 
the actual and historical. 
In a footnote to p.123 of DH Otto says of his first 
publication die Anschauung vom heiligen Geist bei Luther: "I 
wrote this first paper at the time quite under the influence 
of Ritschlianism, as can be seen from its attitude to 
mysticism. But the impact of the numinous-nonrational in 
Luther and in every genuine idea of God were clear to me. 
Since then over the years I had to produce a different 
evaluation of mysticism .. " 
On page 3 of AHG Otto lists those whose work has most 
influenced him up to then. The list begins with Ritschl and 
A. Harnack, and includes Loofs and Reischle (of Halle), H. 
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Schultz (of Gottingen) and v. Herrmann, all of whom are 
lis ted by Richmond ( 1978, 28) as prominent members of the 
'Ritschlian school'. 
Ritschl taught at Gottingen till his death in March 1889, the 
month before Otto arrived as a theological student for the 
summer semester 1889. Otto had originally gone to Erlangen, 
although Gottingen was his local university, because 
Gottingen was considered too liberal. This reputation may be 
due to the ascendancy of Ritschl. 
During the years Ritschl was a student and then a lecturer at 
Bonn, the "supernatural approach to Christianity" was 
fighting on two fronts 48 • One was the philosophy of Hegel 
and the impersonal Absolute which was above all particulars; 
and the other was the advancing scientific materialist and 
naturalist world view. With the sudden collapse of 
Hegelianism in the 1840s materialist thought rushed into the 
vacuum, giving added impetus to philosophies which were 
naturalistic and positivistic49 • From 1860, after the 
publication of Darwin's Origin of Species, these philosophies 
attached the label 'evolutionary' to themselves 50 • 
The contemporary stress on mechanical causality in the name 
of empiricism questioned the nature and freedom of mankind. 
Kant had shown a way to incorporate empiricism within 
idealism, and Ritschl followed in this tradition. But where 
Kant's mode of thought was largely !!historical, Ri tschl 
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taught the importance of historical development. The 
question concerns the relation of human consciousness to the 
material world. For Kant there was the knowledge of freedom 
typified in ethical choice, but the relation of choice to 
causality lay beyond the reach of knowledge. Ritschl was 
less tightly rationalist and was prepared to take the 
connection on trust. Thus he asserted a clear distinction 
between "nature" and "spirit", the human from the non-
human51, with the effect that while human beings are part of 
nature, they are "superior in value" in that they are 
conscious of having freedom of choice. 
provides the starting point. 
Consciousness 
Ritschl wrote 
Metaphysics 52 
(in 
as 
seven weeks) 
an attack 
his essay Theology and 
or self-defence against 
specifically Luthardt and v. Frank (Frank was the Erlangen 
professor who had most impressed the young Otto), but more 
generally to represent his own opposition to speculative 
systems which disvalued or subordinated human experience and 
consciousness. Such systems included both the dominant 
"sense-organ prejudice" (Spiegelberg) of mechanical 
positivism and naturalism on the one hand, and metaphysical 
systems of which Hegel's, now split into Right and Left, was 
a powerful example. But equally, the speculative theological 
structures of medieval scholasticism, of the Roman church and 
of Lutheranism traditionally understood, constituted non-
empirical structures which Ritschl opposed. 
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Ritschl, like Schleiermacher before and like Otto later, 
wanted to put experience before system. Ritschl's dogmatics 
centres on revelation. But unlike Schleiermacher, this is 
for Ritschl primarily scripture and the tradition of 
scripture interpretation. Ritschl therefore emphasises the 
Christian community, and holds that faith is corporate before 
it is individual. This provides the basis for Ri tschl 's 
opposition to piety, as understood in the Lutheran tradition, 
which he links to "neo-platonism" (i.e. a non-empirical 
metaphysical system). He opposes pietism on four grounds 53 : 
it is ahistorical because it bypasses the Word of God as 
mediated in the Christian religion; it is amoral because 
mysticism does not entail any moral action; it is 
individualistic; and it is otherworldly, that is non-
empirical and non-practical. Otto stresses experience, but 
the phenomena of religion to which he gives prominence put 
him in the tradition of Religionsgeschichte or actual, 
historical religion. 
On the other hand, in his first publication, AHG, Otto 
appears to minimise the importance of the Christian tradition 
and community in saying that the individual Christian has 
through the preaching of the Word direct and unmediated 
access to the Spirit, and is not dependent on a chain of 
tradition. Otto devotes attention to scholastic theories of 
causality in relation to salvation. His scheme is practical 
and empirical in that he both denies any kind of extra-
psychological causality, and says that the effects of faith 
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are empirical. Luther, he says, speaks of the spirit and the 
fruits or effects of the spirit, not of how and why as the 
mystics and enthusiasts describe it (AHG 38-39). The Spirit 
on one side and Faith on the other is causa sufficiens. (AHG 
40) . 
If AHG owes something to the influence of Ri tschl it is 
possible to see this as a longer-lasting and more beneficial 
strand in Otto's thought than the philosophy of Fries. When 
considered in contrast to Fries, Otto seems more realistic, 
actual and historical, because his appeal to experience is 
often though not always in terms of being influenced by or 
through the rituals, music, art forms etc. of actual 
religions, in contrast to the metaphysical system-making of 
Fries. 
3.6 William James (1842-1910) 54 
William James' 1901-2 Gifford Lectures were published under 
the title of The Varieties of Religious Experience55 (VRE) 
in 1902, and in 1907. appeared in German as Die religiose 
Erfahrung in ihrer Mannigfal tigkei t 56 , translated by the 
psychologist Georg Wobbermin. Otto mentions James's book 
first in KFR, published in 1909, and then quotes several 
passages from James in DH. Otto freely acknowledges a debt 
to James, but the nature of this debt needs further study. 
James on experience 
James defines religion at the beginning of his second lecture 
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"The Circumscription of the Topic". He acknowledges that his 
definition is somewhat arbitrary, but for the purpose of 
these lectures (his own emphasis) he limits his subject to 
"the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in 
their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand 
in relation to whatever they may consider the divine." (VRE 
50b) 
He does not claim scientific precision by this definition, 
and therefore chooses to examine cases which are the best 
developed. 57 
Things are more or less divine, states of mind 
are more or less religious, reactions are more or 
less total, but the boundaries are always misty, 
and it is everywhere a question of amount and 
degree. Nevertheless, at their extreme of 
development, there can never be any question as 
to what experiences are religious. (VRE 57a) 
His topic of course is not religion but religious experience. 
He does not define experience. There is no doubt that 
experience for James is the subject matter of psychology and 
that is why he is competent to treat of it. It is also 
likely that in the puritan-pietist New England in which he 
grew up everyone knew what Christian conversion was and the 
conversion experience was religious experience in its most 
significant form. Thirdly, James forestalls epistemological 
investigation by running down speculative thought, most 
especially philosophy and theology. It may not have occurred 
to him that he might need to define experience, yet his 
straightforward approach appeiled at once to Husser1 58 . 
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In a letter written while he was preparing these lectures 
James outlined his aims: 
First, to defend (against all the prejudices of 
my class) 'experience' against 'philosophy' as 
being the real backbone of the world's religious 
life- I mean prayer, guidance, and all that sort 
of thing immediately and privately felt as 
against high and noble general views of our 
destiny and the world's meaning; and second, to 
make the hearer or reader believe, what I 
invincibly do believe, that, although all the 
special manifestations of religion may have been 
absurd, (I mean its creeds and theories), yet the 
life of it as a whole is mankind's most important 
function. A task well-nigh impossible, I fear, 
and in which I shall fail, but to attempt it is 
~religious act. 59 
Philosophy and Feeling 
In the lectures he repeatedly makes a contrast between 
feelings and philosophy, between experience and thought. His 
subject matter is experience, i.e. feelings, and he rejects 
all forms of metaphysics in most uncomplimentary terms. 
James makes this contrast repeatedly, and most especially in 
Lecture XVIII on Philosophy. Otto on the other hand needed 
to have both the feelings and the philosophy. For James, 
philosophy fails the pragmatic test: 
The test is a perfectly plain one of fact. 
Theology based on pure reason must in point of 
fact convince men universally. If it did not, 
wherein would its superiority consist? If it 
only formed sects and schools, even as sentiment 
and mysticism form them, how would it fulfill its 
programme of freeing us from personal caprice and 
waywardness? This perfectly definite practical 
test of the pretensions of philosophy to found 
religion on universal reason simplifies my 
procedure today. I need not discredit philosophy 
by laborious criticism of _its arguments. It will 
suffice if I show that as a matter of history it 
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fails to prove its contentions to be 
"objectively" convincing. In fact, philosophy 
does so fail. It does not banish differences; it 
founds schools and sects just as feeling does. 
(VRE 419ab) 
Experience is first order, but according to James philosophy 
and theology are second order, because without prior 
experience there is nothing to philosophise or theologise 
about. 
When I call theological formulas secondary 
products, I mean that in a world where no 
religious feeling had ever existed, I doubt 
whether any philosophic theology could ever have 
been framed. I doubt if dispassionate 
intellectual contemplation of the universe, apart 
from inner unhappiness and need for deliverance 
on the one hand and mys t leal emotion on the 
other, would ever have resulted in religious 
philosophies such as we now possess. (VRE 415a) 
Established religions, their doctrines, scriptures and 
rituals, are secondary products. Otto says much the same. 
This view of religion enables both men to offer an 
explanation about the similarities and differences between 
historic religions. If the experiences, the emotions and 
feelings are the same, then the reflections on them depend on 
second order activity mediated by culture, language, and 
other factors which account for the differences. Otto does 
not quite say this, but James plainly does. 
When we survey the whole field of religion, we 
find a great variety in the thoughts that have 
prevailed there; but the feelings on the one hand 
and the conduct on the other are almost always 
the same, for Stoic, Christian, and Buddhist 
saints are practically indistinguishable in their 
lives. The theories which Religion generates, 
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James 
being thus variable, are secondary; and if you 
wish to grasp her essence, you must look to the 
feelings and the conduct as being the more 
constant elements. (VRE 48la) 
sees himself theoughout these lectures as a 
psychologist, although he does not approach the behaviourist 
stance of John B. Watson whose new thrust to the psychology 
of behaviourism dates from 1913, three years after James's 
death. 
You see now why I have been so individualistic 
throughout these lectures, and why I have seemed 
so bent on rehabilitating the element of feeling 
in religion and subordinating its intellectual 
part. Individuality is founded in feeling; and 
the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder 
strata of character, are the only places in the 
world in which we catch real fact in the making, 
and directly perceive how events happen, and how 
work is actually done. Compared with this world 
of living, individualized feelings, the world of 
generalized objects which the intellect 
contemplates is without solidity or life. (VRE 
478ab) 
James does not so much support his position by argument, 
which might in itself be a concession to philosophy, but 
rather by commending a particular outlook. He made clear in 
several of his publications that he regarded attitude and 
will as the determinants of action for which eeasons were 
found later and dressed up as proofs. Thus in Varieties also 
he is presenting a particular way of looking at the evidence. 
Nicholas Lash60 puts it like this: 
James is forever coaxing his reader not so much 
to accept the conclusions of an argument (for any 
intellectualist may have this aim in view!), but 
rather to come to see things in a particular way. 
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"A man's vision," he once wrote, "is the great 
fact about him. n 61 
Lash goes on to cite John J MacDermott, "James's radical 
empiricism is as much an aesthetic as it is a metaphysics or 
an epistemology. "62 This ties in with James's skill and 
training as an artist. 63 
James on objectivity 
Yet for James feeling relates to some objective reality. 
James devotes his Lecture III to The Reality of the Unseen, 
and Otto quotes some lines from it (IH 10-11 footnote; DH 11 
in text). Otto expressly rejects the suggestion that this 
force is somehow inferred from the phenomena as their only 
possible cause. Instead Otto stresses that this unseen, 'the 
Numinous', is directly felt through the experience. Although 
Otto has insisted that the Numinous is beyond concept and 
impossible to describe, he does manage to produce a 
systematic and telling analysis by means of a special device 
involving a double reference. Otto at tempts to use the 
methods of phenomenology to give an outline description of 
this reality which he calls the numinous by means of 
describing the feeling of the numinous. This goes far beyond 
James who does not attempt anything like this. His third 
lecture is entitled "The Reality of the Unseen," and is drawn 
on by Otto in DH. 
The object of feeling for James has an importance which is 
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not made clear. Unlike Otto, James maintains that religious 
feelings, fear, love and so on, are not as feelings different 
in kind from any other love or fear. What makes them 
specifically religious is the specific sort of object to 
which they are directed {VRE 47b). Thus there must be an 
object as well as a feeling. 
Otto had seen James's book before he published KFR in 1909, 
but he did not refer to it in detail until DH in 1917. But 
Otto's own personal project was to find the confluence of 
academic theology with the personal experience of pietism, 
and he seemed to find an ally in VRE. James's radically 
empirical approach to religion is obvious, yet towards the 
end of his series he devotes Lecture XVI I I to Philosophy 
which he expects to be able to point beyond his own work. On 
James's view philosophy cannot be used to justify religion 
after the manner of the theologians, but it would be possible 
to apply reason and intellect to some kind of systematic 
comparison and analysis of the phenomena. 
In all sad sincerity I think we must conclude 
that the attempt to demonstrate by purely 
intellectual processes the truth of the 
deliverances of direct religious experience is 
absolutely hopeless. 
It would be unfair to philosophy, however, to 
leave her under this negative sentence. Let me 
close, then, by briefly enumerating what she can 
do for religion. If she will abandon metaphysics 
and deduction for criticism and induction, and 
frankly transform herself from theology into 
science of religions, she can make herself 
enormously useful. 
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I do not see why a critical Science of Religions 
of this sort might not eventually command as 
general a public adhesion as is commanded by 
physical science. Even the personally non-
religious might accept its conclusions on trust, 
much as blind persons now accept the facts of 
optics - it might appear as foolish to refuse 
them. 64 (VRE 436-7) 
Otto's use of William James 
All critics and commentators agree that Das Heilige draws at 
least in part on psychology. On page 11 Otto acknowledges 
his debt to William James with a direct quotation, and makes 
other references to VRE in the early, descriptive chapters. 
Ernst Troeltsch in his review of DH (1919) says that Otto 
establishes a purely psychological analysis for religious 
phenomena, and goes on to say that this is required by Otto's 
application of Fries's 'anthropological critique' to which 
epistemology and philosophy are merely supplements. A 
psychological contribution is required by Fries. But what 
Fries offers is psychology in the service of epistemology, 
not the collection of psychological data in personal 
accounts, as in James. 
Georg Wobhermin, the translator of James's Gifford Lectures 
into German, was a psychologist, and it is therefore all the 
more significant that he describes Otto in his review of Das 
Hei 1 ige (Wohbermin 1923) as "a master of this kind of 
psychological analysis", hut then goes on to say that Otto 
has ignored developments in psychology in the last ten years, 
and that this has made his worK less clear than it might be. 
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Ten years cannot be a reference to Fries who wrote a hundred 
and ten years earlier, but it is of course exactly ten years 
between the publication of Das Heilige (1917) and the German 
translation of William James (1907). 
Otto studied theology at Erlangen and Gottingen, and there is 
no evidence that he had any formal training in psychology. 
Yet the need to reflect on personal experience is suggested 
by Kant, Schleiermacher, and Fries. Given that psychological 
understanding is important for reading, and a fortiori for 
writing Das Heilige, it seems likely that Otto made use of 
James to develop his psychological ideas, and, equally 
important, to support them with the authority of an 
internationally-known psychologist. 
Many reviewers of Otto's book remarked on the similarity to 
James of Otto's psychological approach. A paper by Peter 
Brunner entitled "The Idea of Religion in William James and 
Rudolf Otto" appeared in 192865 , in which the author compares 
and contrasts DH and VRE. Brunner does not, however, say 
much about the use Otto may have made of James, beyond 
showing the important ways in which Otto either went beyond 
James or differed significantly from him. Given the 
different intellectual climates in which the American and the 
German grew up, differences are to be expected. More 
surprising are the parallels and similarities. At the same 
time it must be recognised that James travelled widely in 
Europe, read and spoke German and French and was familiar 
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with many ideas which Otto grew up with, so some similarities 
may be due less to borrowing than derivation from a common 
source. 
Brunner notes the inductive approach to the material which 
both men take up. This means that both describe cases and 
examples and this is their greatest similar! ty. Although 
both ascribe the highest value to religion and stress the 
reality of religion's focus, Otto and James differ when it 
comes to trying to say what religion essentially is and in 
their handling of the relationship of rational to non-
rational. Both, however, stress that the centre of religion 
is not rational. According to Brunner, James does no more 
than look for common factors in religious examples, while 
Otto seeks out its essence, and this difference leads them to 
different understandings of religion and of the rational. 
For James, reason simply translates the non-rational feelings 
into words and concepts, which can never be complete and may 
be arbitrary. But Otto, borrowing and reshaping Kant's 
device of schematisation, posits an essential and necessary 
link between any particular aspect of the non-rational and 
the concept or phrase used to denote it. Brunner ends with 
the question whether there is a uniquely religious feeling: 
according to Otto there is, but James at one point denies 
this and elsewhere speaks rather imprecisely of the 
unconscious. Brunner does not, however, discuss Otto's 
borrowings from James. To do this it is helpful to bring out 
similarities and differences. 
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Differences centre on the place of the intellect. Otto 
already had his own plans before he made use of James's book. 
He had had a systematic training in philosophy and theology 
and at Gottingen at least this had been in the Ritschlian 
mould. Otto's claims to follow Kant and Fries contrast 
strongly with the anti-intellectualist stance of James. In 
his discussion of James, Nicholas Lash makes much of this 
(Lash 1988, 18-19) with several quotations from VRE. Here is 
a sample of James's anti-intellectualism: 
But surely the systematic theologians are the 
closet naturalists of the deity. What is 
their deduction of metaphysical attributes but a 
shuffling and matching of pedantic dictionary-
adjectives, aloof from morals, aloof from human 
needs, something that might be worked out from 
the mere word "God" by one of those logical 
machines of wood and brass which recent ingenuity 
has contrived . . . What keeps religion going is 
something else than abstract definitions and 
systems of concatenated adjectives, and something 
different from faculties of theology and their 
professors. All these things are after effects, 
secondary accretions upon those phenomena of 
vital conversations with the unseen divine, of 
which I have shown you so many instances .. (VRE 
428b-429a) 
This signals a very important difference between James and 
Otto. Although James hoped that a Science of Religion -
empirically based and, like optics, inductively built- might 
follow from his and similar evidences, he was strongly 
opposed to any application of one branch of science to shape 
the theoretical framework for another66 • 
James appears to have allowed his pragmatism to affect his 
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feeling for truth when he asserts that reality, truth is 
always useful. This is not of course quite the same as 
saying that utility is the criterion of truth, a position 
which Otto recognises and explicitly rejects in his essays on 
Darwinism and in NRW. Evolutionists, Otto says, give the 
answer to Pilate's question in terms of survival, and this a 
religious person cannot accept. 
Similarities: (1) Both James and Otto use case histories. 
Almost at the beginning of his first Lecture, James sets out 
his starting point and his programme: 
. I am neither a theologian, nor a scholar 
learned in the history of religions, nor an 
anthropologist. Psychology is the only branch of 
learning in which I am particularly versed. To 
the psychologist the religious propensities of 
man must be at least as interesting as any other 
of the facts pertaining to his mental 
constitution. It would seem, therefore, that, as 
a psychologist, the natural thing would be for me 
to invite you to a descriptive survey of those 
religious propensities. 
If the inquiry be psychological, not religious 
institutions, but rather religious feelings and 
religious impulses must be its subject, and I 
must confine myself to those more developed 
subjective phenomena recorded in literature 
produced by articulate and fully self-conscious 
men, in works of piety and autobiography. (VRE 
26) 
James's work was based on observation and accounts of 
introspection, in particular on numerous case histories 
collected by Starbuck and others. There are hints that he 
drew also on his own experiences when under severe 
depression67 , as a result of which he wrote the essay Is Life 
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Worth Living? 68 . Because Otto wanted to give examples of the 
effect of religious phenomena on the human psyche, he would 
welcome support from an established psychologist. 
(2) Both focus on the Individual 
Early in his series {Lecture II), James adopts the partition 
of the religious field into institutional and personal 
religion {VRE 48, following Sabatier). Of these, he 
considers ecclesiasticism and all institutional forms to be 
secondary, and because he wants to study religion in its most 
intense form, he decides, 
Now in these lectures I propose to ignore the 
institutional branch entirely. 
In one sense at least the personal religion will 
prove itself more fundamental than either 
theology or ecclesiastic ism. Churches, when once 
established, live at second-hand upon tradition; 
but the founders of every church owed their power 
originally to the fact of their direct communion 
with the divine. {VRE49) 
It would profit us little to study this second-
hand religious life. We must make search rather 
for the original experiences which were the 
pattern-setters to all this mass of suggested 
feeling and imitated conduct. These experiences 
we can only find in individuals for whom religion 
exists not as a dull habit, but as an acute fever 
rather. {VRE 29) 
Otto too centres his work on the individual {for which he was 
criticised in some quarters), and makes the same point about 
the founders of churches. For instance, on the consciousness 
of the 'daemon' in primitive religions: 
And in their case it is very evident that they do 
not arise as a collective product of crowd-
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imagination, . but were the intuitions of 
persons of innate prophetic powers. . . he alone 
experiences a numen or divine-daemonic power at 
first hand. Only where and when it has been 
revealed through such a one do the forms of 
worship and a common cult arise. ( IH 122; DH 149) 
(3) The Primacy of Experience 
In using empirical examples Otto was basing his work on the 
primacy of feelings. This is the first of the two paths Otto 
outlines in the concluding chapter of KFR, and was the cause 
of considerable criticism, especially from those with a 
theological or philosophical background69 • But in writing 
of feelings (plural) primacy can be seen as primacy in time, 
as the feelings lead to the discovery for Otto of the Q 
priori awareness or feeling (singular), and sense of the 
numinous. This is primary in the logical sense and has no 
parallel in James. 
Both James and Otto draw on phenomena from a variety of 
religions and make human feelings, emotions, which are the 
field of psychology, the starting point for their different 
developments. After stating that the Holy is a complex of 
rational and non-rational elements, Otto isolates the non-
rational, for which he coined the word 'Numinous', and the 
book develops this theme. After all, as he writes in his 
Preface to the English translation, he has already discussed 
the rational aspects of religion pretty thoroughly in 
previous books. James has not discussed the rational: indeed 
he rejected "intellectualism" (although he acknowledges 
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elsewhere its place in religion). He simply states that for 
a psychologist feelings are primary: 
Please observe, however, that I do not yet say 
that it is better that the subconscious and non-
rational should thus hold primacy in the 
religious realm. I confine myself simply to 
pointing out that they do so hold it as a matter 
of fact. (VRE 89) 
This fact is the justification for his empirical approach, 
which he defends again in Lecture XVIII on Philosophy: 
In short, you suspect that I am planning to 
defend feeling at the expense of reason, to 
rehabilitate the primitive and unreflective, to 
dissuade you from the hope of any Theology worthy 
of the name. 
To a certain extent I have to admit that you 
guess rightly. I do believe that feeling is a 
deeper source of religion, and that philosophic 
and theological formulas are secondary products, 
like translations of a text into another tongue. 
(VRE 414-5) 
(4) Human reaction and that which is beyond concepts 
Otto uses the phrase 'the sense of the numinous' for which he 
claims a double reference. On the one hand it refers to the 
unseen force itself which is beyond concept and 
indescribable. But on the other it also refers to the state 
of mind or psyche of persons who undergo a numinous 
experience. Now this state of mind can be described, and in 
this way it is possible to find words for the totally non-
conceptual and even to put together a descriptive analysis. 
This way forward is suggested in James when he writes that 
the reality (of the unseen force) elicits a reaction in the 
human consciousness (VRE 69). Although James does not take 
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this any further, it might have struck Otto as a strong 
psychological lead which he has dubbed the 'feeling-response' 
( Geftihls- reakt ion) 70 ( IH 10; DH 10) , and which alone makes 
his famous analysis possible. 
This process serves to underline the fact that the sense of 
the numinous, the feeling itself, is primary, and the 
reaction and descriptions of the states of mind are dependent 
on it. In Chapter III Otto writes, after a preliminary 
discussion of Schleiermacher's term 'creature-feeling': 
All that this new term, 'creature-feeling', can 
express, is the note of submergence into 
nothingness before an overpowering, absolute 
might of some kind; whereas everything turns upon 
the character of this overpowering might, a 
character which cannot be expressed verbally, and 
can only be expressed indirectly through the tone 
and content of a man's feeling-response to it. 
And this response must be directly experienced in 
oneself to be understood. (IH 10; DH 10) 
This device enables Otto to go on to analyse the six 
distinctive moments of the sensus numinis by means of 
introspection. The description of these moments occupies 
Chapters III-VI of his book and are summed up in the phrase 
Mysterium Tremendum et Fascinans. In making this analysis 
Otto goes well beyond James, who did not take this 'reaction 
of the human consciousness' any further 71 • 
(5) The Essence of Religion 
According to Brunner, James made no attempt to reach the 
essence of religion, whereas in Otto's book the ineffabile is 
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early identified as the unique and essential component which 
the rest of the book sets about to analyse and discuss. Yet 
James did in fact have some important things to say about 
religion which go beyond his assertion that no definition is 
satisfactory72 • (VRE46) 
James calls his last lecture Conclusions (Lecture XX). In 
some ways it suggests Otto's starting point, when he says 
virtually at the end of his series, "The next step is to 
characterize the feelings." (VRE 481). And this he begins in 
a sensational way. James contrasts intellectual knowledge 
with the faith-state in a passage which includes the 
following: 
1. The uneasiness, reduced to its simplest terms, 
is a sense that there is something wrong about us 
as we naturally stand. 
2. The solution is a sense that we are saved from 
the wrongness by making proper connection with 
the higher powers. 
The individual becomes conscious that 
this higher part is coterminous and continuous 
with the MORE of the same quality which is 
operative in the universe outside of him . . 
That part of the content concerning which the 
question of truth most pertinently arises is that 
"MORE of the same quality" with which our own 
higher self appears in the experience to come 
into harmonious working relation. 
Let me propose, then, as an hypothesis, that 
whatever it may be on its farther side, the 
"more" with which in religious experience we feel 
ourselves connected is on its hither side the 
subconscious continuation of our conscious life. 
(VRE 484-7) 
Here, in addition to the something wrong which suggests the 
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sense of unworthiness which in turn is the basis of Otto's 
section on 'creature-feeling' in Chapter III and the 
beginning of his analysis, is a clear foreshadowing of what 
Otto calls the 'overplus'. This is indeed the non-rational 
or numinous, that which remains when all rational and 
conceptual aspects of the Holy have been stripped away. 
It is true that all this moral significance is 
contained in the word 'holy', but it includes in 
addition - as even we cannot but feel - a clear 
overplus of meaning, and this it is now our task 
to isolate. Nor is this merely a later or 
acquired meaning; rather, 'holy', or at least the 
equivalent words in Latin and Greek, in Semitic 
and other ancient languages, denoted first and 
foremost only this overplus. (IH 5; DH 5) 
The closer we study the actual texts of the two books, the 
more connections we find or seem to find. But some of this 
must be due to the common subject matter, and some to their 
common cultural heritage. It has already been noted that 
James travelled in Europe and was well-read in German and in 
French, and a note of caution should be marked. This can be 
illustrated in the case of the use both authors make of the 
words "Solemn" and "Solemnity", James already in Lecture II 
(VRE 56), and Otto also early in his book when he invites his 
reader to direct attention to "such states of the soul as 
that of solemn worship" (IH 8; DH 8). In Otto the idea lies 
behind much of his discussion of the awe-inspiring aspects, 
and James devotes a page to a fairly intense consideration of 
solemnity in religious contexts. 
We cannot however claim that Otto drew on this word (and 
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idea) from his study of James. The source behind them both 
could be the 37th Thesis of Claus Harms, produced in 1817 for 
the 300th anniversary of the Reformation. 
I know one religious word, half of whose force 
belongs to the realm of reason, and half does 
not: "Celebration" (Feier, also means holiday and 
holy day). Reason understands this word as a day 
off work etc. But once the word is changed into 
"Solemnity" (Feierlichkeit), then reason has no 
part in it. It is too wonderful and too exalted. 
The same with "Sanctify" and "Blessing". 
The proper area of such things is the "Mystical". 
Religion is a part of this area - terra incognita 
for reason. 73 
Otto quotes this passage at length in DH p.78, but it was not 
included in the English translation. 
(6) The Value and Uniqueness of the Religious Feeling 
Both writers stress the value of the non-rational in 
religion. But James denies that the actual feelings from a 
psychological point of view are unique: 
There is religious fear, religious love, 
religious awe, religious joy, and so forth. But 
religious love is only man's natural emotion of 
love directed to a religious object; religious 
fear is only the ordinary fear of commerce, so to 
speak, the common quaking of the human breast, in 
so far as the notion of divine retribution may 
arouse it; religious awe is the same organic 
thrill which we feel in a forest at twilight, or 
in a mountain gorge, . 
As there thus seems to be no one elementary 
religious emotion, but only a common storehouse 
of emotions upon which religious objects may 
draw, {VRE 47) 
Yet there is some thing unique .about the experience, provided 
that we examine it in its intensest form. James draws a 
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comparison with physiology: 
It is a good rule in physiology, when we are 
studying the meaning of an organ, to ask after 
its most peculiar and characteristic sort of 
performance, and to seek its office in that one 
of its functions which no other organ can 
possibly execute. Surely the same maxim holds 
good in our present quest. The essence of 
religious experiences, the thing by which we 
finally must judge them, must be that element or 
quality in them which we can meet nowhere else. 
And such a quality will be of course most 
prominent and easy to notice in those religious 
experiences which are most one- sided, 
exaggerated, and intense. (VRE 62) 
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Otto proposes the same course of action, that is to consider 
religious feelings in isolation from those of other kinds: 
Next, in the probing and analysis_of such states 
of the soul as that of solemn worship, it will be 
well if regard be paid to what is unique in them 
rather than to what they have in common with 
other similar states. To be rapt in worship is 
one thing; to be morally uplifted by the 
contemplation of a good deed is another. (IH 8; 
DH 8) 
For Otto there can be no question but that the religious 
experience is unique: 
For if there be any single domain of human 
experience that presents us with something 
unmistakably speci fie and unique, peculiar to 
itself, assuredly it is that of the religious 
1 i fe. ( IH 4; DH4) 
(7) Rational and Non-rational 
Both James and Otto are well aware that they are handling 
material which is non-conceptual and non-rational. James 
does not attempt to analyse the psychological case histories 
themselves, but rather uses them as supporting evidence for 
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his description of different types of mind or soul. Thus his 
work remains on the strictly empirical level. He does not 
address the relationship of rational to non-rational, which 
is more a problem for philosophy than for psychology. For 
Otto on the other hand this relationship is fundamental, and 
he is at pains to emphasise the essential links between 
rational and non-rational in that key term in religion, 
summed up in the word 'holy'. 
In the Author's Foreword to the English translation Otto 
wrote; 
In this book I have ventured to write of that 
which may be called 'non-rational' or • supra-
rational' in the depths of the divine nature. I 
do not therefore want to promote in any way the 
tendency of our time towards an extravagant and 
fantastic • irrationalism', but rather to join 
issue with it in its morbid form. The 
'irrational' is today a favourite theme of all 
who are too lazy to think or too ready to evade 
the arduous duty of clarifying their ideas and 
grounding their convictions on a basis of 
coherent thought. This book, recognizing the 
profound import of the non-rational for 
metaphysic, makes a serious attempt to analyse 
all the more exactly the feeling which remains 
where the concept fails, and to introduce a 
terminology which is not any more loose or 
indeterminate for having necessarily to make use 
of symbols. 
Before I ventured upon this field of inquiry I 
spent many years of study upon the rational 
aspect of that supreme reality we call 'God', and 
the results of my work are contained in my books, 
Naturalistische und religiose Weltansicht (Eng. 
Tr. 'Naturalism and Religion', London 1907), and 
Die Kant-Friesische Religions-Philosophie. And 
I feel that no one ought to concern himself with 
the 'Numen ineffabile'. who has not already 
devoted assiduous and serious study to the 'Ratio 
aeterna'. 
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When writing DH therefore, Otto was already prepared for a 
discuss ion which cent res on feeling rather than reason, 
although he is repeatedly insistent that 'the holy' is a 
complex of both rational and non-rational. In Chapter One 
page one he states: "And of Christianity at least it is false 
that 'feeling is all, the name but sound and smoke'." 74 
Like James, Otto approaches the phenomena descriptively and 
empirically. But James cannot claim to have spent time on 
the 'Ratio aeterna', and his study stays almost entirely with 
the non-rational. James states that feeling can and often 
must be contrasted with conceptual content: 
The fact is that the mystical feeling .. has 
no specific intellectual content whatever of its 
own. It is capable of forming matrimonial 
alliances with material furnished by the most 
diverse philosophies and theologies, provided 
only that they can find a place in their 
framework for its peculiar emotional moods. ( VRE 
40) 
This passage underlines the arbitrary relationship between 
reason (philosophy) and the non-rational for James. This was 
not good enough for Otto, whose theory of schematisation 
depends upon a necessary and a priori connection between the 
two. 
It seems that Otto derived some ideas, some ways of 
expressing his thoughts, and some encouragement from reading 
William James. The most important factor would seem to be 
that in James Otto found an acclaimed psychologist whose work 
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he could follow and whose words, where appropriate, he could 
quote. This provided a lively dimension to his handling of 
the re 1 igious phenomena, most of which he already had to 
hand. There is no evidence that they ever met. But at the 
same time it should be said that the basic ideas behind 
Otto's work came from his own background, without any 
reference to James. Likely sources are the strongly 
pietistic tradition of his own upbringing in the Hanoverian 
Lutheran church, and the emphasis on feeling shown by 
Schleiermacher. It is likely, however, that DH would have 
been less practical, less supported by case studies if Otto 
had not read James. What made the deep impression on his 
readers in many lands, however, were the examples of 
religious phenomena drawn from a variety of world religions, 
and the way in which they are used to illustrate and express 
the Mysterium tremendum et fascinans. 
In James Otto was following an empirical psychologist. But 
at the same time Otto was determined to keep a philosophical 
anchorage for his work and that is why the link with Kant 
remained so important for him. James was of course speaking 
and writing about religious experience and probably never 
thought of including similar accounts of experiences which 
were not religious, or not explicitly so for those who 
underwent them. His New England Presbyterian background made 
him look for such experience within religious contexts and 
specifically conversion. Schleiermacher, like James, will 
dispense with doctrine, or rather this is what he said in the 
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Reden. But unlike James, Schleiermacher does not confine 
experience of the Universum to explicitly religious contexts; 
rather he includes such feelings and intuitions within a much 
broader definition of religion. This point of view is 
particularly significant when evidences from the mid-
twentieth century are collected, because here it becomes 
possible for people to speak of experiences as being 
explicitly non-religious in their terms, and would doubtless 
resent a Schleiermacher telling them that they are in fact 
religious. 
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misapplication to produce a matrix for plotting the 
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development (from simple, primitive forms) of religious 
practice and belief, for which a prime example is provided by 
Durham's Professor Jevons (Frank Byron Jevons, An 
Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion, New York, 
1908, and Comparative Religion, Cambridge 1913). 
Otto rejected the application of evolution to religion, and 
published at least three times on Darwinism. He accepted 
that religions unfolded from cruder expressions to more 
developed (esp. IH Chaps XIII, XV, XVI, DH Kaps. 15,17,18), 
but emphatically denied that religion could develop from 
anything which was not already religion in some form. This 
was the basis of his celebrated controversy with W. Wundt. 
Otto's stance is central to The Holy, and the integrity of 
religion central to NRW. 
67. A particularly bad time in Germany is noted by Lewis, 
op.cit. p.185. 
68. First published in 1895, accessible in The Will to 
Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, Harvard 
University Press, 1979, pp.53-4. 
69. Geyser's book, Intellekt oder Gemtit? (see Chapter One), 
provides an prime example of this kind of criticism. (Geyser 
1922, cf. Minney 1990a and 1990b) 
70. IH p. 10 ( DH p. 10: "Geftihls- reakt ion, die sein Erfahren im 
Gemtite auslost und die man selber in sich erleben muss"). 
71. Although James does not try to analyse the sense of the 
numinous (Otto's phrase), it would be easy to find in the 
many case studies which James uses the characteristics of 
'Mystery', 'Dread' and 'Grace' which are the basis of Otto's 
description. Yet these all appear in James' discussion too. 
(Dread) Not the conception or intellectual 
perception of evil, but the grisly blood-freezing 
heart-paralysing sensation of it close upon one, 
and no other conception of sensation able to live 
for a moment in its presence. (VRE 168) 
(Joy) ... we have seen reason to think that the 
most distinctive of them [sc. attitudes 
characteristically awakened] is the sort of joy 
which may result in extreme cases from absolute 
self-surrender. (VRE 89) 
(Being overwhelmed) But beyond ... there is 
. something profounder still, something related to 
that fundamental mystery of religious experience, 
the satisfaction found in absolute surrender to 
the larger power. (VRE 315) 
With the first several passages of Otto could be compared, 
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e.g. the following: 
It is a remarkable fact that the physical reaction 
to which this unique 'dread' of the uncanny gives 
rise is also unique, and is not found in the case 
of any 'natural' fear or terror. We say: 'my 
blood ran icy cold' and 'my flesh crept'. 
(IH 16) 
With the last, compare: 
There you have a self confessed 'feeling of 
dependence' [Abraham in Gen. 18.27], which is yet 
at the same time far more than, and something 
other than, merely a feeling of dependence. 
Desiring to give it a name of its own, I propose 
to call it 'creature-consciousness' or creature-
feeling. It is the emotion of a creature, 
submerged and overwhelmed by its own nothingness 
in contrast to that which is supreme above all 
creatures. (IH 9-10; DH 9-10) 
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The scattered page references in James indicate that Otto's 
psychological analysis is much more systematic. As well as 
quoting James in a few instances, Otto also collected much 
fresh evidence and systematised the moments of religious 
consciousness in a way which goes well beyond James. 
72. James compares the meaning of the word Government in this 
respect, as eluding comprehensive definition. 
73. Quoted also at the end of H. Frick's article 
'Religionswissenschaft in neuer Sicht' from Forell, Frick and 
Heiler Religionswissenschaft in neuer Sicht - Drei Reden tiber 
Rudolf Ottos Personlichkeit und Werk (etc), Marburg 1951 
p.12. 
74. Quotation form Goethe's Faust, where 'name' stands for 
conception or thought." (IH 1; DH 1). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
IS TRANSCENDENT EXPERIENCE RELIGIOUS? 
The message of Schleiermacher's Reden to "the cultured among 
the despisers" of religion is that, although they have 
rejected the Church's doctrines, ceremonies and constraints, 
they are in fact religious1. The evidence for this is their 
own consciousness and their enthusiasm for the aesthetic, the 
creative, the mystical, in short their sensitivity for that 
which transcends the everyday world of economics, pleasure 
and political power-seeking. The fact that his book won him 
almost immediate acclaim (although originally published 
anonymously) suggests that at that time his thesis was 
accepted, and people thought that after all perhaps they 
really were religious. Schleiermacher obviously had in mind 
a very broad definition of religion. 
acceptable to everyone. 
This would not be 
But the area of transcendent experience has attracted a lot 
of attention in recent years, and the question to be 
investigated is raised by Schleiermacher's Reden: is 
transcendent experience the same as religious experience? If 
it is, in what sense, and why are there two terms? Clearly 
Sir Alister Hardy in founding the Religious Experience 
Research Unit2 thought so and his collection of thousands of 
accounts of religious experienc;e. many relating to childhood, 
has been welcomed and drawn on by religious educators and put 
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to use by them. Yet many of the cases turn out on inspection 
to be experiences of nature mysticism with no obvious contact 
to religion in the more narrowly defined sense of religious 
faith traditions. The same is true of Paffard's collection3, 
and many others. How are these to be evaluated in relation 
to James and to Otto? James's examples are almost all, if 
not all, from an explicitly religious context in that the 
respondents refer to God, church, Bible, or (in a few cases) 
recognisable features of other religions. In contrast to 
this, few of the case~ in Paffard, Robinson and Hay do refer 
to traditional religious forms and expressions. Yet they are 
accepted by religious educators as an important area for 
study and as examples of religious experience to discuss, 
reflect on and possibly replicate in their pupils. 
A second consideration is equally important, and this is the 
assumption which lies behind religious education in Britain 
today that even in an age of predominantly secular values 
religion is somehow relevant to all. More than this, the 
great Education Acts of 1944 and 1988 actually require 
"spiritual development" as one of the aims of R.E. in 
schools. A fuller discussion of "spiritual development" 
belongs in Chapter Five, but before that attention must turn 
to secular, i.e. not explicitly religious accounts of 
transcendent experiences and how they have been evaluated. 
Following this it must be asked whether such experiences 
provide knowledge of the transcendent, as Otto has claimed. 
These are the two tasks to be tackled in this Chapter. 
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Marghani ta Laski uses the following descriptive words to 
introduce her study of ecstasy4: "a range of experiences 
characterised by being joyful, transitory, unexpected, rare, 
valued, and extraordinary to the point of often seeming as if 
derived from a praeternatural source" (Laski 1961, 5b). She 
purposely wants to research secular and religious 
experiences, and makes distinctions which will be discussed 
later, but at the same time the similarities between her 
description of ecstasy and how James decided to characterise 
mysticism suggest they are talking about the same set of 
phenomena. James put forward four marks: Ineffability, 
Noetic quality, Transiency, and Passivity (VRE 367-8). 
In fact both Marghanita Laski and Abraham Maslow5 blur the 
distinction between religious and non-religious 
transcendence, and Maslow makes clear that he does not 
recognise religious experience as a separate category. 
Consequently there is a whole area of relevant non-religious 
experiences which must be compared. Maslow states: 
"Practically everything that happens in the peak-experiences, 
naturalistic though they are, could be listed under the 
headings of religious happenings, or indeed have been in the 
past considered to be only religious experiences" (Maslow 
1964, 59a). This makes their inclusion even more necessary. 
The whole area is confused and confusing. While Otto's 
examples in DH are explicitly religious, the experiences of 
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children in Otto's 1926 article "Religiose Kindheits-
erfahrungen"6 are not, and those quoted by Miehle in his 1928 
Die Kindliche Religiosi Ui.t are mostly only marginally or 
incidentally linked to religion, although Miehle classifies 
them according to Otto's DH formula mysterium tremendum et 
fascinans. 
4.1 Researching experience 
Yet in much of this discussion the word 'experience' is 
rarely questioned. In the case of James it was assumed that 
'experience' was the subject matter of psychology, which was 
the field of study for James and his pupil Starbuck. The 
implication, however, is that people somehow have experience, 
during which they remain in a passive state. Discussion of 
more active aspects of experience in the context of religion 
is to be taken up in sections 4.6 and 4.7. In this section 
the plan is to look at what researchers may have included 
under this phrase, and then see what distinctions may be 
appropriate. 
Edwin Starbuck was the first investigator to include a 
question on religious experience in a questionnaire. He 
asked about people's experience of religious conversion7• 
Experiencing conversion in the evangelical mode stood for 
religious experience in the New England of the time. Alister 
Hardy began his researches by asking a news agency to collect 
cuttings on specified religious topics in 1925, and this went 
on till 1946. (Hay RET p.20). When Hardy began research of 
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his own, he formulated a question: "Have you ever been aware 
of or influenced by a presence or power, whether you call it 
God or not, which is different from your everyday self?" (Hay 
RET 36c) Hay used Hardy's question in some of his own 
research, and also one from America used by Greeley and 
McCready: "Have you ever felt as though you were very close 
to a powerful spiritual force that seemed to lift you out of 
yourself?" (Hay RET 69c) All the researchers felt they were 
working in the same tradition as Starbuck and James and that 
the words "been aware of," "influenced by" and "felt" covered 
the concept of religious experience. 
Laski star ted with the conviction that such feelings and 
experiences affected many people she knew who were not 
members of any religious group, but who would consider them 
unusual or non-normal, and consequently refuse to discuss 
them in the belief that such things were either narrowly 
religious or morbid (Laski 1961, p.2). Therefore she needed 
to frame a question which would appear religiously neutral: 
she settled on the question, "Do you know a sensation of 
transcendent ecstasy?" and she adds in brackets, "If people 
asked, as they sometimes did, 'What do you mean by 
transcendent ecstasy?' I replied, 'Take it to mean whatever 
you think it means.'" (p.9a) 
In a later postal questionnaire and after expert advice, 
Laski phrased the question: "Hgve you ever known a feeling of 
unearthly ecstasy?" ( 526b) . Although the survey was much 
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smaller, responses did not differ significantly from her 
earlier ones. 
Paffard' s questions were different in that he offered an 
example of the kind of thing he was investigating and asked 
if respondents had ever felt anything similar. The class of 
15-year-old girls whose work was shown to Laski (134) were 
also asked to read a passage (from Richard Church's Over the 
Bridge, given by Laski on p.417-8), then after normal 
comprehension type questions in a written examination, were 
asked, "Write an account of any event which may have had the 
same kind of significance in your own life." Four triggers 
were suggested by the teacher, and 46 girls answered this 
question. Laski discusses their replies. 
While conversion experience was the term used by Starbuck 
because it fitted the Protestant circles in which he grew up, 
the terms mystic and mysticism seem to relate to a more 
openly recognised tradition within Catholic and Orthodox 
communities. James saw the overlap when he said, "One may 
say truly, I think, that personal religious experience has 
its root and center in mystical states of consciousness" (VRE 
366a) . Definitions are, however, far from easy. Richard 
Swinburne in a more recent discussion says, "The concept of 
a 'religious experience' has as fuzzy a border as the concept 
of a religion". 8 The whole area is somewhat indistinct, and 
many attempts have been made to classify such experiences on 
various grounds: for instance some distinguish explicitly 
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religious experiences from the rest, and some define 
religious experience in narrowly theological, traditional and 
orthodox terms. Others have tried to classify the 
circumstances which may set off such experiences (often 
called Triggers); but these do not always match the feeling-
response, and such feelings may suggest their own 
classification system. Another possibility is to list the 
different results claimed for such experiences. 
4.2 Classifying mystic and other transcendent experiences 
Hick in a paper for the 1976 Calgary conference on mysticism 
thinks that mysticism is simply religious experience at first 
hand: "Mystical experience, as our mystics (and others) 
describe it, does not seem to me to be anything other than 
firsthand religious experience as such. This is, however, I 
believe, the core of religion." 9 Yet Hick goes on to suggest 
that there are degrees of mysticism when he says: "This would 
mean that all who are conscious of existing in the presence 
of the divine are mystics. This would in turn mean . that 
rather than religious people being divided into a small 
minority of mystics and a large majority of nonmystics, we 
should equate mysticism with religious experience or 
religious consciousness as such, but recognising, of course, 
many degrees of consciousness of the Transcendent, as well as 
many forms which this consciousness can take." 
But Penelhum10 wants to distinguish mystical experience from 
other kinds of religious experience. These, he thinks, 
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appear to be preparatory for the unitive experience which he 
sees as the culmination of mysticism. Further distinctions 
can be made. Hardy faced the problem early on and tried to 
establish a system for distinguishing types of transcendent 
experience. He somewhat tentatively distinguished mystical 
experiences from numinous experiences: 
On a first examination of the collection, what 
seemed to be possible was to split the accounts 
of experience into two types: what might be 
called 'numinous' experiences, that is, broadly 
speaking, experiences of the presence of God, 
and, in contrast, more 'mystical' experiences, 
where the writer is talking about something like 
a 'merging' with the rest of reality. In fact 
this kind of classification fits well with the 
categories suggested by a number of philosophers 
of religion. (Hay 1990, 31c) 11 
Hay relates that another category soon had to be added: "a 
third category he labelled Z. They included those that came 
from what is unkindly called 'the lunatic fringe'; some were 
actually sent from psychiatric hospitals." (Hay 1990, 31c). 
Laski too relates that she invited letters from listeners 
after she had been on a BBC Brains Trust in 1958 when a 
question was put on mysticism: "I received 42 letters, most 
of them from women and many of them dotty .. " (Laski 530c) 
Laski's very detailed study classifies ecstasies and 
considers different suggestions. She discusses a distinction 
between ecstasies and their opposite which are called 
Desolations, but decides that this distinction hinges partly 
on whether the experience is pleasant or unpleasant. Words 
used in description also relate, Down and Dark in contrast to 
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Up and Light (168-170), though desolations have a way 
sometimes of turning into ecstasies. Laski recognises that 
she is entirely dependent on the language used to describe 
them: " my sole evidence for the feelings people 
identified with the name transcendent ecstasy lay in the 
words they used to describe them . " (lOa) and she listed 
also what objects or circumstances started them off. These 
she called triggers and she classified them also, but decided 
that the best classification related directly to the 
experiences. But, as already suggested, other factors also 
play a part in each writer's choice. Laski writes: 
I think we must conclude that as these epithets -
nature, religious, aesthetic, neo-platonic, etc. 
are generally used, what is meant by a 
religious experience is an experience, no matter 
how triggered and no matter what its nature, that 
results in what the giver of the epithet regards 
as orthodox religious belief; while by nature, 
aesthetic, neo-platonic, etc. experiences are 
meant either experiences triggered by nature, 
art, knowledge, etc. that do not result in 
accepted religious beliefs, or else experiences, 
no matter how triggered, that result in beliefs 
about the value of nature, art, knowledge, etc. 
I do not think that the use of such epithets 
provides an illuminating way of distinguishing 
ecstasies, however helpful they may be when 
considering mystical experiences that are not 
ecstasies. 
It must then be asked what is the most 
illuminating nomenclature for distinguishing 
ecstasies, and I believe that they are best named 
according to the nature of the experience. It is 
probable that the nature of the experience is 
strongly influential on the nature of the 
overbelief, whether this is expressed in 
religious terms or not. (173bc) 
After trying various possibilities, she decided that 
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varieties of ecstasy could be arranged in a series of stages, 
leading up to those she called "better", not in an 
axiological sense but because they seemed more intense and so 
more ecstatic. She posits the following "working model" 
(p.92): 
At the least stage at which ecstatics identify 
experiences as being of a kind, we find feelings 
that life is joyful, purified, renewed. 
Ecstasies principally characterised by feelings 
of this kind I shall call adamic ecstasies. It 
is to this stage, I believe, that there belong 
those feelings of kindness and love spoken of by 
Wordsworth, Fox's desire to benefit mankind. 
At a stage regarded as better we find feelings of 
creativity or of knowledge gained. These I shall 
call knowledge ecstasies. Often the knowledge is 
felt to be gained through a contact felt to be 
made, and these I shall call knowledge-contact 
ecstasies. 
That knowledge may come at a stage less than that 
in which contact is felt to be made is suggested 
by the feelings often reported that where 
knowledge is gained, self is not felt to be lost; 
but where contact is gained, self is often felt 
to be lost, and it is generally agreed that 
ecstasies in which self is lost are better than 
those in which feelings of self are not lost. 
The more complete the knowledge is felt to be and 
the more incommunicable, the better the ecstasy. 
At the stage regarded as the best, ecstasies may 
involve complete or almost complete loss of 
sensibility, coupled with a feeling (necessarily 
afterwards) that any contact made has been 
complete. Ecstasies with these characteristics 
I shall call union ecstasies. 
Laski calls this classification tentative because it is based 
on very few comparative statements, but she notes that it 
corresponds with schemes of many Christian writers on the 
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subject, "the kinds of experiences that may be progressively 
expected along the Christian's road to God." (92-3) Maslow 
who like Laski wrote from a non-religious stance does not use 
distinctions like this because his purpose is dismissive of 
religion. 
Christian theologians and others who hold a definite position 
on the value of certain types of religious or mystical 
experience, are likely to use their viewpoint as the basis 
for classification. Joseph Marechal S.J. in writing 
specifically about Christian mysticism, distinguishes 
supernatural ecstasy from natural ecstasy on the basis of 
divine grace and the approved experience of mystics on the 
basis of Catholic teaching on the subject. He describes this 
difference as both phenomenological and ontological (Marechal 
in Woods 1981, 472-3). 
But consideration of mystical experiences must go beyond 
Christianity, perhaps beyond institutional religion of all 
sorts. Zaehner wrote Mysticism Sacred and Profane12 to 
refute Huxley's Doors of Perception (1954) in which Huxley 
claimed that his experience under the influence of the drug 
mescaline was identical with the so-called religious 
experiences of saints and mystics. In this explicitly 
polemical book, but at the same time the work of a 
considerable scholar, Zaehner comes to the "tentative" 
conclusion that there are thr€e types of mysticism, which he 
calls panenhenic, monistic, and theistic. The first is 
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nature mysticism. 
Because these experiences are recorded at all 
times and from all parts of the world, it is 
fatally easy to assume that because they are, one 
and all, praeternatural, that is, not explicable 
in the present state of our knowledge, and 
because the keynote of all of them is "union", 
they must necessarily be the same. (199a) 
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If that were so, it would confirm Huxley's thesis that any 
artificial means can be used to produce genuine mystical 
experience. 
The other two classes in his scheme, monistic and theistic 
mysticism, Zaehner assigns to Vedantins and Christians 
respectively. The last "is the normal type of Christian 
mystical experience in which the soul feels itself to be 
united with God by love."(Zaehner 29b). At one point Zaehner 
slightly modifies his stance, when he says, "Though there is 
a difference, and a real difference, between the Vedantin and 
the Christian ways of defining the unitive experience, the 
difference may well be only one of terminology." (33a) But 
it seems that Zaehner really thinks theistic mysticism 
depends on a Christian understanding of God and is therefore 
only open to Christians, and some few others with similar 
beliefs. The theory also brings out the role of 
interpretation, in this case pre-interpretation, as without 
a prior understanding of Christian doctrines the highest 
state on Zaehner's scale would be unattainable. Zaehner's 
three-tiered structure is criticised in detail by Smart 13 and 
will not be discussed here further. 
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The field of study is experience, and to make any sort of 
classification it is needful to gather accounts of mystical 
experiences and to study them. Hardy and Hay compare this 
process to the work of naturalists in the 19th century who 
collected thousands of specimens for their work of 
classification and taxonomy. "We are at present like the 
first collectors of marine plankton, dipping our little nets 
into the sea from a rowing boat and marvelling at the variety 
of life brought forth, just as the marine naturalists were 
doing a hundred years ago." (Hardy quoted in Hay 1990, 32b) 
The picture is perhaps even closer in that ecology or the 
study of living things in their natural habitat became a 
recognised field of biological study in the twentieth 
century. Before that the collectors had tables of dead 
specimens to work on, and the case with religious experiences 
must be similar. Any large-scale work and almost any 
comparative work relates not so much to the experiences 
themselves but to accounts of experiences. This is 
recognised by Laski and stressed by Peter Moore: 
It often seems to be forgotten that the immediate 
data of the philosophical analysis of mysticism 
are not the mystical experiences themselves, but 
the mystics' accounts of these experiences. It 
follows that the fruitfulness of philosophical 
analysis primarily depends on the extent to which 
these accounts render accessible to non-mystical 
investigation the experiences to which they 
refer. (Moore 1978, lOlc) 
In his discussion of the effects of interpretation on such 
accounts together with all the cultural and language factors 
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which go into interpretation, Moore also raises the factor of 
the cultivation of mysticism and in general preparation for 
religious experiences. This question comes into Otto's 
treatment of the communication of the numinous, but is now 
seen to be a much more important factor than Otto realised. 
Moore also suggests that a first account of a relevant 
experience can be improved or educated in the light of later 
experiences or study of similar experiences from other 
people. This is an essential aspect: "In this case the view 
that reports of 'natural' mystical experience must somehow be 
more informative concerning the real nature of mystical 
experience than reports of 'cultivated' experience are 
seriously mistaken." (Moore 1978, 112a) 
Otto unfortunately does not discuss the questions raised by 
cultivated accounts of experience or even by cultivated 
experience, except insofar as experiences may be clarified 
and refined. But this assumes special importance when 
education in religious or mystical awareness in preparation 
for experience is considered. Otto draws a distinction, 
however, between cool and hot mysticism: 
Sankara's mysticism is, however, 'cool', 
unimpassioned and peacefully silent from any 
emotion. But this shows that it is mysticism of 
a particular kind. As 'cool' mysticism it is to 
be distinguished from 'hot' forms of mysticism, 
from forms of mysticism with strong emotional 
characteristics. It is precisely mention of its 
coolness that points up a quite particular trait 
in this mysticism. Persian mysticism, sufic 
mysticism is hot ... The mysticism of Eckhart is 
drenched in feeling. The mysticism of John of 
the Cross is lyrical to its depths. Each is 
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different in itself. And taken together they all 
are different again from Sankara's experience. 
(WoM 176b, tr.RM) 
Hardy tried at first to classify religious experiences 
according to the five senses and extra-sensory perception. 
So his first category was "visual experience of a sensory or 
quasi-sensory nature." The second was "auditory" and the 
third "touch." There were also categories for behavioural 
changes, and for cognitive and affective elements. (Hay 1990, 
40-41) These categories relate to the mode of reception and 
to results of the experiences. Later Hardy changed to 
another scheme which tried to classify the experiences by 
their content, and produced headings such as "patterning", 
"answered prayer", "presence of God", "sacred presence in 
nature," and others (Hay 1990 Ch.4, pp.40-51). This is a 
more sophisticated approach, although it is no less open to 
expectations and other cultural influences. 
W. H. Auden in his Introduction to Protestant Mystics14 finds 
four kinds of mystical experience, classified according to 
content. These are: The Vision of Dame Kind; The Vision of 
Eros; The Vision of Agape; The Vision of God. (Auden 1981, 
pp.382-397). The Vision of Dame Kind is in essence nature 
mysticism: "The objects of this vision may be inorganic -
mountains, rivers, seas or organic trees, flowers, 
beasts, but they are all non-human, though human artifacts 
like buildings may be included." (384b) "The joy felt by the 
natural mystic may be called innocent." (385b) "Though the 
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Vision of Dame Kind is not specifically Christian, there is 
nothing in it incompatible with the Christian belief in a God 
who created the material universe and all its creatures out 
of love and found them good." (386b) 
Auden's Vision of Eros is being in love with someone. But 
the subject is often, possibly always self-deceived! "Under 
its influence so many millions of persons have persuaded 
themselves that they were "in love" when their experience 
could be fully and accurately described by the more brutal 
four-letter words, that one is sometimes tempted to doubt if 
the experience is ever genuine, even when, or especially 
when, it seems to have happened to oneself." (388b) "Like the 
Vision of Dame Kind, the Vision of Eros is a revelation of 
creaturely glory, but whereas in the former it is the glory 
of a multiplicity of non-human creatures which is revealed, 
in the latter it is the glory of a single human being." 
(388b) "The effect of the vision on the lover's conduct is 
not confined to his behaviour toward his beloved. Even in 
his relations to others, conduct which before he fell in love 
seemed natural and proper, judged by his new standard of what 
he feels it should be to be worthy of her, now seems base and 
ignoble." ( 389b) The effect of religious experience on 
subsequent conduct will be taken up later. 
Of the Vision of Agape, says Auden, the classic Christian 
example is the vision of Pentecost, but there are examples 
which are not obviously Christian ( 392a). The vision involves 
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a number of persons, not just one in addition to the subject 
as in the previous vision. Auden ends, "Not the least 
puzzling thing about it is that most of the experiences which 
are closest to it in mode, involving plurality, equality and 
mutuality of human persons, are clear cases of diabolic 
possession, as when thousands cheer hysterically for the Man-
God, or cry bloodthirstily for the crucifixion of the God-
Man. Still, without it, there might be no Church." (393b) 
The Vision of God is described as the direct encounter of the 
human soul with God. Auden makes a number of points which 
have been noticed by others, including the number of mystics 
who have endured ill-health, and the similarity of such 
experiences to some psychophysical disturbances. He further 
links in ascetic practice, preparation and training for this 
type of mysticism, and wonders whether manic-depressives are 
people who also have a vocation for the Via Negativa (394-5). 
The Vision of Dame Kind corresponds to Laski's Adamic and 
Time ecstasies (her Chapter IX), and would include just about 
all the childhood experiences published by the Alister Hardy 
Research Centre. Laski explains the use of Adam's name 
because it represents in some of her texts the Christian 
understanding of the state of Adam in primal innocence before 
the Fall. Auden's Vision of Eros would fit into Laski's 
analysis of triggers, as several of her correspondents of 
both sexes mention love, sex and sexual intercourse as the 
circumstance for setting off ecstasy. But this is not in any 
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predictable manner. 
Auden's third category is a kind of crowd mania, which would 
not be recognised by most as ecstasy or religious experience 
at all. Yet it is a transcendent experience. Nearly all the 
commentators under consideration follow either the psychology 
of James or the mystical tradition of Christianity and other 
world religions in seeing this kind of experience as 
primarily private and individual. Perhaps a fruitful way to 
explore the Vision of Agape would be to make a comparative 
study of mass religious movements, such as evangelical 
conventions, or the foundation and spread of religious 
orders. Religious movements by oppressed groups could also 
provide parallels15 . But Otto did not do this, nor is it yet 
any part of the thinking of spiritual development in 
religious education. 
There does seem to be a valid distinction to be made between 
those who are in some way trained or prepared (see section 
4.6) and those who are not, albeit this represents a 
continuum rather than a dichotomy. Again, perhaps there is 
a distinction to be made between experiences which seem to 
call on the senses (like Hardy's first attempt) or to 
resemble such, and others which seem to transcend sensations 
altogether. Put together, these give us the classes 
suggested by Deikman (Deikman 1981). 
Accounts of mystic experiences can be categorised 
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as (a) untrained-sensate, (b) trained-sensate, 
and (c) trained-transcendent. (Deikman, 241a) 
He does not include a fourth class which logic seems to 
demand because Deikman assigns lower states to the sensate 
group and higher to the transcendent, only to be reached 
after learning some contemplative techniques. He justifies, 
however, two classes of sensate by saying, "The untrained-
sensate and the trained-sensate states are phenomenologically 
indistinguishable, with the qualification that the trained 
mystics report experiences conforming more closely to the 
specific religious cosmology to which they are accustomed." 
(242a) The main focus of his article is on deautomatisation 
or transcending the daily round of touch and see. There are 
obvious links here with Laski's concept of transcendent 
ecstasy and in the matter of non-religious spiritual 
development with the theses of Hill (1989) and Minney (1991), 
to be discussed in Chapter Five. 
There is an esoteric aspect in contemplative practices and 
techniques which are passed on, practiced and learnt. It is 
also sometimes asserted that religious experiences are so 
intimate as to be unique in each case. Yet there is an 
aspect of privacy in perceptions of all kinds, only that most 
are public enough to be tested out by other people. Carl A. 
Keller ends an article16 on Mystical Literature: 
We know perhaps - more or less - what our own 
personal experience is, but we shall never know 
the nature of 'mystical experience' in general, 
particularly if we pass from our own personal 
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environment to other religions ... There is only 
one thing we know for certain: that there were in 
each of the great traditions men and women who 
were not satisfied with the ritual aspect of 
religion but who tried to live totally the 
meaning of their faith, not only on the level of 
outward behaviour, but on the level of deep 
psychological and spiritual experience, on the 
level of their innermost being. They neither 
practised nor propagated 'mysticism' : 'mysticism' 
is an abstract concept. It is a word devoid of 
concrete meaning ... the term is a reminder that 
a religion is not only outward performance, but 
also, for some of its adherents at least, a 
never-ending quest after its own perfection, the 
perfection which is inherent in its specific 
structure, a perfection to be realised on the 
level of the spiritual, the interior, dimension 
of man. 
This passage raises a question about mystics and non-mystics. 
James thought that all formal religions had begun with a 
religious experience to one of the founders or saints, and 
that this experience had then been routinised or 
institutionalised to form the religious tradition which the 
majority followed. Otto followed him, and made a distinction 
between prophets and the rest. For Maslow this difference is 
a dispositional or characterlogical distinction between 
peakers and non-peakers, although he suggests that even non-
peakers, redefined as 'weak-peakers', may be encouraged to 
recognise feelings which can then educate them to become 
peakers (Maslow 1964, 86). In fact this must be possible, as 
Otto realised, when he wrote of refining crude experience, 
and it is one of the aims of education in religion. 
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4.3 Raw experience and interpreted experience 
A fundamental issue underlies all writing about mystical and 
religious experience. Some, like James, build on the premise 
that religious experiences have so much in common that they 
can be said to be at base the same, while the differences, 
which are not denied, reflect cultural, linguistic, 
historical and social differences. Others feel that any 
suggestion of some basic "raw experience" is not just 
misleading but also unresearchable and therefore meaningless. 
Therefore they seek to distinguish different sorts of 
transcendent experiences, although they recognise certain 
character is tics which are shared. Richard Woods in his 
Introduction to Understanding Mysticism wrote: 
An important and to some extent a perennial issue 
in comparative mysticism concerns the 
similarities and differences among mystical 
experiences and mystical doctrines. Is mystical 
experience in fact one and the same for all in 
its essential structure and function, or are 
there irreducibly plural forms of mystical 
experience? On one side of this issue stand 
Smart, Huxley, Fischer, Underhill, Deikman and 
Wapnick. On the other side are found in no less 
uneasy alliance Zaehner, Maritain, Marechal and 
Knowles. The antagonists in this debate are 
generally the theologians, who opt for pluralism, 
as opposed to the philosophers and psychologists. 
(Woods 1981, 3c) 
Belief in a common basis of raw experience can be carried 
further to belief in a common source for all religions of 
which the particulars are brought about by different cultural 
and linguistic circumstances. The essence is the same but it 
takes its colour from contingent differences. An outstanding 
Chapter Four 228 
example of this is Ramkrishna Paramahamsa who used the 
picture of a water reservoir or lake which has several ghats: 
at one Hindus draw water and call it jal, at another Muslims 
who call it pani, and at a third are Christians who call it 
water. The substance is one under different names, and 
everyone is seeking the same substance; only climate, 
temperament and name create differences17 
Otto did not meet Ramkrishna, but his attitude to the sort of 
syncretism Ramkrishna and his disciple Vivekananda were 
advocating is clear from GRIC, discussed in 2.7. 
To those who see a common basis may be added James, Maslow, 
Hardy and Hay, while it will not escape notice that the four 
pluralists Woods has named are all self-consciously orthodox 
Roman Catholics. 
Otto saw that there is much to be said on both sides, and 
perhaps he is right. At the same time there is no doubt that 
in DH he follows James in considering religious experience, 
that is encounter with the numinous, as one and the same 
across the differences of culture, space and time. He 
realised, of course, that this could be oversimplified, and 
by 1926 expressed it as follows: 
There is still the very general view that 
mysticism, no matter on how many different 
backgrounds it may crop up, is basically one and 
the same and as such independent of time and 
space, of circumstances and chance contingencies. 
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This view seems to me, however, to misrepresent 
the facts . 18 
The phrase "independent of time and space, of circumstances 
and chance contingencies" exactly reflects the criticism of 
Ritschl against all mysticism as such. In W5M Otto describes 
how what he calls Western mysticism, that is the tradition of 
Eckhart rather than Sankara, can actually lead to an active 
life, and he instances St Teresa of Avila and St Catherine of 
Siena. 
Otto appears to think that the fact that the word 'mysticism' 
has a recognised field of meaning implies that there is some 
kind of mystic essence which corresponds to this concept. In 
WoM he states that mysticism has one and the same essence 
which is shown by the common term and concept. And he 
continues that the same is true for religion: "We call 
Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity 'religions' and mean 
that they are to be subsumed under one and the same class 
'religion'. But this does not deny, in fact must include the 
fact that 'religion' is particular in each of these cases, 
and within one and the same essence there are very different 
examples to be found." (WoM p.162ab, tr.RM) 
Otto makes a distinction more in tune with modern study when 
he goes on to distinguish experience of the immanent divinity 
of mystic union from experience of the transcendent God. For 
the mystic there is an experience of absolute otherness and 
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mystery, which obviously matches that which is the subject 
matter of DH published nine years earlier. 
This concept of God with its totally non- rational 
character. being different from the familiar, 
personal, modified God of theism in its pure 
form, is what makes the mystic. It is not in the 
first place the unionwhich is mysticism, but the 
quite overpowering life in wonder at this 'wholly 
other' God. God himself is 'mystical' that is 
mysterious, and experience of this is hidden and 
therefore mystical. (WoM 163c, tr.RM) 
It may be thought that Otto was himself quite ambivalent in 
his attitude to different religions. He seems to want to 
have it both ways: both that there is a basic kind of 
experience common to all religions, primitive as well as 
universal, which is the direct encounter with the numinous; 
and that religions are different descriptively and 
axiologically, and not just variations in experience and 
expression due to contingent factors. Otto is not simply and 
solely a philosopher of religion. It must not be forgotten 
that for Otto the key category in religion is "the holy" and 
the existential experience of salvation outweighs any kind of 
generalised description. Wach quotes Max Scheler in words 
that could be applied to Otto: 
As one window stands out of a row if a face looks 
out, so one finite object becomes 'special' or 
'holy' as it symbolizes Ultimate Reality. 19 
Thus the personal aspect is central for him and must not be 
obscured by the also important framework of truth and its 
philosophical justification. 
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Yet the subject matter under study is not experience, but 
descriptions of experiences at either first or second hand. 
Moore's comments, already quoted, underline the student's 
dependence on accounts of experiences, not the experiences 
themselves. Yet the accounts are accounts of something. The 
level and degree of interpretation also varies in 
sophistication and in dependence on outside influences. 
Those who believe that the differences between accounts of 
transcendent experiences stem not so much from the 
experiences themselves but from the linguistic, cultural and 
religious stance of the person receiving them (in Laski's 
parlance "the Ecstatic"), also maintain that such experiences 
as experiences are essentially the same across the 
differences of time and space. Or if all are not the same, 
then there are at least recognisable classes or categories of 
such experiences which similarly are not dependent on the 
religious, cultural etc. background of the ecstatic. They 
would consider that the accounts of such experiences are 
evidence of two separable things; first an experience which 
can be assessed in psychological, religious or other terms, 
and second an overlayer of beliefs or cultural interpretation 
which is local and culture-bound. 
Maslow for instance is quite specific: 
it is very likely, indeed almost certain, 
that these older reports_, phrased in terms of 
supernatural revelation, were, in fact, perfectly 
natural, human peak-experiences of the kind that 
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can easily be examined today, which, however, 
were phrased in terms of whatever conceptual, 
cultural, and linguistic framework the particular 
seer had available in his time ... 
Also this kind of study leads us to another very 
plausible hypothesis: to the extent that all 
mystical or peak-experiences are the same in 
their essence and have always been the same, all 
religions are the same in their essence and 
always have been the same ... This is something 
common, this something which is left over after 
we peel away all the localisms, all the accidents 
of particular languages or particular 
philosophies, all the ethnocentric phrasings, all 
those elements which are not common, we may call 
the 11 core- religious experience 11 or the 
11 transcendent experience ... (Maslow 1964, p.20) 
Maslow goes further, and argues that as all religious 
revelation, illumination and conversion are modelled on 
natural peak-experiences, it is now possible to study them 
scientifically and even to replicate them with the use of 
drugs (Maslow 1964, 26-7). He does not seem to know Zaehner's 
Mysticism Sacred and Profane which had appeared in 1957. 
It could with some plausibility be argued that Maslow is only 
taking account of Adamic or first level experiences and has 
not looked at any other stages. In any case, Laski, whom he 
quotes in support of his hypothesis, is much more cautious. 
It has already been noted that she classifies ecstasies into 
three levels of intensity, of which the second subdivides 
into two, and therefore has a much more scholarly picture 
than Maslow. But she does indeed want to separate the 
experience from its interpretation: 
This impression, that interpretation followed the 
ecstatic moment and was not simultaneous with it, 
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is given by several other people in the groups. 
'I continued in this state of inward joy, peace, 
and astonishment till near dark, without any 
sensible abatement; and then began to think and 
examine what I had seen,' wrote Brainerd (R13). 
Of the experience itself the author of text R6 
says only that he felt a 'temporary loss of my 
own identity, accompanied by an illumination 
which revealed to me a deeper significance than 
I had been wont to attach to life.' This is a 
minimal statement of overbelief - little more 
than the expression of feelings of loss of self 
and gain of knowledge. 'It is in this, ' he 
continues, 'that I find my justification for 
saying that I have enjoyed communication with 
God.' The justification is made after the 
experience; it is what he afterwards interpreted 
his feelings as having implied. (Laski 1961, 60c-
61a) 20 
Ninian Smart brings this distinction out. He suggests that 
accounts of experiences can carry a very ramified kind of 
interpretation or interpretation of a less complex kind. In 
addition, while interpretation in the first instance comes 
from the ecstatic, the account may pass into the public 
domain and acquire interpretation by others. Thus Smart 
posits four classes of descriptions: (a) those interpreted by 
the subject with few ramifications, (b) those interpreted by 
others with a low degree of ramification, (c) those 
interpreted by the subject with a high degree of 
ramification, and (d) those interpreted by others with a high 
degree of ramification. These are put shortly as: (a) Low 
auto-interpretation; (b) Low hetero-interpretation; (c) High 
auto-interpretation; (d) High hetero-interpretation. (Smart 
1981, 84b) 
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There would seem to be no place on Smart's scheme for raw or 
uninterpreted experience, although this seems to be what 
James and Starbuck, and Hardy also, thought predominated in 
many of their cases. On this view, it would make 
phenomenological analysis easier if cultural and doctrinal 
elements could somehow be discounted or peeled off. In fact 
it is sometimes suggested that interpretations have been 
added onto an originally pure or raw nucleus of experience. 
Moore (op.cit. llOc) thinks there may be some nature-mystic 
cases (for Laski adamic ecstasies) which approach this, and 
remarks too that those who think there is a clear distinction 
between experience and interpretation usually try to discount 
influences from formal religion (doctrinal elements) because 
they see them as obstructions to an assessment of the 
experience as experience, rather than essential components 
which have made it what it is. (Moore 1978, 109c-110a). 
Moore started out, as already noted, by seeing that the 
material for study is accounts of mystical experience, 
usually mystical writings, and not the experiences 
themselves. But this seems to assume that a description of 
such an experience would be at once comprehensible to a non-
ecstatic. Otto prefaces his description of the sensus 
numinis by saying that it can only be understood by someone 
who has personally had this experience. Yet in most cases 
writers seem to think that in practice mystical experience is 
to be laid out for non-mystical examination. 
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Laski felt it necessary to ignore overbeliefs when 
classifying what ecstatics felt, and she quotes from the 
Oxford English Dictionary (1933 supplement) where overbelief 
is defined as: 'Belief in more than is warranted by the 
evidence or in what cannot be verified.' ( 20b). 
writes: 
In making entries under the general heading of 
what they said they felt, I have tried to elicit 
the general sense of the statement made, 
ignoring, for the purposes of analysis, 
implications of specific beliefs. This is the 
method of approach that William James thought 
proper in considering religious experiences, that 
of 'disregarding the over-beliefs, and confining 
ourselves to what is common and generic.' 
. Here James uses overbelief as I shall 
principally use it, to name the subjective gloss 
or interpretation placed by people on their 
experiences, and although he believed, as he put 
it, that 'the most interesting and valuable 
things about a man are usually his over-beliefs', 
he still thought it proper in trying to discover 
the nature of religious experience, to disregard 
the overbeliefs and confine himself to what was 
common and generic. (Laski 20, VRE 490a) 
Laski 
The attempt to separate interpretation from experience brings 
to light a difficulty at the level of presupposition. 
Swinburne writes: "Once the line is drawn the line 
always leaves the typical objects of religious experience as 
matters of interpretation rather than as true objects of real 
experience." (1979, 258c). Steven Katz states unequivocally 
and in italics, "There are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) 
experiences." (Katz 1978, 26a) He criticises both Stace, who 
thought there was a clear distinction between a mystical 
experience and its interpretation, and also Zaehner, who did 
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not, for failure to examine the conditions of experience as 
being the context within which any mystical experience takes 
place. Taking an example from Judaism, Katz goes through ten 
factors to illustrate that "these images, beliefs, symbols, 
and rituals define, in advance, what the experience he wants 
to have, and which he then does have, will be like." (Katz 
1978, 33c). Katz introduces the term "preinterpretive 
concern" (23c), and takes up a position at the opposite end 
from, for instance, Stace whom he rebukes: Stace thought of 
Christian or Hindu beliefs being based upon their 
experiences, whereas for Katz it must be the other way round, 
if his Jewish example is regarded as typical, and religious 
experiences are not possible without some prior conditioning 
or concern. 
Predictably, this is opposed to the view that all historical 
religions start from one or more ecstatic experiences of the 
founder or other significant figure, which then get 
institutionalised or routinised to become an established 
religious faith and tradition. This is explicit in Maslow, 
in James, whom Maslow consciously followed, and even in Otto. 
Yet Woods remarked that it is usually only the psychologists 
who think all the experiences are the same at the core, and 
theologians who insist on their being different. 
This represents the argument sixty years previously between 
Otto and Geyser: Geyser, a· Roman Catholic, held that 
religious experience was not possible without prior education 
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in doctrines and sacraments, because without this no-one 
would be able to recognise it as religious. This surely 
rests on a much narrower definition of religion than the one 
Otto and most of his successors are working with. There is 
little doubt, however, that Otto held a much less 
sophisticated view than would now be possible. 
4.4 Describing transcendent experiences 
The central problem in describing religious experiences 
relates to the uses and limits of language. To maintain that 
a description is just a factual account of what actually 
happened, as might be concluded from James or Starbuck or 
from accounts in the Alister Hardy collection, is surely too 
naive. In any case James introduces the word "ineffability" 
as a characteristic of mystical experience and makes clear 
that most mystics claim that words are inadequate to express 
transcendent experience. 
As might be expected, Maslow, who says his work "is in direct 
line with James's Varieties of Religious Experience" (Preface 
p. xi), thinks that the language used in description does not 
match the experience, and because it is culture-bound cannot 
be expected to do so: 
These experiences are essentially ineffable (in 
the sense that even the best verbal phrasings are 
not quite good enough), which is also to say that 
they are unstructured (like Rorschach ink-blots). 
(1964,72b) 
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But this assessment of the language used could not be 
acceptable to a philosopher. Because interpretation depends 
largely on language, this area needs much more thorough 
treatment than the dismissive and obscurantist comparison 
with ink-blots allows. 
Renford Bambrough in his article, "Intuition and the 
Inexpressible," centres on the problem of language and other 
forms of expression. His aim seems to be to demystify the 
area, and on his second page he quotes Wittgenstein 
"Intuition an unnecessary shuffle. n 21 Bambrough then goes 
on to discuss knowledge which is never exhaustively 
described, but any bit of it can be researched and described 
further. Consequently he feels that the limits of language 
are conventional and therefore temporary. Support comes from 
Laski when she relates: 
Sometimes people spontaneously proffered 
additional information later, often several years 
later ... This possibility, that we are being 
told only a part of what might have been said, 
applies to all descriptions of experiences 
whether oral or written, but it is obviously more 
likely when someone is trying, unprepared, to 
answer a question verbally than when they have, 
of their own accord, decided to communicate an 
experience in writing. (llc) 
Language always has a context, and this contributes often 
substantially to the communication of meaning. Bambrough 
recalls that Otto in DH made use of "arts other than the art 
of speech through which we can express and communicate 
thoughts and feelings." (Bambrough 1978, 209b). 
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Otto would not, however, agree with Bambrough's relativist 
view of the limits of language. Bambrough adds, "To hold 
that there may be inarticulate understanding is not to hold 
that there may be any understanding that could not be 
articulated." (212b) And the assertion, "We may recognise 
that some questions are unanswered and some problems are 
unsolved without concluding that some problems are insoluble 
and some questions unanswerable." (212b) almost directly 
contradicts Otto's position throughout DH, and indeed all his 
writing on the numinous. Otto makes a distinction between a 
problem and a mystery: a problem unsolved could in principle 
be solved, whereas a mystery is by its nature beyond human 
reason and solution in this sense. Bambrough does not use 
the word here mystery, but it is clear that this is the 
context of his article. 
Further, Bambrough tackles Otto directly on 
Inexpressible: 
In his chapter on the scope and limits of 
expression, under the title 'Means of Expression 
of the Numinous', he is as modest and hesitant 
about our powers of communication as he is in the 
subtitle about our powers of understanding. The 
paradox is that he makes effective use of the 
powers whose feebleness he labours to expose. 
(206a) 
the 
Bambrough holds that the limits of language are contingent 
and must not be represented as a priori barriers to 
expression (206c). Yet Otto is going beyond language, and 
his references to art, liturgy, and music relate to non-
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rational expression of the non-rational, which is 
communicable only to those who, because they have had the 
relevant numinous experience, can grasp in some non-verbal 
way the ideogram or other form of expression. 
Laski comes close to this when she writes that "a number of 
rhetorical devices seems to derive from the existence and 
nature of ecstatic and response experiences. . Sometimes 
they are used as a reference to or an ideograph of such an 
experience, where the experience itself is not described but 
the idea of it, with its associated values and implications, 
is to be conveyed" (Laski, 226a). 
Laski takes a genuinely phenomenological line when she writes 
that the experiences feel ineffable. The following comes 
from her table entitled "What they said they felt": 
The entries here are those where the experience 
is said to be, of its nature, indescribable; as 
opposed to those under loss of words/images, 
where the failure is said to be that of the 
person and not necessarily because of the nature 
of the experience. Demonstrably these 
experiences are not ineffable; few kinds of 
experiences can have been so fully and so 
consistently described. But such experiences 
obviously feel ineffable, and to say that they 
are ineffable (or indescribable, etc.) is a 
typical part of their description. (Laski, 31c) 
In fact being indescribable may be thought of as a sign that 
the experience is genuine (in any acceptable sense). Laski 
comments on a passage from Fox's Journal: 
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He passes from the stage in which communicable 
knowledge is gained to one in which, through 
contact with God, incommunicable knowledge is 
felt to have been gained. Not only is this stage 
felt to be better than the one in which 
communicable knowledge is gained; incommunicable 
knowledge is itself felt to be better than 
communicable knowledge. Both beliefs are common 
among religious mystics. (Laski, 91ab) 
The suggestion is that "ineffability" has become a 
convention, along with other descriptive phrases, and these 
serve to condition the expectations of the ecstatic. This 
means also that there is a ready-made vocabulary. Laski 
adds, "To a substantial extent the people in the religious 
group knew the vocabulary for such experiences before they 
knew the experiences; inevitably, when the experiences are 
known, they tend to be recounted in the vocabulary already 
accepted as appropriate" (Laski, 14b). Later on she extends 
this to non-religious people in her Questionnaire group, 
about a third of whom were writers or creative artists, and 
very few of whom claimed recognised religious adherence: 
Many of the texts in the religious group 
demonstrate how readily this stock vocabulary may 
be drawn from, and, as the questionnaire group 
shows, it is barely possible to describe an 
ecstatic experience without using it. Mystical 
religions and philosophies, together with poetry, 
have so comprehensively provided the vocabulary 
in which ecstatic experience is felt to be 
fittingly described that their words and phrases 
will perforce be used even by people who do not 
share the beliefs these words and phrases imply. 
So many inroads have been made on the ineffable 
that even an atheist may find heaven the 
appropriate word to describe a feeling of 'not 
mundane here but happy ~nified everywhere' and 
communion with God or union with ultimate reality 
the appropriate phrase for a feeling of 'not 
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isolated lonely self but together with something 
or someone else.' (Laski, 348c-349a) 
Language is not only a means of expression. As with other 
means of expression, language is part of the cultural and 
religious tradition. The language used by mystics helps to 
establish the tradition (Moore 1978, 115a). This is true of 
metaphorical language. Indeed metaphorical language is often 
more appropriate than what might be called literal, and in 
its own way more particular to a particular experience or 
type of experience. Kenneth Wapnick suggests that "precise, 
objective language" will "inevitably" transform the 
experience which is more truthfully expressed in metaphor 
(Wapnick 1981, 322b). 
Religious orthodoxy may lay down the limits of language, and 
it is therefore significant when religious mystics overstep 
these limits in their descriptive language (Laski, 122-3). 
The experience seems to burst the bounds of language 
officially approved. This too seems to be part of the 
experience. 
Much depends, however, on how language in mystical experience 
is thought to be functioning. James and many others have 
seen language in these contexts as mainly, if not 
exclusively, for the purpose of description. The suggestion 
already made (by Moore) that language helps to establish a 
tradition may suggest another function. Otto knew that means 
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of expression could at the same time help to induce or at any 
rate prepare one for a numinous or mystical experience, but 
Frederick J. Streng distinguishes descriptive from 
transformative language (Streng 1978, 150ff). This relates 
more particularly to the techniques taught and used, and 
Streng is writing of the need to transform the personality, 
in the first stage by purification of perceptions, will and 
thoughts. Seen in this light, much language is specific to 
a particular religious tradition and helps to establish it. 
Just as the cumulative mystical experience of many 
generations shapes the language, so the language guides the 
tradition. The effect is dialogical and ongoing. 
The problems posed by Otto's language are taken up again by 
Schlamm22 who directly tackles Bambrough. While 
acknowledging that Otto's expectations of language used in 
his descriptions of and discussions about the numinous would 
need critical modification in the light of subsequent 
discussion in this field, Schlamrn takes a more sympathetic 
view of what Otto was trying to achieve. This was more than 
purely descriptive or explanatory: "Otto was constantly 
striving to extend the boundaries of our understanding . " 
( Schlamm 1992, 545a) . This entails a creative programme 
whereby using language to discuss and express religious 
(numinous) experiences has two further results: it can help 
us to recall subtle variations in religious experience, and 
secondly, it helps to create in us a greater sensitivity for 
future religious experiences (Schlamm, 550-551). The 
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implications of this for education in religion are obvious. 
The mystical or numinous experience is usually itself 
transformative and leads in many examples to reorganisation 
of outlook (Woods 1981, 5a) and to deautomatisation (Deikman 
1981, 240ff.). The effects of this in social and in 
biological terms (survival fitness in evolutionary 
competition) will be taken up in section 4.7. 
4.5 Religious experience and knowledge 
"For knowledge ecstasies I require that people make claims 
that can be entered- in terms of my headings, under mystical 
knowledge or new knowledge." (Laski 1961, 116a). One of 
these claims is to know by experience what hitherto they had 
known only by description (116b). This is clearly important 
for them, and must be taken seriously. 
One of those who answered Laski's questionnaire (Q 61) wrote 
as follows: 
When you suddenly discover a faculty working with 
effortless efficiency which enables you to .hold 
in the forefront of conscious feeling both 
knowledge of the smallest bacteria in the field, 
how the blade of grass works, and the universe in 
the same detail - all you know about nature, the 
whole thing, you can think about them all 
simultaneously and not in parts, that knowledge 
is almost limitless -one's aware objectively of 
what one's doing but not aware of anything else, 
not aware of yesterday or tomorrow, just of the 
moment, doing this now. (479ab) 
But describing the content of what is known can be 
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problematical. "It should be noted that where coherent 
knowledge is claimed to have been received during ecstasy, 
there is no evidence of more than a feeling of coherent 
knowledge unless such knowledge can be coherently 
communicated later." (Laski 62b) And Laski gives examples 
from non-religious sources which she refers to with "L" 
numbers, as well as from religious ones, marked with "R" 
numbers: 
Virginia Woolf believes that during her 
experience she learns what 'reality' is, but that 
it is nearly impossible to set it down afterwards 
(L8). Jacquetta Hawkes believes that during her 
experience her thoughts had been given an 
extraordinary clarity and truth which could not 
be translated into 'everyday terms' (L19). 
Boehme, again, believed that it was during his 
experience that he was able to understand 'all 
things' but that afterwards 'I could very hardly 
apprehend the same in my external man' (R16) . 
(Laski 61c) 
Laski discusses the problem about how one can gain knowledge 
when the senses are either shut off or completely absorbed, 
and suggests that the knowledge is gained by insight after 
the main transcendent ecstasy, often by reflection or else by 
supplementary illumination. An example is taken from a 
friend of her correspondent Q 26, who wrote, 
When it's greatest, you're entirely unaware, you 
realise it only when you come back; if you're 
conscious of the state when you're in it, it's 
not so terrific. But with the great ones, you 
don't realise till you come back that you were in 
heaven. ( 384c) 
Similarly, Laski quotes from St Teresa: 
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How can the soul see and comprehend that she is 
in God and God in her, if during this union she 
is not able either to see or understand? I 
reply, that she does not see it at the time, but 
that afterwards she perceives it clearly: not by 
vision, but by a certitude which remains in the 
heart which God alone can give. (Laski 60a, and 
ref. 430a, and taken from The Interior Castle) 
Mystics and those who have undergone other types of religious 
experience claim that it has affected their lives. The 
obvious ways to approach such claims from outside are to look 
both at the language used (Section 4.4 supra), and also at 
any changes in activity and behaviour (Section 4.7 infra). 
In many cases, whether from nature mysticism in childhood, or 
from the raptures of practised saints, there are claims to 
knowledge. These claims often include a certainty in the 
unity and goodness of the world, or an intimacy with the 
divine. Can these and other claims be made to stand up in 
the light of non-mystical examination? 
The phenomenology of mystical experience provides one of the 
keys to understanding. The other is the highly abstract 
method of metaphysical speculation. Metaphysics implies 
ontology, but phenomenology does not exclude ontological 
reality; it merely leaves the question open. Each route 
leads to the epistemology which suits it. Moore says that 
analysis of the elements of such experience must at least be 
at tempted, as there is otherwise little hope of reaching 
valid conclusions concerning either phenomenology or 
epistemology (Moore 1978, 109b). 
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The starting point must be the claims made by or on behalf of 
the mystics themselves. 
Clearly no phenomenological stone should be left 
unturned when it comes to assessing the 
epistemological and ontological status of 
mystical experience. But the starting point 
should be a careful analysis of the various 
claims made by or on behalf of mystics concerning 
their experiences. (Moore 1978, 122-3) 
Writing as a psychologist, Maslow makes a suggestion which 
philosophers do not appear to have taken up. This is that a 
change in the focus of attention can lead to "new" knowledge, 
in the sense that the subject had not noticed it before. 
"The widening and enriching of consciousness through new 
perceptual experiences, many of which leave a lasting effect, 
is a little like improving the perceiver himself." (Maslow, 
1964, 76-7) Further: 
In peak-experiences, several kinds of attention-
change can lead to new knowledge. For one, love, 
fascination, absorption can frequently mean 
"looking intensely, with care. . This new 
"knowledge" can be a change in attitude, valuing 
reality in a different way, seeing things from a 
new perspective, from a different centering 
point. (Maslow, 77c-78a) 
Maslow introduces a second aspect of the same point: 
Another kind of cognitive process which can occur 
in peak-experiences is the freshening of 
experience and the breaking up of rubricization. 
Familiarization dulls cognition, especially in 
anxious people, and it is then possible to walk 
through all sorts of miraculous happenings 
without experiencing them as such. In peaks, the 
miraculous "suchness" of things can break through 
into consciousness. It is a kind of 
perspicuity which contrasts with what can only be 
called "normal blindness." (Maslow, 78bc) 
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Some of the examples given of supposedly new knowledge seem 
nonsensical. To some extent this is linked with difficulty 
in finding the right words, but to some extent the knowledge 
itself is obscure. Laski writes, "the most usual post-
ecstatic feeling is that something new is known but it is not 
known what." (1961, 346c). This may seem impossible to make 
sense of, but at the level of phenomenology it must be taken 
as seriously as all similar claims to knowledge and ~ntimacy 
in religious mystical writing. 
Moore insists that his procedures imply that no mystical 
experience can be self-authenticating in the sense normally 
understood by this term. This contradicts the commonsense 
view adopted by Hay, Hardy, and before them James, that they 
are. Hay says that self-authenticating means two things: 
First, religious or mystical experiences have 
authority. Their immediacy and power is itself 
a guarantor of their truth. . The other way 
that these experiences are self-authenticating is 
that they seem to bring to the person who has 
them an awareness of his or her true self, 
underlying the self-deluding subterfuges that so 
often appear to be necessary for survival in a 
threatening world. (Hay 1990, 33c) 
On the power of experiences, Swinburne says: "Note that some 
experiences are very much more forceful than others . 
some experiences are very clear and unavoidable and leave a 
very strong impression." (Swinburne, 265a) Swinburne does 
not, however, say they are self-authenticating. Indeed he 
could not do this as his whole approach is that of a 
philosopher working a posteriori from inferences to a 
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possible or probable inference of their cause23 . 
Otto follows James and quotes from him on "the Reality of the 
Unseen." Katz criticises James and those who follow him on 
two different grounds. The first concerns the use of the 
term ineffable and with it any reference to difficulties in 
describing the experience. This, says Katz, gives no basis 
for claiming that all the ineffables are the same. His 
second criticism is aimed at cases where two or more 
witnesses do in fact use the same words such as blessedness, 
peace, happiness, nothingness, God. Katz claims that mystics 
from different traditions must be using these words to refer 
to different states of mind, or to different objects of 
experience, whether real or imagined. 
Yet this is surely to misrepresent James and with him Otto. 
The claim to the reality of the unseen is not a description 
of the numinous but an awareness of "something there." Laski 
in the chapter on Contact (Chapter XI) divides the contacts 
into three kinds: "contact with a transcendental • someone' or 
'something'; contact with an object or objects; and contact 
with an immaterial all." (Laski, 126b). Laski's material 
came from three groups of people, those who answered her 
questionnaire (Q), excerpts from literature (L), and 
explicitly religious or mystical writers (R). "Both union 
and contact less than union are . claimed by people in all 
three groups, by Christians an~ by non-Christians, by people 
of religious faith and by people of none." (126b) 
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On the felt reality of the unseen Laski quotes 'a clergyman' 
from James's VRE, a passage also quoted by Otto in DH: 
The perfect stillness of the night was 
thrilled by a more solemn silence. The darkness 
held a presence that was all the more felt 
because it was not seen. I could not any more 
have doubted that He was there than that I was. 
Indeed, I felt myself to be, if possible, the 
less real of the two. (Laski 426a, VRE 81b) 
Another which Laski quotes from James includes the words: 
My soul was so captivated and delighted with the 
excellency of God that I was even swallowed up in 
Him; at least to that degree I had no thought 
about my own salvation, and scarce reflected that 
there was such a creature as myself. (Laski, 
433a, VRE 216c) 
Laski also quotes from Joseph Salmon, a Ranter: 
I appeared to myselfe as one confounded into the 
abyss of eternitie, nonentitized into the being 
of beings, my soul spilt and emptied into the 
fountaine and ocean of divine fulness, expired 
into the aspires of pure life. In brief, the 
Lord so much appeared, that I was little or 
nothing seen, but walked at an orderly distance 
from myself, treading and tripping over the 
pleasant mountains of the heavenly land, where I 
walked with the Lord and was not. (Laski 436a) 24 
What is described, by Otto in the case of the numinous and by 
James in his chapters on Mysticism, is the state of mind both 
during and as a result of such experience. Otto makes it 
clear that he is not able to describe or analyse the 
Numinous, but only the state of mind of one overshadowed by 
a numinous encounter. 
In non-mystical terms, alteration in behaviour and attitude 
Chapter Four 251 
(section 4.7) would seem to be the best argument in favour of 
the position that something significant had really happened. 
4.6 Communicating and preparing for religious experience 
It has long been known that certain personalities have a 
psychic disposition which makes religious experience of any 
kind more likely. Marechal, writing from within an expressly 
Roman Catholic position, speaks of supernatural grace being 
received by an aptitude which is a connecting link or 
stepping stone (Marechal in Woods 1981, 470b). He goes on to 
the role of training in preparation for the gift of divine 
grace; 
It may be asked indeed, since the essential of 
ecstasy depends upon God's free initiative, what 
role the psychological unification brought about 
by asceticism still has in it. This role, we 
think we may affirm without boldness, is very 
important ... The whole man must be "prepared" 
for the divine communications by his natural 
dispositions or by the training of ascesis. (in 
Woods 1981, 473bc) 
Maritain, who distinguishes natural mysticism from 
supernatural, thinks that training applies to both: but his 
natural mystic ism is not nature mysticism, but mysticism 
outside his own (Catholic) tradition: 
To the extent that supernatural mysticism 
requires human preparation, involves structures 
and disciplines, one should find therein 
structures analogically similar to those of 
natural mysticism yet transposed toward a 
specifically different finality, and hence 
specifically different themselves. (Maritain in 
Woods 1981, 492c) 
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Katz goes further, but he is writing of all mystical 
experience, when he writes of the predisposition of the 
subject mediating the experience: 
there is no evidence that there is any 
'given' which can be disclosed without the 
imposition of the mediating conditions of the 
knower. All 'givens' are also the product of the 
processes of 'choosing', 'shaping', and 
'receiving'. (Katz 1978, 59a) 
It is an aspect of Katz's general position that all 
experience is shaped by the predisposition of the mind. 
Often this is active. 
I will merely suggest that, if one looks closely 
at the language of mystics, as well as at 
mystical devotion, practices, and literature, one 
will find that much of it is 'intentional' in the 
sense suggested by Husserl and Brentano. (Katz 
1978, 63a) 
It has long been thought that mystics, ecstatics, peakers are 
a different sort of people from the rest of mankind. Some 
scholars want to divide people into classes of receptive or 
non-receptive, prophets or administrators, peakers or non-
peakers. There is room for modification, as Maslow regrades 
non-peakers as weak peakers who could be educated. 
Maslow asserts that peak experience is totally private and 
personal, and can be shared with other peakers only by their 
recalling their own (Maslow, 27c). He goes further on the 
next page and suggests, like a good American, that each 
peaker can have his own religion, in the sense that peakers 
stand for religious innovators, while non-peakers are the 
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plodders and religious organisers or routinisers. Yet later, 
Maslow suggests that non-peakers are in reality weak-peakers 
to whom spiritual values can be taught (56-7, cf. 86). This, 
while little more than a suggestion, seems to enlist him 
among those who think religious education for all could be 
possible and worthwhile. 
Much that has been said about language is obviously 
applicable here, in that received language and other forms 
too play a big part in making people at least aware that such 
experience is possible for them. 
4.7 The results of transcendent experience 
On the physical side there are two aspects to consider as the 
results of transcendental experience. One is biological, in 
that such experience contributes to the survival fitness of 
the race and of those members best fitted to propagate the 
human species. This is an argument taken up by Hardy (1975) 
and elsewhere. The other aspect relates to the mental and 
physical health of the individual and is also taken up by 
Hardy and by Hay. 
Maslow mentions therapeutic effects (Maslow, 66b). 
among beneficial results mentions "improved 
Laski 
mental 
organization, whether this takes the form of replacing 
uneasiness and dissatisfaction with ease and satisfaction, or 
of inspiring to moral action or of enabling the expression of 
a new mental creation." (Laski, 371a) Looking for a link 
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between ecstasy and inspiration, Laski writes: 
The gains of ecstatic experience are various but 
all, I believe, are compatible with this 
hypothesis. At its simplest the ecstatic may 
feel that he has gained generalised mental or 
emotional benefits. Or he may feel that he has 
gained a new focus of value, as in revelation 
ecstasies. Or he may believe that knowledge, 
whether religious or otherwise, has been gained 
or confirmed, and the expression of that 
knowledge may take the form of artistic or 
scientific creation. Or the ecstatic experience 
may, to borrow an admirable phrase used by Kirk 
of the power of contemplation, 'inspire to action 
and . . . renew ideals. ' ( 280bc) 
She has more to say about the stimulus to action: 
In the west, then, it is generally accepted that 
the right and proper function of ecstatic 
experience is to lead to improvement 
improvement for the individual as he achieves 
finer organisation, sees more truth, develops his 
intellect and creative capacity; and improvement 
for the group as a result of the contribution the 
improved individual is able to make, whether in 
the form of service or in the form of 
communicating new ideas that may lead to more 
successful mastery of the environment or which 
may act as triggers to lead to improvement in 
others. (316a) 
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Motivation to action is an effect which has received little 
attention till recently, although it is one of the main 
conclusions of Otto's study WoM, Mysticism East and West. 
Comparing Eckhart with Sankara, Otto distinguished two kinds 
of mysticism, that which tends inwards and to inactivity, and 
that which being theistic leads back to an active life. This 
is the Western tradition, according to Otto, and he gives 
other examples as St Teresa of Avila and St Catherine of 
Siena. 
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Laski outlines a talk given on the BBC (31 January 1955) in 
which Morris Carstairs describes a situation he found in a 
village in North India in regard to the use of stimulants. 
It appears that the Rajputs drank wine while the Brahmins 
used bhang or hashish, at the same time condemning the use of 
alcohol. Carstairs remarks that transcendental experience 
for Brahmins tends to "the sense of detachment from oneself, 
of loss of all impulse towards action, and a widespread 
indifference to other persons, as to all worldly ties." But 
the Rajputs represented an active warrior tradition, "a life 
of action and self-assertion," and Carstairs further notes 
that Western civilisation, itself seeing activity as a 
virtue, seems to have condoned and even encouraged the free 
use of alcohol, while making drugs either illegal or only 
available under strict control. (Laski 1961, p.259ab). 
It is possible to show a scale of progression for spiritual 
development, beginning with wonderment at natural beauty, and 
then wonder induced by great music or art, going on to 
experiences of a more active or participatory kind, 
admiration of great deeds or the noblest human qualities; 
spirituality can also be stirred into activity when 
appropriate feelings 
disasters, even by 
are aroused by natural or man-made 
shock at violent acts and human 
wickedness. The notion of a progression, and the possibility 
of educating for it belong to Chapter Five. 
This Chapter has been spent on the consideration of 
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experiences which are religious and non- religious, in the 
stricter sense of the word. Laski calls them "transcendent 
experiences," thereby including together people who see 
themselves within a religious tradition as well as those who 
do not. These may even call themselves agnostic or atheist. 
This surely is the situation in our schools, where R.E. is to 
be given to children, some of whom belong to a recognisable 
religious tradition and faith community, with indeed varying 
degrees of commitment, and some who do not. It is remarkable 
how very few parents exercise their right to withdraw their 
children from R.E. or from school worship. In fact there is 
a strong consensus in favour of compulsory R.E. in schools as 
at present. 25 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE EXPERIENTIAL APPROACH IN R.E. 
5.1 New directions in religious education 
In a recent review article (October 1993) Peter Vardy1 
describes and comments on developments in religious education 
in schools. He says that changes in the last fifteen years 
have made school R.E. almost unrecognisable. He lists five 
developments. Of these the newest and potentially the most 
innovative is the introduction of Affective R.E. It is 
precisely in this area that the work of Rudolf Otto is 
relevant, has already been influential2, and offers at this 
time the possibility of further development. Otto's work not 
only makes it possible to enrich affective R.E., but also and 
perhaps more important, shows how this approach is integrated 
with other approaches to R.E. and to religion. After a brief 
discussion of four other changes in school R.E, Vardy 
concentrates his attention on the affective as something new 
and significant, and accordingly he devotes the bulk of his 
article to describing and evaluating it and pointing out its 
shortcomings if used in isolation. 
The Affective approach concentrates on the 
subjective or 'feeling' side of R.E. and is 
pupil-centred. It might be described as taking 
the spiritual side of human development seriously 
in the classroom. (Vardy 324c-325a) 
The significance of pupil-centred R.E. and of spiritual 
development are taken up in later sections of this Chapter. 
Vardy notes that Affective R.E. can appeal to "people from 
all walks of life, from all religious and non-religious 
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groupings and from all age groups." (ibid.) He notes also 
that this approach was pioneered in the state sector, i.e. 
not in church schools, although church schools and parish 
educational work can make use of the approach and its 
techniques. 
Affective R.E. is also known as pupil-centred R.E. and 
experiential R.E. The approach seems to have developed 
around the time of Sir Alister Hardy's founding his Research 
Centre in 1969, at that time called the Religious Experience 
Research Unit (RERU). Shortly after that similar but more 
classroom-oriented work was begun by David Hay who got 
together a team at Nottingham University to research 
techniques and exercises that could be used in schools. He 
offered in-service training to teachers who were prepared to 
test the techniques under his guidance. A group of teachers 
from Durham County went to do this in Nottingham in 1987 on 
the initiative of the County R.E. Adviser (Maureen Potter), 
and a book was subsequently published which drew on their 
work3. Consequently the approach may not seem so novel in 
the Durham area as it is in many other parts of the country. 
Classroom results in terms of pupil engagement, interest and 
creative response, have been dramatic, as a number of Durham 
teachers can testify. 
But there are some drawbacks too. One of these is a danger 
of concentrating on inwardness as an end in itself, and 
another is that any connection with explicit religion may 
Chapter Five 261 
disappear and the whole approach turn into personal 
development, or personal and social education (PSE), which is 
a recognised aspect of education not especially linked to 
R.E. Both these are noted by Brenda Watson (1993) 4 . More 
worrying still is the risk of psychological damage to 
individuals unless the whole is handled by an experienced and 
sensitive teacher. The work at Nottingham was organised in 
part with the aim of preventing this5 . Thus experiential or 
affective R.E., while outwardly simple in its aim of 
involving teachers and learners together, in fact raises a 
number of different questions. These form the substance of 
this Chapter, along with the outworking suggested by a study 
of Otto. 
Experiential R.E. should always be linked with other methods. 
A good way to represent this is the three wheel diagram which 
features at length in the 1986 Westhill project for R.E. 6 
The three wheels represent three approaches, all of which 
should be used and if possible combined to provide an 
integrated and holistic education in the area described by 
religious education. 
The Westhill authors label their three wheels: Traditional 
Belief Systems (TBS); Shared Human Experience (SHE); and 
Individual Patterns of Belief (IPB). The first, TBS, covers 
what was in the past often considered to be the whole of R.E, 
that is teaching about spe_cific religions, especially 
Christianity (in a Christian social milieu), doctrines, 
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scriptures, beliefs, festivals and so on, much of which is 
usually taught by well-tried methods of communication, 
factual teaching, reading, video, study and discussion. 
The second wheel, SHE, stands for deep human experiences and 
problems which are endemic to all human life, whatever the 
religion, social structure or outlook. These include 
questions of birth and death, love and hate, courage, 
suffering and fortitude. All are questions to which 
traditional religions may offer some solutions, but these are 
at best partial and usually at a psychological level, e.g. 
rituals for the dead and for mourners. So there is an 
obvious link with the first wheel (TBS) which is not 
applicable for everyone in all cases. SHE must also include 
the ultimate questions of good and evil, fate, justice and 
the problem of pain. Even very young children can raise such 
questions as, "Why did my daddy have to die?" 7 The value of 
learning to reason about these problems is being recognised, 
as Vardy notes: "More recently the philosophy of religion has 
begun to be an important part of religious education in a 
number of schools - particularly at 'A' level" (323c). This 
is also a suitable area for non-examination R.E. at Key Stage 
Five (ages 16+), but can be taken with younger children as 
occasion arises. 
The third wheel, IPB, was envisaged as the response of 
individuals to questions raised in SHE and to the patterns 
and models offered in TBS. At the time the Westhill team 
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were at work the idea was still pervasive that pupils be 
encouraged to work out for themselves "a faith to live by" 
which is a stated aim of R.E. in earlier papers and reports8. 
But it certainly includes what has later come to be 
recognised as pupil-centred and experiential R.E. The 
Westhill team state here: 
Education - and, more specifically R.E. - is not 
primarily concerned with children as recipients 
of information, suitably packaged and delivered 
to them, or as units to be trained or 
indoctrinated in cultural norms. (24c) 
It is inevitable that children (and teachers) 
will bring into the classroom their own personal 
beliefs and sense of identity (however embryonic 
they may be) and their own attitudes and 
experiences. These are the materials of the 
subject which are closest to the children 
themselves and of most relevance to them. (24b) 
This area stands for the personal response or engagement of 
all who participate in R.E., teachers as well as pupils, and 
sometimes others who are drawn either into the classroom or 
into discussions outside the classroom. 
Seven years later when Vardy wrote, it seems fair to see this 
area as having developed into Experiential or Affective R.E. 
with almost total overlap. The four other directions in 
which Vardy sees modern R.E. is developing are as follows. 
His first is a more academic and detached handling of Old and 
New Testaments, allowing pupils to see Bible stories from a 
new and distinctive perspective. This probably applies more 
in classes geared to GCSE or 'A' level. His second is the 
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handling of world religions, which he acknowledges is more 
advanced in state schools and Church of England schools than 
in Catholic schools, and it appears that he is more at home 
in the Catholic school system. Both these obviously fit into 
Westhill's TBS (traditional belief systems), as does quite a 
lot more of a descriptive and factual nature which is not so 
new but still relevant. His third direction is the 
discussion of important social and ethical issues like 
abortion and euthanasia, and it is clear that such topics 
raise fundamental questions like those Westhill put into SHE 
(shared human experience). Vardy's fourth direction 
(mentioned already) also belongs here and involves a more 
philosophical and logical approach to fundamental questions 
which religions either pose or attempt to answer. 
Just as a superficial reading of DH has led some to the 
impression that Otto is mainly or solely interested in the 
psychological and non-rational, so too some teachers today 
think of experiential R.E. as one-sided, because they fail to 
see it in relation to other approaches. This overall 
integration must be stressed. But in order to consider 
experiential methods it is easier to consider them first in 
isolation. To some extent it may be helpful in practice to 
focus on experiential R.E., provided integration with the 
whole is not forgotten. Otto's work will prove of particular 
help here. 
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5.2 The human and the spiritual 
The Education Act of 1944 was the first to make the teaching 
of religion compulsory in state schools. Before 1944, from 
1870, schools could choose whether or not to teach religion, 
but if they did choose to, then they were obliged to observe 
the Cowper-Temple clause which laid down that such religious 
instruction must not be distinctive of any particular church 
or denomination. This clause is still in force throughout 
the state system9• The 1988 Education Act which brought in 
the National Curriculum reaffirmed the 1944 position with 
regard to religious education, making it obligatory as part 
of the Basic Curriculum which is seen as embracing the 
National Curriculum. The same provisions are made to permit 
parents to withdraw their children from R.E. and from school 
worship. Very few in fact do this. 
This is not the place to argue for the current situation or 
to seek to justify the inclusion of R.E. in the curriculum 
legally established. At least religion is no longer (as 
between 1944 and 1988) the only subject schools were obliged 
to teach as now the whole National Curriculum is also legally 
enforceable. It must suffice simply to state that this is 
the situation with religious education in Britain. 
Given that R.E. is required in all state schools, two 
assumptions of importance are bound up with this. The first 
is that all children are deemed to be capable of taking R.E., 
and if the aim is not to make them religious, they must be 
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able to learn about and empathise with actual religions and 
religious questions. This capacity is what Otto called the 
Anlage des Gemiltes and it is as fundamental to his writing as 
it must be to the general British belief that R.E. is 
desirable and practicable for all. 
The second point is equally important and closely connected 
to the first. The basis of R.E. in the state system, that is 
in non-religious schools in a (supposedly) secular state, 
must be human education. R.E. must appeal to human qualities 
and not specifically religious ones in the explicit sense, 
and spiritual development as required in the 1988 Education 
Act must also be seen in these terms. Thus the foundation of 
R.E. is educational in the first instance and religious in 
the broader and more general sense which underlies 
Schleiermacher's approach and through his work that of Otto. 
Otto noted as early as 1909 that it was necessary to replace 
the old theology ("a metaphysic about God, Man and the 
World") by a Science of Religion which, like "all sciences of 
the mind in general," must apply itself to an examination of 
the human spirit (Geist), (PR 222; KFR 192-3). When 
religious education is approached in the first instance as 
education, the focus for consideration must be the human. 
This is because education is about developing the mind and 
spirit (Geist) of the pupils, and because the mind and spirit 
of the educators provide the principal means for planning the 
process and putting it into action. If in addition it is 
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accepted that education is a right for all human beings, not 
just for a favoured, perhaps religiously favoured few, then 
education must build on what all have in common, and that is 
their humanness. 
To accept an educational justification for R.E. in state 
schools is to accept Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of 
religion as human response (Smith 1978). For Smith, all 
religion is a human construct and contrasts in this with the 
neo-orthodox and Barthian emphasis on revelation from God as 
constituting the only foundation for a Christian. The case 
for school R.E. as the Christian upbringing of the nation's 
children might have been argued, in fact as late as the 1960s 
was argued, but the immigration of numbers of adherents of 
non-Christian religions and the presence of their children in 
some of our classrooms, has emphasised that the role of R.E. 
in the state school is not to make converts, nor even to 
nurture children into the faith of their forbears 10 • 
Christian parents accept, as do their Hindu, Sikh and Muslim 
neighbours, that it is the privilege and duty of the family 
together with parish, mosque or temple community to develop 
children's commitment to the faith tradition as a living 
issue. Looking back, it is easy to see this had anyway been 
impossible under the Cowper-Temple clause because R.E. (RK or 
RI) which was not distinctive of any confession or 
denomination could not link pupils into a church. This was 
only possible in a church school where the Cowper-Temple 
clause did not apply. 
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Religion in a non-confessional way must then be recognisable, 
and can in fact be found in almost all human societies, 
primitive as well as advanced. David Hay opens his book 
Exploring Inner Space with an "ordinary man" watching the 
ships of Cortes approach the Mexican coast in 1519. The 
ancestors of the Aztecs and the Spaniards had had no contact 
since the old stone age, yet the visitors were able at once 
to recognise religious rituals, altars, temples, priests and 
the standard manifestations of religion, in spite of 
historical, religious and cultural differences. As well as 
practices, the phenomena of religion include attitudes and 
responses which can be called religious. These too can be 
recognised across cultural and language chasms. This fact of 
recognition is important, although it does not make it easy 
to offer a definition of religion11 , but at any rate the 
features of religion relate to an aspect or Anlage of what it 
means to be human. 
This would lend substance to what is required by the 
Education Reform Act of 1988 when it calls for "the 
spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development 
of pupils at the school and of society. n 12 The Act obviously 
regards the spiritual as common to all human beings which 
state education can and should develop. But when it comes to 
definite identification, the spiritual seems equally as 
protean as the religious. These are two different but 
overlapping fields, as can be shown by a Venn diagram 
involving ideas connected with 'religious' and ideas 
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connected with 'spiritual' 13 . Some people have argued that 
the proper function of R.E. in school is to help personal and 
social education (PSE) and to stay clear of religion as such 
altogether. But the area designated by the spiritual is far 
wider than this and reaches to the depths of traditional 
religions. 
The spiritual denotes an aspect of life and thought which is 
meaningful for agnostics and atheists as well as for members 
of traditional religions. This important fact is supported 
by the findings of Laski, for instance, as discussed in 
Chapter Four. It is clear that the term 'spiritual' must 
include qualities like imagination, wonder, aspiration to 
higher ideals, and even those human presentiments described 
by Peter Berger as 'signals of transcendence' (Berger 1972). 
Professor Brian V. Hill 14 wants to label this aspect of the 
spiritual as the "distinctively human". He refers to an 
earlier publication of his in which he had argued for four 
distinctive 'marks of the spirit' on which educational 
energies should be focussed. These were endurance, 
transcendence, creativity and dialogue. In the 1989 article 
he chose to make transcendence the lynch-pin, as the other 
qualities anyway seem to relate to it. It is relevant to 
note that Laski used 'transcendent' to provide a neutral 
setting for her enquiry. Obviously a lot depends on how this 
often-used term is unpacked. Hill does not give 
transcendence the ecstatic quality that Laski found, but the 
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qualities he mentions do transcend what is ordinary and 
uninspired. Perhaps this allows scope for Maslow's weak 
peakers to be developed. 
Hill discusses very briefly a number of qualities which 
include "a distinctive capacity to rise above the feelings 
and rhythms of animal life"; self-awareness; capacity for 
abstract reasoning; ability to transcend time; ability to 
rise above the current stream of emotions and to fix 
attention on one or two which may become long-term 
motivation; imagination; freedom; a sense of moral 
obligation; and a kind of dissatisfaction with the human 
situation. Other things are mentioned, but it is clear that 
this last quality prepares for a critical stance over against 
the normal run of events. It may also be relevant to remark 
(Hill does not mention this) that dissatisfaction is at the 
root of all religions of salvation, that is the realisation 
that human beings long for an ideal state which has not yet 
been attained. 
In calling spirituality "distinctively human", Hill's idea is 
to see it as a human quality, or set of qualities, free and 
separate from religion in the traditional sense, even though 
there must be overlaps. In taking transcendence as the focus 
of his investigation, Hill adds that this notion does not 
require any particular theological explanation, nor any 
specific psychological theory of self-concept. In calling it 
"distinctively human", he wants to make it a form of 
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humanism, and thus be able to anchor the transcendent and 
through it the spiritual firmly within the domain of 
education rather than in the disputable area of religion. 
That it is possible to teach spirituality in a context of 
theological neutrality is further emphasised when the current 
Professor of Theology at Bristol writes of "an education 
towards spirituality without indoctrination or nurture into 
a specific religion", which she further calls "training in 
sensitivity for spiritual awareness." 15 
The basic ideas then would include ( 1) transcending the 
everyday, going beyond "normal" concerns and assumptions, 
whether bodily, emotional or economic; (2) being able to take 
up a new and different viewpoint, which can in turn lead on 
to empathy; (both these points are mentioned by Hill); (3) 
the combination of (1) and (2) frees 16 the mind and the 
imagination and thus has the effect of countering 
indoctrination, or bringing about de-indoctrination17 ; and 
(4) the capacity or the opportunity for wonder and stillness. 
Point (4) in some respects refers back to (1), but may also 
lead to a critical standpoint. 
The benefits of a widely defined spirituality have been 
recently argued by Carl Garner in a collection of exploratory 
essays on teaching spirituality (Garner n.d.). Garner argues 
for the need to meet the needs and aspirations of the human 
spirit which may in fact be expressed through non-religious 
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social ideals and aims. Among these he instances (at that 
time) Marxism and we could add patriotism, famine relief, 
artistic ideals, and a wide range of examples, not the less 
sincerely felt for being imprecisely defined. 
Hill's article on Spiritual Development stresses the need to 
transcend everyday experiences, and makes two further points: 
one that as human beings we are conscious of transcending the 
everyday, and the second, that we need to reflect on this if 
such capacity for and awareness of transcendence is to be 
developed. 
Spiritual development calls for experiential methods and it 
is possible to make use of wonderment at natural beauty, as 
well as wonder induced by great music or art, going on 
perhaps to experiences of a more active or participatory 
kind, admiration of great deeds or the noblest human 
qualities; spirituality can also be stirred into activity 
when appropriate feelings are aroused by natural or man-made 
disasters, even by shock at violent acts and human 
wickedness . 18 
Thus the responses to such stimuli go well beyond the 
spiritual exercises now being used in classrooms. Running, 
dancing, splashing water, all mentioned by Br. Ramon SSF19 , 
accord with modern educational trends. But social concern 
and compassion, particularly when aroused by violence, hatred 
and human need, can also, when skilfully handled and 
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reflected on, be points of growth in spiritual awareness and 
understanding. An example might be provided by Ethiopian 
famine and the response of Band-Aid. Kenneth Leech takes 
this further in an article (Leech), and raises social and 
political questions some of which could be material for 
development through the school assembly or in other areas of 
the curriculum. There would seem to be a link here with the 
Western traditions of mysticism coupled with social activity, 
as noted by Otto in WoM and Laski towards the end of her 
book20 • There are good educational reasons for developing 
this aspect after reflection and in addition to the quietist 
exercises which are part of Affective R.E. 21 For education 
in spirituality, it is essential to develop the ability to 
reflect. Without this, sensitivity can remain at a 
retroactive and superficial level. 
5.3 The process curriculum - pupil-centred R.E. 
Interest in experiential R.E. certainly grew from 
consideration of pupils' response and attitude. In the 1980s 
R.E. was considered under the three headings of Concepts, 
Skills and Attitudes, as in the Durham Agreed Syllabus of 
1982, but the distinction, while helpful, cannot be rigidly 
sustained. "Awe and Wonder" is listed as the first concept, 
yet obviously spills over into attitude and substantially so. 
Those who drew up the syllabus account for this by saying 
that some concepts are really a "fundamental idea" (Durham 
1982, 7). On this basis Awe and Wonder can be experienced, 
prepared for, reflected on, expressed and developed. 
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Increased sensitivity to wonder is a capacity which is the 
proper ground of R.E. Awe and wonder need not, of course, be 
explicitly religious. In modern educational parlance it is 
more usual to describe this as spiritual development, leaving 
the field open to spiritual experience which comes within 
recognised religious traditions, as well as spiritual 
experience, like Laski's ecstasies, which does not. 
Awe and wonder denote just one aspect of a wider field, much 
of which is below the level of conscious thought. It is 
clear that experiences in this general area have large 
coincidence with Otto's experiences of the numinous, even 
though it does not seem at present possible to define 
religious experience in distinction from aesthetic and 
sublime experiences as Otto tried to do, but without 
convincing his readers. 
Attention has also been given to developing the imagination. 
This too is an aspect of spiritual development which can only 
by carried through by experiential methods. Numerous 
articles on this theme have appeared over the last ten years 
in the British Journal of Religious Education, and certain 
names have become particularly associated with this 
approach22 . To link this with R.E. in schools is to stress 
responsive and creative aspects of religion, in contrast to, 
but not necessarily in opposition to, the historical, 
doctrinal and imitative aspects. 
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A recent book of exercises for R.E. (Hammond 1990) puts early 
emphasis on "Seeing through another's eyes" and begins its 
second chapter with these words: 
Religious education must perform two tasks if it 
is to face the question of the religious 
believer's intention squarely. First, it must 
honestly present religion for what it claims to 
be - the response of human beings to what they 
experience as the sacred. Secondly, religious 
educators must help pupils to open their personal 
awareness to those aspects of ordinary human 
experience which religious people take 
particularly seriously ... Both tasks .. still 
leave open questions of the ultimate truth of 
religion. They are therefore educational rather 
than indoctrinatory in intention. (p.ll) 
The use of such techniques in school can be criticised on the 
grounds that it is unfair to put children through exercises 
specifically designed for religious groups of volunteers, 
e.g. Zen novices, under the umbrella of non-confessional R.E. 
But in fact these techniques are shared by many in different 
religions and the recent works of those who have explored 
Hindu meditation exercises for use by Christians23 somewhat 
modify this criticism. Additionally it is fair to say that 
as techniques they can be claimed by educationists without 
any particular religious framework or preconceptions. As 
such they are human endeavours and may fairly be adapted 
within a philosophy of humanist education. 
The consideration of practical teaching demands consideration 
of curriculum styles. A good deal has been written about 
curriculum theory in the last twenty years, and particular 
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advocates of the process curriculum include Blenkin's Early 
Childhood Education and Blenkin and Kelly's The Primary 
Curriculum24 . Out of this special problems may arise in the 
case of religious education25 . The process or dialogue 
curriculum for R.E. has been discussed in a remarkable book 
by two Christian, specifically Roman Catholic, educationists, 
O'Leary and Sallnow26 . 
Blenkin and Kelly make it clear that they are advocating a 
model which they call education as process in opposition to 
two other models which are designated content-based and 
objectives-led. Further, they stress that in focussing 
attention on the process, they are not simply advocating a 
teaching method which might in point of fact be used with 
either of the rival models, but they are putting forward at 
length a different model altogether. 
(1) The content-based curriculum 
Perhaps the plain man's notion of what mainly goes on in 
schools is a form of the content-based curriculum. It is 
based on learning facts, on getting through a syllabus or 
study plan which consists of lists of things to be learnt. 
They may be arranged in a logical order, so pupils must cover 
the first part before they can go on to the second, and so on 
through the whole syllabus, and the topics may be graded for 
difficulty. The content may be very important, like learning 
lists of words and grammar for a foreign language, or 
chemical formulae. But whatever it is, the teacher can tell 
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how much has been learned by asking or testing the pupils to 
see if they can give back the content of the lessons clearly 
and accurately. 
The final proof of this style of curriculum is revealed in 
the end of session examinations. Those who have learnt well 
can answer the questions correctly and score the highest 
marks. The examination does not ask whether the information 
thus retold is either useful or interesting to the students. 
(2) The objectives-led curriculum 
It looks like a good idea for the teacher starting to plan a 
term's teaching, if there is a list of objectives which can 
be worked out. These can also serve as a guide for the 
teacher. This kind of curriculum style is not inconsistent 
with the curriculum based on content and is often found in 
conjunction with it. But it is different. This curriculum 
style places attention on abilities or skills, and it is 
tested by what the pupils have learnt to do. It can be 
called a curriculum of "how", as contrasted with the 
curriculum of "what". 
(3) The process curriculum 
The process model is in contrast both to the content model 
which puts emphasis on the starting point, the ground which 
has to be covered, on the one hand, and to the objectives 
model which directs at tent ion ·to the result which is to be 
achieved. Instead, the process model considers that what 
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goes on in pupil learning is valuable in itself. 
It is clear that this model of education puts the focus on 
the pupil in the classroom, and not on the subject to be 
taught, the syllabus, nor on the finished product, the 
successful examinee or school leaver. Obviously all 
education is supposed to be for the benefit of pupils, but 
the process model puts the emphasis on the business of 
learning rather than teaching, that is, the relationship with 
each pupil and between pupils while in the classroom. 
The process curriculum involves the teacher and the pupils 
together in the classroom when it is in operation. Because 
pupils and teacher participate, this curriculum model is 
spoken of as a dialogue, in the course of which the conduct 
and content of the lesson (or series of lessons) is 
negotiated between all the participants. Doing this does not 
of course diminish the teacher's responsibility or remove the 
need for careful planning, but it does lead to affirmation of 
the worth of pupils, collectively as well as individually, 
because they are able to own their education and its 
processes in ways which are not much in evidence in many 
schools. It is not only children's experience and 
experiences which the teacher using this model tries to draw 
on, build up, enhance, or in some cases to contrive and 
shape, but also their ideas, abilities and interests which 
are given as far as possible active scope in the curriculum 
and in the lesson. 
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Religion in the process curriculum 
At first sight it looks as if religious education cannot be 
handled in this way, and this for two reasons. The first is 
the nature of religion itself. Religion is centred on 
tradition handed on from each generation, including rituals, 
doctrines and writings, especially holy scripture, and these 
form a content which, so it is claimed, learners must simply 
assimilate and take over without alteration. On this view 
religious knowledge is given by God, it is revelation, and 
the teacher's task is to hand it on. 
Very often the teaching for each stage of learning is laid 
out in the form of a syllabus to be covered, and problems are 
anticipated and explained, regardless of whether a particular 
group of pupils need this explanation, or are indeed ready 
for it. The traditional teacher of religion, whether 
Christian or the teacher of almost any other established 
religion, regards it as duty to hand on a body of beliefs and 
practices. The elder generation must teach the younger, 
exactly as they themselves have received this teaching and 
with as little change as possible. There is a clear parallel 
with the ever-lengthening chain of transmission which Otto 
opposed in AHG (p.lOO). 
The second objection derives from practical education rather 
than from the nature of the subject itself. In England the 
law requires that religion," often facts about several 
religions, be taught, and teachers are therefore under an 
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obligation to show that they are doing this. The process 
curriculum is very often an integrated curriculum because 
pupils too have an important say in what is to be considered 
relevant, i.e. in the content of the lessons, and this may 
make religion as a subject area less easy to identify. Many 
primary schools have in the past included religion under more 
general groups of subjects in the integrated day or 
integrated approach. 
In England, as the 1988 Education Act is enforced, teachers, 
especially primary teachers, may find they need to identify 
R.E. in order to show that it has really been covered. The 
most obvious way to do this is to put the subject on the 
timetable and to teach it as a subject, i.e. using some form 
of the content-based curriculum. This is because most people 
would see this as a simple, concrete and practical way to 
meet the demands for anyone outside the school classroom. 
Modern education, however, expects pupils to be guided to 
find things out for themselves. The word "indoctrination" is 
used to describe teaching (in any field) which is narrow and 
dogmatic and which does not allow questioning or alternative 
points of view. Even today there are teachers of religion 
for whom indoctrination is considered a good word, and who 
welcome the possibility of dogmatic instruction in which 
pupils have as little opportunity as possible for raising 
doubts and difficulties. This seems to many to be an 
essential aspect of traditional religious teaching. In 
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strongest contrast is the process model of the curriculum and 
the methods associated with it. 
Yet even within the context of the Church school and 
Christian education the challenge and the opportunity offered 
by process-based education has been taken up. In their 
remarkable book O'Leary and Sallnow tackle this difficulty 
head-on. Although they have got Mgr. Kevin Nicholls to write 
them a Preface, the authors are explicitly opposed to his 
approach in the matters of authority and revelation. For 
their discussion of revelation they refer frequently to 
Gabriel Moran. They have obviously had personal experience 
of the three curriculum models. 
Their section headed "Curriculum Models and the Incarnational 
Approach" (pp.96-98) describes the three models outlined 
above with reference to the practice of R.E. 
1. The 'objectives-model', sometimes referred to 
as the 'means-end model', is based on the 
achievement of predetermined goals and 
foreseeable results ... 
2. The 'content-model' . The emphasis is on 
'content' as a quantifiable and assessable 
objective. Content is selected for its 
intrinsic worth rather than for its contribution 
to the achievement of an objective. The keynote 
of this approach to the curriculum is the 
emphasis on what 'goes in', and how it is 
treated, rather than on what 'comes out.' 
3. The 'process-model' emphasises the 
principles of procedure in sharing and gaining 
knowledge and wisdom, rather than predetermined 
goals ... The goals centre around the process of 
learning rather than the end-product of the 
activity. 
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O'Leary and Sallnow then go on to their Dialectical Model, 
which they introduce as 'an enlargement of model 3 above.' 
The Incarnation of Christ has established once 
and for all that the totality of human experience 
is deeply significant in terms of man's 
salvation. The function of explicitly religious 
content therefore, is to illuminate and bring to 
a level of awareness in the child the full value 
and meaning of all his experiences. (p.77) 
It becomes clear that they want to use liturgy etc. in 
education as a means of pointing up the significance of the 
ordinary human experiences of the children. This is a 
dialectic between three levels, as the following quotation 
shows: 
The design offered here suggests that the 
relationship of the curriculum components is 
structured in a threefold dialectic. The 
curriculum takes its starting-point with the real 
experience of the child, and its end-point is the 
living Christian significance of that same 
experience in terms of the child's own 
understanding in terms of his humanity and its 
immense possibilities for love, growth and ever 
deeper meaning. Between these two components -
the child's life experience and its ultimate 
meaning - lies the essential mediating area which 
includes Scripture, doctrine, liturgy, and all 
forms of communicating media constituted in the 
various disciplines of literature, history, 
dance, drama, music, visual arts and so forth. 
(p.86) 
And again more briefly: 
The illuminating quality of these mediations -
particularly Scripture, doctrine and liturgy -
specifically points up the potential and meaning 
of experience. They are the means by which the 
pupil develops experiential insight and 
understanding in his process of becoming more and 
more deeply and intensely human and Christlike. 
(p.89) 
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This opens the way for the conscious use of schematisation 
which is discussed in the next section 5.4. 
The value of their book is that it is a sustained argument 
for seeing the heart of religious education in the process-
model, as opposed to the traditional idea of an authoritative 
body of revealed content passed on from teacher to pupil in 
the shadow of the Church. O'Leary and Sallnow are arguing 
from a position within the Church, specifically the Roman 
Catholic Church, but the content-model can be found in almost 
all religious education where specifically religious matters 
are being dealt with. For instance in the matter of world 
religions, it is reasonable to assume that most pupils know 
next to nothing about Hinduism or Islam, unless they happen 
to belong to one of these faith communities, and many pupils 
are outsiders to Christianity too. This suggests that the 
material must be presented to them in an explicit manner with 
the emphasis on the content of what is to be learnt 27 . At 
the same time it is clear that religions differ in their 
character and emphasis. While Hinduism might be very 
tolerant of an approach through human experience, the 
dominant emphasis on revelation in quite explicit terms which 
is the foundation of Islam is much less sympathetic to an 
approach from the side of human experience. Christianity has 
traditionally been seen as a religion of revelation in a 
similar way, and in the present discussion the nature of 
revelation becomes cardinal. Hence the stress on incarnation 
in O'Leary and Sallnow. 
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By starting out from a particular understanding of creation, 
and more particularly by means of their discussion of the 
incarnation, O'Leary and Sallnow are able to see revelation 
in terms of human experience, including the experience of 
children. It is not clear whether this might apply to Islam 
or other world religions, and there is not space to examine 
this question here. Theologically the discussion of 
revelation is the heart of their book, and it goes further 
than the writings of most Christian adult educators who 
advocate face-to-face discussion groups. 
Education in the gospel 
Jesus did not leave a syllabus and he did not write any text 
book. In fact he criticised the didactic methods of the 
scribes and Pharisees who in their teaching relied heavily on 
the tradition which they had received and on their own 
authoritative interpretation of the past. In strongest 
contrast to this, we have the model or example of Jesus 
emptying himself in order to take on humanity, to become a 
human being - a baby, a child, an adolescent, an adult, going 
through all the stages of development we have come to 
associate with different levels of formal education. The 
gospels do not tell anything about his schooling and it would 
be quite unreasonable for any Christian teacher to commend 
the methods of teaching used in Jewish schools at the time 
when Jesus was himself a pupil. Such methods would today be 
called indoctrination. In fact the only thing which is 
definitely known about his educational development is seen 
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from the side of the learner and not the syllabus: this is 
the picture of Jesus at the age of twelve asking and 
answering questions with the learned rabbis in the Temple. 
He engaged in dialogue, and this is an aspect of the process 
curriculum. 
5.4 Schematisation applied to R.E. 
The phenomena of religion make religion accessible to us, 
whether we are students, tourists, worshippers or pilgrims. 
It is not unknown for even a casual tourist to be gripped by 
something in a religious building or service of solemn 
worship. This may be only a passing emotion, soon to 
evaporate, or it may lead her or him to a deeper insight into 
the religion so manifested and turn to an incentive for 
further study, perhaps to personal commitment. 
While it is outside the remit of R.E. in state schools to 
lead pupils to personal commitment, the possibility of a real 
insight into religion is a proper aim for those who plan and 
teach R.E. Schematisation, as already explained in Chapter 
Two, section 2.6.2, can be used for this experience in that 
certain phenomena activate an a priori capacity to sense the 
numinous, not in general terms, but a "feel" for the numinous 
in a particular aspect and under particular forms. Thus 
Otto's use of a picture of the Bengali goddess Durga in the 
first edition of DH was intended to give an insight into the 
non-rational within Hindu worship, both the tremendum and the 
fascinans. It is not, of course, a question of cause and 
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effect, but the empathetic reader who already has experience 
of the tremendum and the fascinans may recognise the numinous 
in these aspects as part at least of the character of the 
religion of Bengal and get a grasp of Hindu worship. This is 
a situation of disclosure. 
Schematisation works in several ways but it goes almost 
without saying that there can never be the kind of guarantee 
of success that might be expected from a reasoned and logical 
argument. It is more like music or poetry in the ways it can 
work. The kind of schematisation just outlined corresponds 
more closely to the ideas suggested in Schleiermacher's Reden 
where "vistas are hewn through, before which each person is 
led so that his sense might find the way to the universe" 28 , 
or rather the "Universum" which stands for the divine. 
Schleiermacher is talking of natural phenomena which act as 
triggers for religious experience, much like the many cases 
collected by Sir Alister Hardy's Foundation. Schleiermacher 
continues this passage, "and upon whose sight feelings are 
stimulated that, to be sure, are not immediately religion, 
but that are, if I may say so, a schematism of the same. " 29 
Schleiermacher also includes artistic works which can act as 
stimuli. What is central is the relationship between the 
schema and the thing schematised, and this is where Otto goes 
beyond Schleiermacher to anchor the process in an a priori 
relationship which is both immediate and necessary. The fact 
of its a priori immediacy is in no way reduced if it is only 
discovered after reflection and discussion with others to 
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bring out the relevant features of the phenomena, as might be 
needed by Westerners looking at Durga's image. Discussion 
serves to bring to light the a priori link between the 
manifestation and the numinous that is itself independent of 
the process. 
Obviously images of Durga, like all religious artifacts, are 
man-made. In this respect the essential and a priori 
connection is seen as an expression of numinous experience, 
not perhaps a spontaneous expression because making an image 
takes thought, prayer, skill and a lot of time. The art of 
painting icons for Greek and Russian Orthodox Christians well 
illustrates this and rightly puts emphasis on reflection 
(prayer, study, meditation) as well as on skill and training 
in traditional techniques. 
through" which becomes 
And the result is "a vista hewn 
or at least makes possible 
"transitions into the infinite." 
Otto probably chose Durga's image to lay emphasis on the non-
rational. But, as DH stresses throughout, rational and non-
rational belong together and in developed forms of religion 
completely interpenetrate. Here is a different working of 
schematisation which is quite explicit in Otto, where 
rational discussion leads to insight. The ethical demands of 
religion can disclose the power of the numinous behind and 
within them. Ethics, therefore, cannot stand over against 
God, nor is there a need to explain ethics away in separation 
from the numinous. At all but the most primitive levels of 
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religion, moral precepts either follow from faith commitment 
(Christianity, Judaism) or are presupposed by it (Buddhism). 
Thus the experience of ethics linked to a particular religion 
schematises an aspect of that religion, and perhaps of 
religion in general. This kind of schematisation, to which 
Otto gives more explicit attention in DH, now looks like one 
form of schematisation within the more general, whereby 
phenomena as experienced schematise the numinous. This is 
implicit throughout DH and it would have been clearer if Otto 
had acknowledged his debt to Schleiermacher more explicitly. 
On the other hand it was a common if fairly vague notion 
among the Romantics, so perhaps Otto received it in general 
terms and only sharpened it up in his own way. 
Thus there are three ways in which schematisation applies in 
the practice of R.E. In the first, the phenomena of religion 
must be chosen carefully in order to lead to religious 
insight, as far as it may be possible to plan for this. It 
is not enough to present religious art, rituals and music as 
if that were all there is to it. The beyond, the "overplus 
of meaning" ( DH & IH 5c) must be reckoned with and if 
possible disclosed. 
The second use of schematisation applies to means of 
expressing the numinous. This requires study, discussion and 
examples of what the artist is about in painting an icon, 
composing or playing music whibh expresses some aspect of the 
numinous, the motivation, will and driving force within such 
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people. By extension this could apply also to acts of 
courage and self-sacrifice, but this is to go beyond 
schematisation as here understood, and may be an extension of 
its use. Here also Otto's own models of schematisation in 
terms of the erotic on the one hand and music on the other 
are helpful and offer suggestions for doing this. 
The third use of schematisation concerns the rational and the 
non-rational. It includes the ethical but goes beyond to 
include consideration of all rational and conceptual aspects 
of religion. Seen under the figure of schematisation, 
reasoned consideration of the problem of pain, for example, 
should be expected to disclose some essential aspect of the 
numinous, something about the will and character of the 
divine. Arguments for the existence of God, for instance, 
are often explored at Key Stage 5 (age 16+), and Swinburne 
has produced a shortened version of his well-known 1979 book 
which can be used for this 30 . But arguments using induction 
should at some time make it possible for people to see or 
feel or be grasped by the numinous which is pure a priori. 
If this never happens, we are left with the god of the 
philosophers whose place in the R.E. lesson, however 
instructive, should play no more than an auxiliary role. 
That the rational aspects of religion are essential Otto 
frequently makes plain, for example: 
This permeation of the rational with the non-
rational is to lead, then, to the deepening of 
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our rational conception of God; it must not be 
the means of blurring or diminishing it. For if 
the disregard of the numinous elements tends 
to impoverish religion, it is no less true that 
'holiness', 'sanctity', as Christianity intends 
the words, cannot dispense with the rational, and 
especially the clear ethical elements of meaning 
which Protestantism more particularly emphasizes 
in the idea of God. (IH 109a) 
The action of schematisation in the R.E. lesson may be 
spontaneous. This is obviously the hope of those who have 
devised the exercises gradually becoming more popular in 
Affective R.E; insofar as they have had schematisation in 
mind at all. But more often it needs to be brought out by 
discussion, reflection and creative expression. This is at 
the heart of the R.E. lesson. Here the integration of 
Experiential R.E. with the other two wheels (to use the 
Westhill model) becomes clear. The phenomena of religion 
belong to "TBS" (traditional belief systems): the problem of 
pain to "SHE" (shared human experience). In schematisation 
at least as much as anywhere else in Otto the essential 
wholeness of religion and of the study of religion becomes 
plain. It cannot be said to be a one-sided or unbalanced 
approach. 
Schematisation firmly links the experiential to the factual 
in religion as well as to human experience. These come 
together most obviously in those religious rituals which are 
specific to turning points in human life, birth, death, 
marriage and so on, and in rel~gious stories and scriptures. 
Some of these scriptures are chosen to be read out at the 
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appropriate religious ceremonies. 
A later book by Otto, Gottheit und Gottheiten der Arier 
(GGA) 31 , gives more suggestions about the development of the 
non-rational. Otto draws on Indian religion in the context 
of the development of the human race, but this has relevance 
also for the development of religious awareness in the 
individual. In fact Otto himself relates this process to 
education on more than one occasion, as in a passage already 
referred to where an example given by Socrates suddenly 
awakens understanding in Adeimantos, and he says that he had 
known it all along but did not know that he knew it (IH 137b; 
DH 166b). The parallel with a priori knowledge is clear. 
Otto links this process too to religious education: 
An important function of religious communication 
(Religionskunde) is to search out occasions when 
the numinous feeling breaks through and arises, 
and then to guide the reader by like feelings and 
empathy to understand for himself how they 
achieve their effect. This communication will 
want to be more than stringing together old 
phrases and stories of miracles. (GGA 15c) 
A little earlier (GGA 14c-15a) in a similar passage Otto 
writes of triggering (erregenden) situations and objects and 
gives some examples. This process is already in action in 
religious education and exemplifies the style of 
'schematisation' which uses examples from explicit religion, 
even while they are themselves not fully rational and 
conceptual. But it cannot be all and R.E. needs a clearer 
sense of purpose. 
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The numinous bas is and background cannot be handed down, 
cannot be taught, and must be induced, excited, aroused. How 
this may be done is richly suggested and illustrated in many 
chapters of DH and other writings, through "reverent attitude 
and gesture, in tone of voice and demeanour, expressing its 
momentousness, and in the solemn devotional assembly of a 
congregation at prayer." (DH 79b; IH 60b) Yet even these 
means are only effective insofar as they indicate "an 
object." 
Or they are simply ideograms for the unique 
content of feeling, ideograms to understand which 
a man must already have had the experience 
himself. For the best means are actual 'holy' 
situations or their representation in 
description. If a man does not feel what the 
numinous is, when he reads the sixth chapter of 
Isaiah, then no 'preaching, singing, telling,' in 
Luther's phrase, can avail him. Little of it can 
usually be noticed in theory or dogma, or even in 
exhortation, unless it is actually heard. Indeed 
no element in religion needs so much as this the 
viva vox, transmission by living fellowship and 
the inspiration of personal contact. ( IH 60c-61a; 
DH 79c-80a) 
5.5 Is there progression in religious development? 
Consideration of schematisation and its application in 
practice involves refining crude ideas or presentiments to 
make them more distinct. They are further developed as the 
rational is brought in to schematise the non-rational. 
Inevitably this suggests development, or Entwicklung which is 
a favourite theme in Otto. Development in terms of pupils' 
progress too must be in the minds of religious educators, 
particularly when they have Attainment Targets and Key Stages 
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to work through as required for National Curriculum subjects 
since 1988. 32 
Otto in several places33 suggests a development which, if two 
conditions can be met, could provide a model for religious 
education. These conditions are first that there is a 
pattern of progression, and second that the development can 
be measured against the development or growth in 
understanding of the learners. Parallels with Piaget, 
Goldman and Fowler's Stages of Fai th34 suggest themselves, 
but the points of contact remain controversial. They do, 
however, repay consideration. It is important to note that 
Otto is addressing quite different questions from those of 
developmental psychology, so we may not expect to find direct 
help with the problems Piaget posed. 
In fact Piaget's theory is inimical to Otto. This is because 
Piaget starts from the adult mind, and only considers 
children to have developed as they leave behind the stages of 
egocentricity and animism and approach the rational habits 
(as Piaget understands 'rational') of the educated Western 
adult. Thus from Otto's point of view Piaget falls into the 
error described in the second paragraph of DH (IH 1-2; DH 2), 
and would confine all sensitivity to the numinous to a crude 
and childish level, to be left behind with maturity. 
Schleiermacher's Third Rede pours scorn on the analytic and 
rational approach to education-which was advocated then as it 
is today. Piaget's theory, enormously influential, has been 
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criticised and modified very substantially in recent years 35 • 
Goldman (1984) started from Piaget and looked for evidence to 
establish progressive stages in religious development along 
the same lines. Goldman's adult mind which was to be the 
measure of all childish deficiencies was his own and shows 
the understanding of the 1960s Protestant liberal! Thus it 
too is fundamentally rationalist, although there is a place 
for wonder - e.g. the story of the burning bush (Goldman 
1984) which presupposes the numinous. But Goldman's 
approach to religion is based on understanding and so is 
quite different from Otto's which is founded on experience. 
Any parallels between Goldman and Otto's chapter on the 
interpenetration of rational and non-rational (IH XIII) are 
therefore superficial. Goldman's notion of pre-religious and 
sub-religious phases as discussed in Readiness for Religion 
has perhaps a link with Otto's vestibule for religion 
(Vorhof), but with the basic difference that Otto approaches 
the problem from social-anthropology (Religionsgeschichtliche 
school) and Goldman from developmental psychology in an 
individua1 36 • Even Goldman recognises that "the key may lie 
more in the realm of emotion than intellect" (1965 43c), but 
adds in characteristically Piagetian mode "in the first 
decade of development." 
Piaget and Goldman are addressing a question to which Otto 
appears to give less than two·pages (IH 60-61). 
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- in religion there is very much that can be 
taught - that is handed down in concepts and 
passed on in school instruction. (IH 60b; DH 79b) 
Otto outlines a plan for development in two directions in a 
chapter in DH which is entitled "The Two Processes of 
Development" ( DH Ch. XI I I) . Both are needed in religious 
communication and it is important in today' s climate of 
religious education to see these as separate, although in 
practice links will emerge. 
The first process is the development of awareness of the 
numinous, a refining of the Ahnung or sensus numinis whereby 
the dread of demonic power is elevated to fear of the gods 
and to fear of God in the recognisably religious sense (IH 
109c-110b). This process is concerned with the non-rational 
aspect, although descriptions and comparisons in words, as 
well as non-conceptual forms of expression (art, music) are 
used in the process. 
The other process of development consists in the use of 
reason whereby the basic experience of numinous awareness is 
developed through the unfolding of moral-rational and 
rational aspects (IH llOc). 
Language is important here, but not only for reasoned 
discussion. Evidence noted in Chapter Four makes clear that 
religions and all traditions of mysticism make use of 
technical language, some of it highly symbolic, with which to 
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denote this area of experience, and not to describe it only, 
but also to indicate what the subject may expect or to induce 
appropriate experience. Symbolic language and symbolism of 
all kinds are a fruitful area for learning and for showing 
development in the learners. Clearly development may be 
expected to take place, but the question is whether there are 
identifiable stages of development, similar to those put 
forward by Fowler in his SoF. There are indeed hints of this 
in Otto, not detailed plans. But even these hints are 
relevant for any kind of progression. 
In Chapter XVI (DH Kapitel 18) Otto says that, 
The numinous only unfolds its full content by 
slow degrees, as one by one the series of 
requisite stimuli or incitements becomes 
operative. But where any whole is as yet 
incompletely presented its earlier and partial 
constituent moments or elements, aroused in 
isolation, have naturally something bizarre, 
unintelligible, and even grotesque about them. 
(IH 132b; DH 160b) 
This self-revealing by parts is likened by Otto to seeing 
parts of a whale in the water and different people attempting 
to classify it by its arched back. or its tail, or its 
spouting head, like the Buddhist story of the blind men and 
the elephant. Otto's assumptions (as already mentioned) are 
socio-anthropological, but he is at the same time aware of 
psychological development relating to the feeling of the 
numinous. 
Like all other psychical elements, it emerges in 
due course in the developing life of human mind 
and spirit and is thenceforward simply present. 
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Of course it can only emerge if and when certain 
conditions are fulfilled, conditions involving a 
proper development of the bodily organs and the 
other powers of mental and emotional life in 
general, a due growth in suggestibility and 
spontaneity and responsiveness to external 
impressions and internal experiences. But such 
conditions are no more than conditions; they are 
not its causes or constituent elements. (IH 124b; 
DH 151a) 
Otto has more to say about the provision of stimuli. These 
involve helping to bring what is implicit to explicit 
expression, that is developing the inner content of an 
experience or feeling, most commonly by putting it into 
words. As an illustration Otto gives Jacob at Bethel 
(Genesis 28.17). The first step of expression is, "How 
dreadful is this place!" This is the closest we can get to 
the original feeling. But a further expression follows: 
"This is none other than the house of Elohim." (IH 126c; DH 
153b). In fact there are four steps to consider here: there 
is the primal numinous awe, there is secondly its expression 
in words or gestures, there is also the idea of a numen or 
presence, and fourthly a named power or nomen. Only this 
last makes worship possible as worship is understood in 
religion. Artistic, musical and ritual expressions are also 
possible, and Jacob set up the stone and anointed it. He 
gave the place a name and vowed a vow ( 28. 18-22). An 
apprehension or presentiment (Ahnung) has found expression 
and this seems to be due to Jacob's having reflected on it 
and decided to respond in word and deed, with implications 
for the long-term future. 
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It would be good if Otto's ideas had been worked in to a 
system, but this has not yet been done. August Miehle, who 
applied Otto's basic theme to the experiences of children, 
simply classifies accounts of childhood experiences under the 
headings of mysterium, tremendum, and fascinans. Comparison 
may be made with Fowler's Stages of Faith, although Fowler's 
ideas in religion are a long way from Otto's, but there is 
some correspondence in the matter of progressing from a lower 
stage of Fowler's to a higher. 
The Jacob illustration is instructive and for Jacob its four 
steps must occur in this order But this is just one 
particular pattern. For another person it may be the fourth 
step, the solemnworship, which provides the trigger, and for 
that person the process of clarification might involve taking 
Jacob's steps in reverse order. 
Fowler's pat tern is psychological, that is in terms of 
development of religious understanding in the individual, 
whereas the Jacob example centres on the development of 
religion and religious practice. Both are of concern to the 
religious educator. 
Fowler identifies seven stages in religious development, 
numbered 0 to 6. He believes that his sequence of stages 
makes both ontological and ontogenetic sense, i.e. it 
corresponds to the development of the human race as well as 
to that of the individual. He is intentionally dealing with 
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both knowing and value (SoF 99b-101b), but as integrated 
modes and not reduced ''to some mixture of the two." This 
reads encouragingly like Otto. Further, in seeing 
progression as spiralling rather than linear (SoF 100a), 
Fowler avoids Piaget's assumption that earlier, less-
developed stages are left behind. 
The question at issue for educationists is what are the 
expressions and the stimuli which help this development. For 
Otto these are expressions which either by their novelty or 
by their ritual familiarity prompt reflection, leading in 
turn to new expression of a more developed or clarified form. 
But while he does write in Chapter XV (Kap. 17) of phases or 
stages, the first eight relate to pre-religion (IH 124a) and 
some are alternative rather than consecutive: the other two, 
9 and 10, give us the stimuli and developing expression which 
we have already discussed. Fowler, who sees his stages as 
invariably consecutive, links them (but not rigidly) with 
Levinson's Eras and Erikson's Psychological Stages, and sees 
a life crisis or other factor which disturbs previous 
equilibrium as the necessary stimulus for growth or 
development of faith (SoF 100c-10la). Thus neither Fowler 
nor Otto provides an answer to the questions religious 
educators want to put, and for teachers Fowler even less so 
as half his steps are linked to adult life. 
There are, nonetheless, several things which might lead to a 
developmental programme. "Transition to Stage 1 begins with 
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the convergence of thought and language, opening up the use 
of symbols in speech and ritual play" (SoF 121c). Stage 1 
"is marked by a relative fluidity of thought patterns," and 
transition to the next stage, Stage 2, begins with "the 
child's growing concern to know how things are and to clarify 
for him- or herself the bases of distinctions between what is 
real and what only seems to be." (SoF 133 and 134) The 
strength of this stage, according to Fowler, is the use of 
stories, beliefs and observances to symbolise identity and 
belonging to a community. Stories help too to make sense of 
experience. The crisis comes with a clash or contradiction 
in stories or of stories with experience which should lead to 
reflection on meanings, and this is the stimulus or life 
crisis which develops in Stage 3 ( SoF 149, 150). Fowler 
links it with "the emergence of interpersonal perspective 
taking," and growing social awareness and relationships. 
Against this it must be noted that Fowler has not considered 
those who grow up in a monocultural society, such as strict 
Islam. 
Fowler represents Stage 3, dubbed Synthetic-Conventional 
Faith, as a relatively comfortable stage in which many 
church-, temple- or mosque-goers may remain for the rest of 
their lives. A breakdown in authority patterns, or sudden 
contradictions and changes in valued personnel, officers or 
practices can lead either to nihilistic despair, or 
alternatively to "critical reflection on how one's beliefs 
and values have formed and changed" (SoF 173c). Fowler links 
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this to "leaving home" emotionally or physically, but many of 
today's school pupils are at the threshold of this transition 
and perhaps should be encouraged to cross it. This will lead 
to a questioning and critical outlook, a "defundamentalising" 
which, by encouraging a more reflective outlook, will build 
up more self-confidence, competence, and new communities in 
religion, politics and other directions. Once more the role 
of reflection, so clear in Otto, is decisive. 
Stage 4, dubbed Individuative-Reflective Faith, Fowler 
represents as the most outgoing of them all. It includes 
taking responsibili~y for one's own commitments, lifestyle,· 
beliefs and attitudes (SoF 182a). The life-crisis which 
leads to Stage 5, says Fowler, may grow from images and 
energies of a deeper past, including from childhood, which 
break into the neat patterns of faith. "Life is more complex 
than Stage 4' s logic of clear distinctions and abstract 
concepts" (SoF 183). By recognising depths from the unknown 
- Fowler does not mention the numinous here - the way is open 
for a "second naivet~ (Ricoeur) ." 
before mid-life" (SoF 197-8). 
But this stage is "unusual 
It has its tensions which 
Fowler thinks can only be eased by the Universalising Faith 
of Stage 6 (the last of the seven stages). 
If Fowler is right, then a number of triggers or stimuli are 
suggested which might help people to move on to the next 
level. But if Fowler is also right in stating first that the 
stages invariably occur in this order without any suggestion 
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that some might be rushed through, and second that they are 
linked to growth through adult life, then religious educators 
need to be careful. The two factors which seem to be 
recurrent are first the breaking-in of the disturbing, the 
non-rational and the unknown, and second the need for 
reflection, which presumably benefits from discussion and 
mutual help in reflection and self-expression. 
At this point there is a link between developmental stages in 
R.E. and the discussion of spiritual development in Section 
5. 2 of this Thesis. A clash of values or experiences in 
Fowler corresponds to the sight of human suffering or of 
human wickedness which leads to an upsurge of spiritual 
energy. Earlier, the progression from wonder at nature, to 
artifacts and then to human virtues also suggests a system, 
but there is no reason why this particular order should be 
followed in the spiritual growth of any one person. Nor, as 
with Piaget and to a lesser extent Fowler, are earlier stages 
left behind. Consequently it does not seem feasible at 
present to suggest steps for a scheme or programme in R.E. 
The constant factor, however, which belongs to the 
transitions at every step is the provision of time and 
material for reflection, and the will or the stimulus to 
engage. 
In summary it can be said that there are developmental 
stages, more or less loosely linked to physical and 
intellectual growth. Progress can be helped by sui table 
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stimuli and by help, often in groups such as classes or house 
groups, in expressing one's feelings and thoughts, in 
creative activity and in words, thus clarifying, sharing and 
refining them. These can act as triggers between persons, as 
well as the traditional religious forms. These certainly 
help people to move to a new level, although, given the 
variety of human personalities and the complexity of human 
associations, it would seem rash to suggest stages of 
invariant progression but there may be some statistically 
supported norms, sufficient to be built up into an outline. 
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immature and naive in his religious beliefs" (Goldman 1965, 
40c). 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions to be drawn fall into two groups: those 
about the thought of Otto, and those arising from the 
application of Otto's thought to the practice of R.E. To 
a great extent this study reaffirms what is already well 
known, but three aspects of his work come into a new 
prominence. These are as follows: 
(1) Otto was not always careful in his use of terms and 
this brought him into trouble with some of his critics. 
He was himself aware that because study came easily to him 
he was not always self-disciplined in the precise way that 
philosophers approve. On the other hand, what he had to 
say was of the greatest importance and tended to elude 
precise language, so that in picking up minor 
inconsistencies critics like Feigel appear to strain after 
a gnat and miss a camel. 
(2) The detour to Fries was needless, and adds nothing to 
Otto's thought while again giving leverage for his critics. 
Scholz was the first to point this out, as early as 19101 . 
Because Otto knew that he lacked rigorous precision in his 
expression and no doubt also in his thought, the tidy-
looking system of Fries and his followers, Apelt and De 
Wette, was alluring. But it convinced few, even at the 
publication of KFR, and has misled many who study Otto ever 
since. 
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There is no break between Otto's phenomenology and his 
philosophy in DH, but whether or not there is a serious 
inconsistency between his phenomenology in DH and his 
philosophy in KFR depends on how one interprets his 
treatment of the system of Fries. He sought to adapt what 
Fries had to say about immediate and a priori knowledge of 
the aesthetic to a priori awareness of the numinous. Fries 
was not writing about religion and it is doubtful, from 
Otto's own ambivalent attitude to the link between the holy 
and the sublime, whether such a transfer can be made. 
Otto's philosophical underpinning, however, derives much 
more easily and securely from Kant and Schleiermacher. 
(3) Most important of all and quite new is the discovery 
that Otto's use of the term schematisation has been 
misinterpreted when confined to narrow Kantian limits.· It 
should be seen as an active relationship between the 
accessible, whether rational or empirical, and the basic 
non-rational power of which we can at first be no more than 
dimly aware. Acknowledging that Otto himself referred his 
use of schematisation to Kant, it is necessary to 
appreciate that his use is in fact quite different and 
derives in important ways from Schleiermacher and the use 
he made of this term. Schematisation has practical 
application. His use of schematisation and of the ideogram 
is implicit in almost everything he wrote, in fact wherever 
he treats of the relationships between the rational and the 
non-rational or between the numinous and the phenomena that 
Chapter Six 309 
disclose the numinous. So this is quite fundamental. 
The conclusions for R.E. derive directly from this. The 
discovery that schematisation opens the way to disclose if 
not the essence of religion then at least the "feel" of the 
essence of a particular religion comes at the present time 
when those engaged in R.E. in Britain are trying out 
experiential and pupil-centred methods. This discovery is 
not fortuitous. 
Otto's personal commitment as a Christian theologian comes 
through, from the testimonium spiritus sancti internum in 
AHG, to his writing on ethics, the sense of the numinous 
informing all his work. At the same time he did not claim 
an absolute monopoly for Christianity, but for reasons 
explicitly based on the interweaving of rational and non-
rational, but implicitly perhaps on his own pietistic 
upbringing, he maintained the superiority of Christianity. 
Otto presupposes a human disposition, or predisposition in 
the Anlage des Gemtites, the capacity to become aware of the 
numinous. This is the meeting place where one finds a feel 
for the essence of religion, and it acts as a guarantee 
enabling one to distinguish a true manifestation from a 
false one. Conversely, the manifestations of religion can 
act as triggers to stimulate understanding and disclose the 
capacity in the mind and spirit (Geist) which apprehends 
the religious or numinous, purely a priori in the depth of 
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the soul (the Seelengrund). 
relationship. 
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So there is a reciprocal 
It is precisely at this point that Otto's own "feel" for 
religion, not only for religion in general but for the 
centre of particular religions, comes into play, as his 
one-time pupil Joachim Wach aptly observed2. Otto would 
wish and expect that everyone who is at all religiously 
educated should be able to develop this "feel" or sense for 
the essence of religion. Such a sense is entirely 
consistent with Kant's notion of a pre-philosophical sense 
of right and wrong which so far from being misleading is 
actually developed by philosophical argument and made 
precise. 
How to develop this sense is made easier by a better 
understanding of schematisation. As already noted, the 
term must be freed from its strict Kantian bonds, and the 
pattern suggested by Schleiermacher will be found much more 
illuminating. It supports the interplay of religious 
phenomena with essential feeling in exactly the way a 
reading of Otto requires. This interrelation suggests a 
programme for R.E., in that the essence of religion is 
discovered through appropriate phenomena. Yet this method 
does not presuppose or demand adherence to any particular 
faith, as Otto himself recognised. R.E. teachers should 
come to see this as an essential part of their teaching and 
plan accordingly. 
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As has been explained in Chapter Five, there are three 
possibilities here. In the first, the phenomena of 
religion may be the stimuli for participants to discover 
the essence of religion (or of a particular religion) for 
themselves, rather as aspects of the image of Durga evoke 
feelings for the tremendum and the fascinans. Discussion 
or other developmental work clarifies this and helps to 
make people more sensitive to religion in its essence and 
its manifestations. Of course there can be no guarantee 
that this will happen, and the thoughtful teacher must try 
various approaches, depending on the ability and 
experiences of the pupils. To some extent this is the case 
in all subjects. 
The second use is directly related to the first but starts 
from the opposite end because it centres on working out or 
devising ways of expressing the numinous, or of studying 
ways this is traditionally done, like the painting of 
icons. In both uses what is essential is the hidden ~ 
priori link between schema and the thing schematised. 
The third use of schematisation directly concerns the 
application of the rational to bring out the non-rational. 
Thus ethics in a religious context ought to make one aware 
of the numinous, and reasoned discussion of the problem of 
pain should make it possible for the numinous to be felt, 
albeit in ways less dramatic that the experience of Job. 
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Schematisation, however, does not apply in every aspect of 
R.E. Even in the teaching of World Religions there is much 
which does not really relate to Otto's work at all. One 
may start a project by making use of religious artifacts, 
like the collection in the Religionskundliche Sammlung at 
Marburg. To this must be added the phenomena of living 
religions which are on hand in the environing communities 
through festival, music, dress, dance and so on. These 
excite interest and encourage people to consider the study 
of religion as a worthwhile activity. The teacher should 
not forget, however, that these can and at some stage 
should provide genuine religious insights, but may be 
brought in at first merely to arouse interest. 
Otto's work really assumes importance when the learners 
start to engage as participants. It means that learners 
must expect to empathise with and gain insight into 
religious experience (taking 'religious' in the broad sense 
of transcendent or spiritual within the meaning of the 1988 
Education Act). Such experience in a secular or not 
explicitly r~ligious context opens the way also to empathy 
with explicitly religious experience, and indeed a reading 
of Laski and Maslow would suggest that it is not always 
easy to tell the difference3. 
Empathy is helped by using certain techniques to engage the 
attention and the affective side. This is the contribution 
of the exercises in stillness, listening to music, silence 
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and meditation which are becoming more widespread in the 
1990s with the increasing interest in Affective R.E. And 
this spread of interest reaches well beyond schools and 
beyond traditional religious bodies. Exercises in a group 
should be followed by reflection and discussion. The 
readiness to reflect is attested in Otto's personal life 
and in his seminars, writings and personal contacts. With 
this pattern of practice progress can be seen in a number 
of ways. Reflection and discussion must lead to 
clarification, clarification both of concepts and of the 
experiences themselves. The immediate reaction leads to 
a more considered response which in turn helps to formulate 
and provide a comparative assessment of the experiences and 
responses of other people, some of which may be of a 
clearly liturgical or symbolic kind. 
Such a method of study leads to an understanding of the 
phenomena themselves and additionally of the way they may 
act as triggers to further experience. Although most 
people have claimed that a transcendent experience is in 
the last resort a spontaneous one, it is obviously possible 
to prepare oneself or put oneself in the way of such a 
spontaneous encounter, and much religious liturgy, music 
and art has this very effect. 
Arising from reflection and shared discussion participants 
should become aware, thr-ough the phenomena, of a 
transcendent reality which is "bigger than all of us." 
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Here we get close to the heart of Otto's work. While for 
some the numen becomes a nomen and religious people tend 
to call the transcendent reality "God," it is clear from 
Otto's DH that it is not necessary and often not helpful 
to do so. Care must be taken when dealing with a religious 
factor of such magnitude within a secular context. At this 
point it is possible to get a grasp, however indistinctly, 
thanks to the a priori basis of numinous intuition, of a 
"something" which is made known through the phenomena of 
experience. By applying the principle of schematisation 
it is possible with Otto to characterise aspects of this 
experiential reality. 
Steps beyond this must be the prerogative of the churches 
or explicitly religious bodies. There is a kind of 
threshold which religious education in the context of the 
state ought not to cross, although to indicate what lies 
beyond is perfectly legitimate. Indeed it is scarcely 
possible to study traditional religions without doing so. 
But it cannot be the business of the state school to try 
to push pupils over the border. On the other hand 
religious communities need to discover what is going on in 
religious education, campaign if it is inadequate while 
scrupulously observing the distinction between educating 
and proselytising, and then build consciously on the work 
which has been done in the state sector. Obviously any 
Christian family or community (and the same applies to 
other religions) who care about the upbringing of their 
Chapter Six 315 
young will ensure that appropriate Christian (etc.) 
foundations are laid within the home environment. This is 
their duty and their privilege and should in no case be 
expected of the state education service. 
Otto knew well that there were other aspects to 
communicating religion. There is much that can be studied, 
demonstrated, put into words and concepts, and taught like 
any other area of studi. In DH, however, he wanted to 
focus attention on an aspect of religion which has been 
neglected in R.E. both in church catechism and in school. 
This is the area of personal response, which is only since 
the mid-1980s beginning to receive proper recognition in 
British R.E. 
In our earlier discussion of R. E. use was made of the 
"three wheel" pattern of the Westhill project5. On this 
basis the contribution of Otto's approach and Otto's use 
of resources must be seen principally but not only within 
the area of personal response. For Otto's work also 
includes the other two areas, both the vast field of 
traditional religions in its various dimensions6, and the 
third area, the field of shared human experience. In fact 
the application of schematisation to the practice of R.E. 
shows how they interrelate. 
Otto's development of schematisation shows how to apply the 
phenomena of religions, and use them to reveal the numinous 
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at the meeting place in the human soul. It is only by 
applying schematisation that it is possible to relate the 
phenomena to the essence of religion. Otto certainly wrote 
with conviction and with energy. Perhaps in the end 
Poland7 is right to assert that in writing DH his purpose 
was not so much to analyse a religious phenomenon as to 
bring it about in the reader. 
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1. Heinrich Scholz "Philosophie. Referate." (review of KFR) in 
Deutsche Literaturzeitung 1910, cols. 529-532 
2. So also J W Hauer, see Hauer 1929, col.722 
3. This is perhaps a good instance where research into religious 
experience over the last eighty years has moved on and is now 
somewhat closer to Schleiermacher's understanding than to that 
of Otto who wanted to draw a line between religious and non-
religious. His problems over the presumed divide between 
religious and aesthetic show that even he was not entirely 
successful. Today the chances for total success in this 
distinction are even smaller. 
4. This is explicit in DH 79, IH 60. 
5. Garth Read, John Rudge, Roger B. Howarth, How Do I Teach R E? 
the Westhill project R. E. 5-16, Mary Glasgow Publications, 1986 
6. Smart analysed six dimensions for study in his The Religious 
Experience of Mankind, pp. 15-25 
7. Lynn Poland "The Idea of the Holy and the History of the 
Sublime" in The Journal of Religion, vol. 72, No. 2, April 1992, 
pp.175-197. This assertion is on page 175. 
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